# Neg – K Affs – BFHR

K aff case neg vs new K lab files + supplements to FW, Baudrillard, Ballot PIK, and Deleuze K

## FW

### 1NC SSD

#### SSD straight turns aff offense and doesn’t require commitment to a certain ideological position.

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[TITLE CAPTION]: Choosing to ignore the side of the argument you don't agree with only weakens your own.

It Can Strengthen Your Argument

Or it may lead you to modifying your argument some, either because you've realized you weren't expressing something clearly enough, or you weren't aware of all the facts. The danger of reading extremely biased articles, or listening to a biased speaker, is the chance of being fed misinformation. Unfortunately, not everyone is honorable enough to not use whatever mischievous tactic they can to get others to follow them.

Furthermore, if this did happen and you went on to cite their misinformation to support your own argument, it would lessen your credibility as well as reassert the unreliability of theirs. This is only if the source isn't trying to address both sides themselves. They, as well as you, don't need to agree with both sides or remain objective in their stance on the matter, but cherry-picking things that only work to strengthen your side of the argument can actually hurt it.

However, if you read rebuttals, or listen to people who have just as much stock in their oppositional argument that you have in yours, you can gain new perspective. You can see where the opposition is coming from and modify it to strengthen your own argument in a way that can better address your points.

Once you take the time to assess the points of people who think differently than you, if you decide afterwards that you're still satisfied with your argument as it is, the information is still useful. An instance could occur where someone tries to criticize you for not knowing what you're talking about, and if they do, then you'll be able to say that you have actually read up on both sides of the argument and/or other resources, and therefore do know what you're talking about. Depending on the person, they may not care much, but forcing yourself to still pay attention to that information does matter.

### Enclave Deliberation Bad

#### Studies demonstrate casual evidence between the AFF’s model and violence. If anything, these studies understate the effect.

Steffen Selmer Andersen 7-7-2022. Researcher at the Department of Political Science, focusing on radicalization, terrorism, causes for political violence, legitimacy, misogyny and public policy. "Accepting Violence? A Laboratory Experiment of the Violent Consequences of Deliberation in Politically Aggrieved Enclaves". Terrorism and Political Violence. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2022.2076600. DL

In the introduction, I raised the question whether enclave deliberation might break down barriers that typically prevent politically aggrieved people from accepting the use of violence as a means to meet their ends. Unfortunately, this study indicates that we can answer this primary question in a confirmatory way. Enclave deliberation among aggrieved citizens seems to enhance the acceptance of violence in general and as a specific response to aggrieving policies. Additionally, I reproduced the finding that enclave deliberation causally enhances existing political attitudes and decreases enclave members’ diversity in opinions. This result was strengthened with a DD-analysis aimed at investigating the causality of this argument.

Before discussing the implications of this study, I address a few important questions regarding generalizability and ecological validity. Most experimental studies, especially conducted in the laboratory, are met with two questions: (1) What can we infer from an experiment where participants were mostly students when the study population is relatively different, and (2) can we trust the results outside the laboratory?

Addressing the latter question first, I acknowledge that only few experiments, this included, succeed in grasping the complexity of real-world situations. However, less might also be sufficient, and I argue that the ‘artificiality’ of this particular laboratory experiment should strengthen our belief in the results rather than weaken it. First, in real life, politically aggrieved citizens tend to segregate into enclaves because of their similarities in, for example, opinions, whereas participants in this study had to undergo a two-stage priming method to simulate such a scenario. Others studies72 indicate that the group polarization effect is even stronger when participants know they are grouped with like-minded strangers. Here, participants did not have this information. Second, enclave members tend to already have close affectionate bonds or form them through joint activities such as group discussions,73 where participants were grouped with strangers. Lastly, outside the laboratory, politically aggrieved enclaves do not only deliberate once.74 Rather, they tend to meet up numerous times (offline and online) before “taking action”—exemplified in the storming of the U.S. Capitol.75 Therefore, if this study was to simulate “real-world” deliberation in aggrieved enclaves, participants should have had strongly felt political grievances, relatively strong affectional ties with other participants, and partaken in several enclave discussions before measuring their acceptance of violence. Had it been practically and ethically feasible to “intensify” these circumstances, we would, however, from a theoretical perspective, only expect participants’ acceptance of violence to increase rather than decrease. As such, the causal evidence provided by this study should not be seen in light of but despite of the way the experiment was designed.

Returning to the related question concerning generalizability, it is twofold: (1) What do we learn about politically aggrieved enclaves from a laboratory experiment conducted on a student-heavy sample, and (2) what knowledge do we gain from a study of only “lefties?” First, the fact that most participants were students should not bode concern. Recall that this particular student sample consisted of mostly highly educated people exclusively from a well-established democracy where violence is luckily still seldom. Moreover, they indicated high institutional trust, agreeableness, and imagination and low self-uncertainty and neuroticism. These are all characteristics which typically do not correspond with the acceptance of violence.76 Therefore, the utilized sample should be seen as a least-likely case based on our prior knowledge of what predicts the acceptance of violence. In this light, the results are conservative estimates of this relation in “real-world” politically aggrieved enclaves.

Second, what can we learn from only studying left-leaning participants on two policy areas? Obviously, this is a key limitation of this study as I cannot report empirical evidence suggesting that enclave deliberation increases the acceptance of violence among politically aggrieved right-leaning enclaves. However, the group polarization effect has been documented both among Republicans and Democrats on various policy areas,77 and numerous studies reveal that mechanisms such as group fusion do not discriminate between jihadist,78 right-wing79 or left-wing ideologies.80 Consequently, I expect that these mechanisms might kick in regardless of political ideology and political topics and increase the acceptance of violence across the board. Still, it is an interesting gap in our knowledge that calls for further investigation.

Another way forward is by testing the importance of and potential interplay between the suggested theoretical mechanisms that link enclave deliberation with the acceptance of violence. From the radicalization literature, the mere amplification of existing political grievances in itself is argued to lead to a discussion of “what to do about it” where violence for some could be a viable solution. Within social identity theory, mechanisms such as specific identity types and the strength of them are suggested to be at play. However, the jury is still out in terms of determining which of these mechanisms matter the most. Do they interplay, and if so, how? Perhaps a third strain of literature might provide a new set of applicable mechanisms? Future studies aiming at shedding light on the mechanisms underlying the relationship between enclave deliberation and the acceptance of violence should be welcomed.

This study has several implications. First, it provides empirical backing to the hypothesis claiming that enclave deliberation increases the acceptance of violence, which is often implied but seldom tested directly in radicalization research. Until now, we have primarily seen case studies address this potential causal relationship and this study was designed to contribute and supplement these studies with tight experimental control of an independent variable receiving increased public and academic interest. Second, these results provided another test of the group polarization mechanism specifically in a political context similar to the study by Schkade et al.81 As shown, the hypothesis gained strong support even after conducting a DD analysis that more directly tests the causality of the thesis. Thereby, we have further evidence from outside the US indicating that when like-minded individuals deliberate, they, on average, tend to have amplified political attitudes relative to before deliberating. Third, these results imply that enclave deliberation not only amplifies existing political attitudes but also has the potential to increase enclave members’ acceptance of violence. Lastly, although the aim was to test the theoretical arguments in a face-to-face setting, the results might travel to parts of the online sphere. In this experiment, participants were filtered into likeminded groups and feed information intended to conflict with their opinion. This dynamic resembles to some degree how social media algorithms function, as users a filtered based on their own preferences and those of their network. However, this point would need further empirical investigation.

The results presented in this article suggest that there is a causal link between enclave deliberation and the acceptance of violence. Now, we need to investigate further why they are causally linked. Lastly, this article might provide practitioners working with preventive work and policymakers with a clearer idea of when and how to intervene in politically aggrieved enclaves. Specifically, by de-segregating politically aggrieved enclaves, we might avoid them enhancing their acceptance of violence. A measure such as active moderation might be effective in this regard, especially online. However, it is a difficult path to tread as potential interventionists have to balance considerations of public security with citizens’ civil liberties.

### AT: Surrender to Blackness

#### Deference epistemologies are worse for community formation, reify trauma, and actively strengthen hegemonic structures by marginalizing the people who were never here to defer to in the first place.

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4, dml)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do o0r do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail. The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces. Some rooms have outsize power and influence: the Situation Room, the newsroom, the bargaining table, the conference room. Being in these rooms means being in a position to affect institutions and broader social dynamics by way of deciding what one is to say and do. Access to these rooms is itself a kind of social advantage, and one often gained through some prior social advantage. From a societal standpoint, the “most affected” by the social injustices we associate with politically important identities like gender, class, race, and nationality are disproportionately likely to be incarcerated, underemployed, or part of the 44 percent of the world’s population without internet access – and thus both left out of the rooms of power and largely ignored by the people in the rooms of power. Individuals who make it past the various social selection pressures that filter out those social identities associated with these negative outcomes are most likely to be in the room. That is, they are most likely to be in the room precisely because of ways in which they are systematically different from (and thus potentially unrepresentative of) the very people they are then asked to represent in the room. I suspected that Helen’s offer was a trap. She was not the one who set it, but it threatened to ensnare us both all the same. Broader cultural norms – the sort set in motion by prefacing statements with “As a Black man…” – cued up a set of standpoint-respecting practices that many of us know consciously or unconsciously by rote. However, the forms of deference that often follow are ultimately self-undermining and only reliably serve “elite capture”: the control over political agendas and resources by a group’s most advantaged people. If we want to use standpoint epistemology to challenge unjust power arrangements, it’s hard to imagine how we could do worse. To say what’s wrong with the popular, deferential applications of standpoint epistemology, we need to understand what makes it popular. A number of cynical answers present themselves: some (especially the more socially advantaged) don’t genuinely want social change – they just want the appearance of it. Alternatively, deference to figures from oppressed communities is a performance that sanitizes, apologizes for, or simply distracts from the fact that the deferrer has enough “in the room” privilege for their “lifting up” of a perspective to be of consequence. I suspect there is some truth to these views, but I am unsatisfied. Many of the people who support and enact these deferential norms are rather like Helen: motivated by the right reasons, but trusting people they share such rooms with to help them find the proper practical expression of their joint moral commitments. We don’t need to attribute bad faith to all or even most of those who interpret standpoint epistemology deferentially to explain the phenomenon, and it’s not even clear it would help. Bad “roommates” aren’t the problem for the same reason that Helen being a good roommate wasn’t the solution: the problem emerges from how the rooms themselves are constructed and managed. To return to the initial example with Helen, the issue wasn’t merely that I hadn’t grown up in the kind of low-income, redlined community she was imagining. The epistemic situation was much worse than this. Many of the facts about me that made my life chances different from those of the people she was imagining were the very same facts that made me likely to be offered things on their behalf. If I had grown up in such a community, we probably wouldn’t have been on the phone together. Many aspects of our social system serve as filtering mechanisms, determining which interactions happen and between whom, and thus which social patterns people are in a position to observe. For the majority of the 20th century, the U.S. quota system of immigration made legal immigration with a path to citizenship almost exclusively available to Europeans (earning Hitler’s regard as the obvious “leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration”). But the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act opened up immigration possibilities, with a preference for “skilled labour”. My parents’ qualification as skilled labourers does much to explain their entry into the country and the subsequent class advantages and monetary resources (such as wealth) that I was born into. We are not atypical: the Nigerian-American population is one of the country’s most successful immigrant populations (what no one mentions, of course, is that the 112,000 or so Nigerian-Americans with advanced degrees is utterly dwarfed by the 82 million Nigerians who live on less than a dollar a day, or how the former fact intersects with the latter). The selectivity of immigration law helps explain the rates of educational attainment of the Nigerian diasporic community that raised me, which in turn helps explain my entry into the exclusive Advanced Placement and Honours classes in high school, which in turn helps explain my access to higher education...and so on, and so on. It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes. ​But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted. But these are the last facts we should want to hold fixed. Doing better than the epistemic norms we’ve inherited from a history of explicit global apartheid is an awfully low bar to set. The facts that explain who ends up in which room shape our world much more powerfully than the squabbles for comparative prestige between people who have already made it into the rooms. And when the conversation is about social justice, the mechanisms of the social system that determine who gets into which room often just are the parts of society we aim to address. For example, the fact that incarcerated people cannot participate in academic discussions about freedom that physically take place on campus is intimately related to the fact that they are locked in cages. Deference epistemology marks itself as a solution to an epistemic and political problem. But not only does it fail to solve these problems, it adds new ones. One might think questions of justice ought to be primarily concerned with fixing disparities around health care, working conditions, and basic material and interpersonal security. Yet conversations about justice have come to be shaped by people who have ever more specific practical advice about fixing the distribution of attention and conversational power. Deference practices that serve attention-focused campaigns (e.g. we’ve read too many white men, let’s now read some people of colour) can fail on their own highly questionable terms: attention to spokespeople from marginalized groups could, for example, direct attention away from the need to change the social system that marginalizes them. Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy. Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside. But probably not. A fuller and fairer assessment of what is going on with deference and standpoint epistemology would go beyond technical argument, and contend with the emotional appeals of this strategy of deference. Those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in. After all, a person privileged in an absolute sense (a person belonging to, say, the half of the world that has secure access to “basic needs”) may nevertheless feel themselves to be consistently on the low end of the power dynamics they actually experience. Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect. The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology – its recognition of the importance of perspective – becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents “centring” or even hearing from the most marginalized; it focuses us on the interaction of the rooms we occupy, rather than calling us to account for the interactions we don’t experience. This fact about who is in the room, combined with the fact that speaking for others generates its own set of important problems (particularly when they are not there to advocate for themselves), eliminates pressures that might otherwise trouble the centrality of our own suffering – and of the suffering of the marginalized people that do happen to make it into rooms with us. The dangers with this feature of deference politics are grave, as are the risks for those outside of the most powerful rooms. For those who are deferred to, it can supercharge group-undermining norms. In Conflict is Not Abuse, Sarah Schulman makes a provocative observation about the psychological effects of both trauma and felt superiority: while these often come about for different reasons and have very different moral statuses, they result in similar behavioural patterns. Chief among these are misrepresenting the stakes of conflict (often by overstating harm) or representing others’ independence as a hostile threat (such as failures to “centre” the right topics or people). These behaviours, whatever their causal history, have corrosive effects on individuals who perform them as well as the groups around them, especially when a community’s norms magnify or multiply these behaviours rather than constraining or metabolizing them. For those who defer, the habit can supercharge moral cowardice. The norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility: it displaces onto individual heroes, a hero class, or a mythicized past the work that is ours to do now in the present. Their perspective may be clearer on this or that specific matter, but their overall point of view isn’t any less particular or constrained by history than ours. More importantly, deference places the accountability that is all of ours to bear onto select people – and, more often than not, a hyper-sanitized and thoroughly fictional caricature of them. The same tactics of deference that insulate us from criticism also insulate us from connection and transformation. They prevent us from engaging empathetically and authentically with the struggles of other people – prerequisites of coalitional politics. As identities become more and more fine-grained and disagreements sharper, we come to realize that “coalitional politics” (understood as struggle across difference) is, simply, politics. Thus, the deferential orientation, like that fragmentation of political collectivity it enables, is ultimately anti-political. Deference rather than interdependence may soothe short-term psychological wounds. But it does so at a steep cost: it can undermine the epistemic goals that motivate the project, and it entrenches a politics unbefitting of anyone fighting for freedom rather than for privilege, for collective liberation rather than mere parochial advantage. How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have. The water crisis in Flint, Michigan presents a clear example of both the possibilities and limitations of refining our epistemic politics in this way. Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), a government body tasked with the support of “healthy communities”, with a team of fifty trained scientists at its disposal, was complicit in covering up the scale and gravity of the public health crisis from the beginning of the crisis in 2014 until it garnered national attention in 2015. The MDEQ, speaking from a position of epistemic and political authority, defended the status quo in Flint. They claimed that “Flint water is safe to drink”, and were cited in Flint Mayor Dayne Walling’s statement aiming to “dispel myths and promote the truth about the Flint River” during the April 2014 transition to the Flint River water source. That transition was spearheaded under the tenure of the city’s emergency manager Darnell Earley (an African-American, like many of the city residents he helped to poison). After the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) circulated a leaked internal memo from the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in July of 2014 expressing concern about lead in Flint water, the MDEQ produced a doctored report that put the overall measure of lead levels within federally mandated levels by mysteriously failing to count two contaminated samples. The reaction from residents was immediate. The month after the switch in water source, residents reported that their tap water was discoloured and gave off an alarming odour. They didn’t need their oppression to be “celebrated”, “centred”, or narrated in the newest academic parlance. They didn’t need someone to understand what it felt like to be poisoned. What they needed was the lead out of their water. So they got to work. The first step was to develop epistemic authority. To achieve this they built a new room: one that put Flint residents and activists in active collaboration with scientists who had the laboratories that could run the relevant tests and prove the MDEQ’s report to be fraudulent. Flint residents’ outcry recruited scientists to their cause and led a “citizen science” campaign, further raising the alarm about the water quality and distributing sample kits to neighbours to submit for testing. In this stage, the alliance of residents and scientists won, and the poisoning of the children of Flint emerged as a national scandal. But this was not enough. The second step – cleaning the water – required more than state acknowledgement: it required apportioning labour and resources to fix the water and address the continuing health concerns. What Flint residents received, initially, was a mix of platitudes and mockery from the ruling elite (some of this personally committed by a President that shared a racial identity with many of them). This year, however, it looks as though the tireless activism of Flint residents and their expanding list of teammates has won additional and more meaningful victories: the ongoing campaign is pushing the replacements of the problematic service lines to their final stage and is forcing the state of Michigan to agree to a settlement of $600 million for affected families. This outcome is in no way a wholesale victory: not only will attorney fees cut a substantial portion of payouts, but the settlement cannot undo the damage that was caused to the residents. A constructive epistemology cannot guarantee full victory over an oppressive system by itself. No epistemic orientation can by itself undo the various power asymmetries between the people and the imperial state system. But it can help make the game a little more competitive – and deference epistemology isn’t even playing. The biggest threats to social justice attention and informational economies are not the absence of yet more jargon to describe, ever more precisely or incisively, the epistemic, attentional, or interpersonal afflictions of the disempowered. The biggest threats are the erosion of the practical and material bases for popular power over knowledge production and distribution, particularly that which could aid effective political action and constrain or eliminate predation by elites. The capture and corruption of these bases by well-positioned elites, especially tech corporations, goes on unabated and largely unchallenged, including: the corporate monopolization of local news, the ongoing destruction and looting of the journalistic profession, the interference of corporations and governments in key democratic processes, and the domination of elite interests in the production of knowledge by research universities and the circulation of the output of these distorted processes by established media organizations. Confronting these threats requires leaving some rooms – and building new ones. The constructive approach to standpoint epistemology is demanding. It asks that we swim upstream: to be accountable and responsive to people who aren’t yet in the room, to build the kinds of rooms we could sit in together, rather than merely judiciously navigating the rooms history has built for us. But this weighty demand is par for the course when it comes to the politics of knowledge: the American philosopher Sandra Harding famously pointed out that standpoint epistemology, properly understood, demands more rigour from science and knowledge production processes generally, not less. But one important topic stands unaddressed. The deferential approach to standpoint epistemology often comes packaged with concern and attention to the importance of lived experience. Among these, traumatic experiences are especially foregrounded. At this juncture, scholarly analysis and argument fail me. The remainder of what I have to say skews more towards conviction than contention. But the life of books has taught me that conviction has just as much to teach, however differently posed or processed, and so I press on. I take concerns about trauma especially seriously. I grew up in the United States, a nation structured by settler colonialism, racial slavery, and their aftermath, with enough collective and historical trauma to go round. I also grew up in a Nigerian diasporic community, populated by many who had genocide in living memory. At the national and community level, I have seen a lot of traits of norms, personality, quirks of habit and action that I’ve suspected were downstream of these facts. At the level of individual experience, I’ve watched and felt myself change in reaction to fearing for my dignity or life, to crushing pain and humiliation. I reflect on these traumatic moments often, and very seldom think: “That was educational”. These experiences can be, if we are very fortunate, building blocks. What comes of them depends on how the blocks are put together: what standpoint epistemologists call the “achievement thesis”. Briana Toole clarifies that, by itself, one’s social location only puts a person in a position to know. “Epistemic privilege” or advantage is achieved only through deliberate, concerted struggle from that position. I concede outright that this is certainly one possible result of the experience of oppression: have no doubt that humiliation, deprivation, and suffering can build (especially in the context of the deliberate, structured effort of “consciousness raising”, as Toole specifically highlights). But these same experiences can also destroy, and if I had to bet on which effect would win most often, it would be the latter. As Agnes Callard rightly notes, trauma (and even the righteous, well-deserved anger that often accompanies it) can corrupt as readily as it can ennoble. Perhaps more so. Contra the old expression, pain – whether borne of oppression or not – is a poor teacher. Suffering is partial, short-sighted, and self-absorbed. We shouldn’t have a politics that expects different: oppression is not a prep school. When it comes down to it, the thing I believe most deeply about deference epistemology is that it asks something of trauma that it cannot give. Demanding as the constructive approach may be, the deferential approach is far more demanding and in a far more unfair way: it asks the traumatized to shoulder burdens alone that we ought to share collectively. When I think about my trauma, I don’t think about grand lessons. I think about the quiet nobility of survival. The very fact that those chapters weren’t the final ones of my story is powerful enough writing all on its own. It is enough to ask of those experiences that I am still here to remember them. Deference epistemology asks us to be less than we are – and not even for our own benefit. As Nick Estes explains in the context of Indigenous politics: “The cunning of trauma politics is that it turns actual people and struggles, whether racial or Indigenous citizenship and belonging, into matters of injury. It defines an entire people mostly on their trauma and not by their aspirations or sheer humanity”. This performance is not for the benefit of Indigenous people, but “for white audiences or institutions of power”. I also think about James Baldwin’s realization that the things that tormented him the most were “the very things that connected me with all the people who were alive, who had ever been alive”. That I have survived abuse of various kinds, have faced near-death from both accidental circumstance and violence (different as the particulars of these may be from those around me) is not a card to play in gamified social interaction or a weapon to wield in battles over prestige. It is not what gives me a special right to speak, to evaluate, or to decide for a group. It is a concrete, experiential manifestation of the vulnerability that connects me to most of the people on this Earth. It comes between me and other people not as a wall, but as a bridge.

### Link – AT: Reform

#### Even if we are wrong – don’t let ontology filter the link debate – reform can be good

Wilderson 16 (Frank B. Wilderson 16, it's Wilderson, "'The Inside-Outside of Civil Society': An Interview with Frank B. Wilderson, III", [https://www.academia.edu/26032053/\_The\_Inside-Outside\_of\_Civil\_Society\_An\_Interview\_with\_Frank\_B.\_Wilderson\_III)//Xain//recut-gene](https://www.academia.edu/26032053/_The_Inside-Outside_of_Civil_Society_An_Interview_with_Frank_B._Wilderson_III)/Xain/recut-gene))

So that’s a hurdle that we have to overcome. You know, I’ve been doing political education workshops for Black Lives Matter in New York and Los Angeles, and probably will do more in Chicago. And what I hope to have people do workshop exercises around is this concept that I have called “Two Trains Running (Side by Side).” By that I mean, you can do your political organizing that will help us get relief from police brutality right now. We need that. We need that. But that work that we do should be seen as puny in terms of its philosophical and theoretical orientation so that we can educate ourselves politically to be against the police as an institution and against the United States as a country, even while we are working to reform police practices, because we do not have the strength right now that we had in the 1960s and 1970s to act in the way the Black Liberation Army did, or BaaderMeinhof, we do not have the strength to act in the revolutionary mode, but that lack of strength, that lack of capacity, should not contaminate our orientation. We should not feel that we have to accept the existence of police even if we’re working in reformist measures politically. Hopefully this idea of two trains running will pick up. Black Lives Matter has done a great job in opening up a new Black political organizing space. That’s great. Now let’s use that space for an educational project that is soundly anti-American, and soundly anti-police even if tactically, we have to work for police reforms

### Ontology – Progress is Possible

#### [ ] Multiple examples of progress --

#### [a] Historically, the VRA and Loving v. Virginia all improved black people’s rights. Inserted studies for each.

VRA improved accesss to voting for black people

Insert study

Mendible 19 (Myra Mendible is a Professor of Language and Literature at Florida Gulf Coast University), 2019, "Cultural disenfranchisement and the Politics of Stigma," Florida Gulf Coast University, Ethnic Studies Review, Volume 42, Number 1, pp. 7–24)//eli

When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6,1965, he called it a “triumph for freedom as huge as any victory that’s ever been won on any battlefield.” 1 The act outlawed discriminatory practices that prevented African Americans from exercising their right to vote under the 15th Amendment, abolishing literacy tests and poll taxes and giving the federal government the power to take over voter registration “wherever, by clear and objective standards, States and counties are using regulations, or laws, or tests to deny the right to vote.” Passage of the Voting Rights Act had a significant widespread impact: in Mississippi alone, voter turnout among African Americans rose from 6 percent in 1964 to 59 percent in 1969. Later amended to include protection of voting rights for non-English speaking American citizens, the Voting Rights Act would also represent an important breakthrough for Latinos, particularly Mexican Americans—many with roots in the United States dating back centuries. 2 In the decades since the passage of the act, Black and Latino voting power has increased dramatically, potentially reshaping the nation’s political landscape. 3 For example, Black and Latino voters are largely credited with putting Barack Obama in the White House for two terms. For the first time in history, African Americans voted at a higher rate than Whites in 2012; while in 2016, Latino voter rolls grew to a record 12.7 million. 4 Clearly the nation’s two largest minority groups area political force to be reckoned with, a fact that inspires hope in some and evokes dread in others. Minorities’ increasing civic participation prefigures a kind of enfranchisement that extends beyond voting in elections: it signals the possibility of achieving full cultural citizenship. Cultural citizenship involves more than legal definitions and documents. First, beyond one’s relationship to the state, it involves social relations—the extent to which individuals are recognized as full members of the wider community, whatever their heritage or skin color. Second, it involves an acknowledged right to participate in the public sphere, to be seen and heard. Finally, it involves collectively imagined affiliations, notions about who belongs in the collective “we,” mostly articulated through the stories we tell about ourselves and others.

Loving v. Virginia increased citizenship and equality for black people

Insert study

Livingston 17 (Gretchen Livingston is a senior researcher at the Pew Research Center,05-18-2017, "Tabroom.com," Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2017/05/18/intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia)//eli

In 2015, 17% of all U.S. newlyweds had a spouse of a different race or ethnicity, marking more than a fivefold increase since 1967, when 3% of newlyweds were intermarried, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.[2](https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2017/05/18/intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/#fn-22844-2) In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Loving v. Virginia case ruled that marriage across racial lines was legal throughout the country. Until this ruling, interracial marriages were forbidden in many states. More broadly, one-in-ten married people in 2015 – not just those who recently married – had a spouse of a different race or ethnicity. This translates into 11 million people who were intermarried. The growth in intermarriage has coincided with shifting societal norms as Americans have become more accepting of marriages involving spouses of different races and ethnicities, even within their own families. The most dramatic increases in intermarriage have occurred among black newlyweds. Since 1980, the share who married someone of a different race or ethnicity has more than tripled from 5% to 18%. White newlyweds, too, have experienced a rapid increase in intermarriage, with rates rising from 4% to 11%. However, despite this increase, they remain the least likely of all major racial or ethnic groups to marry someone of a different race or ethnicity.

#### [b] Specifically in the context of fracking

Buhl 16 [Larry Buhl, 2016, The Color of Pollution: How Environmental Contamination Targets People of Color, DeSmog, https://www.desmog.com/2016/07/28/color-pollution-how-environmental-contamination-targets-people-color/] Eric

In Los Angeles last November, three groups – Youth for Environmental Justice, the South Central Youth Leadership Coalition and the Center for Biological Diversity – filed a [lawsuit](http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lawsuit-oil-drilling-20151106-story.html) against the city, alleging L.A. was fast-tracking new oil and gas wells in minority communities without the environmental reviews required by the California Environmental Quality Act.

Residents of Buffalo, New York, recently won victories for regulatory actions and penalties against the Tonawanda Coke Corporation. In 2014 the company was forced to pay $24 million in criminal suit for releasing cancer-causing benzene at rates nearly 30 times higher than it reported to the EPA. In 2015 it agreed to pay $2.7 million in penalties and $8 million to upgrade its plant.

#### [c] Biden’s Justice 40 Initiative

Kelly 21 [Cathleen Kelly is a senior fellow for Energy and Environment at the Center for American Progress. She specializes in international and U.S. climate mitigation, preparedness, resilience, and sustainable development policy, 6-22-2021, Implementing Biden’s Justice40 Commitment To Combat Environmental Racism, Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-bidens-justice40-commitment-combat-environmental-racism/] Eric

While action to end systemic racism is long past due, President Joe Biden’s commitment to direct 40 percent of his administration’s climate and clean energy investments to disadvantaged communities marks a turning point in the fight for justice.3 He solidified this commitment by launching the Justice40 Initiative through the landmark climate executive order he signed in 2021. This initiative aims to begin to redress the high levels of pollution, chronic disinvestment, and lack of access to capital in communities of color and low-income areas driven by discriminatory environmental, housing, infrastructure, and economic policies. Achieving the Justice40 goal would set the country on a course to correcting persistent injustice by mobilizing substantial new investments in legacy pollution cleanup, pollution-free energy and transportation, workforce development, quality and affordable housing, and critical clean water infrastructure in communities that need it the most.4

To accelerate the delivery of investment benefits to communities on the front lines of environmental, racial, and economic injustice, as well as communities dependent on the fossil fuel industry for their livelihoods, the White House must direct federal agencies to remove funding barriers and strengthen existing programs where needed.5 Specifically, the national climate advisor, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and agency leaders must take the following immediate actions to implement the Justice40 Initiative:

Develop and use investment criteria and guidance to ensure that federally funded projects reduce harmful local pollution and carbon emissions where possible; minimize flood, heat, and other extreme weather risks; avoid displacing existing community members; and meaningfully engage community stakeholders.6

Overhaul application and reporting requirements, provide technical assistance, and waive cost-sharing rules to make grants and other federal aid more accessible to disadvantaged communities. Cost-sharing requires grantees to bear a percentage of the costs of projects funded by the federal government.

Work with Congress to increase the amount of federal funding that flows directly to communities, including by changing distribution formulas; expanding existing infrastructure, such as Community Development Financial Institutions, that communities need to access critical investments; and increasing annual appropriations to programs that funnel resources directly to disadvantaged communities.7

#### [d] EPAs new pollution standards

Wilf 12 [Rachel Wilf is an intern with CAP’s Progress 2050 program and Jorge Madrid is a Research Associate with the Energy Policy team, 4-20-2012, New EPA Rules Help Communities of Color Breathe Easier, Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/new-epa-rules-help-communities-of-color-breathe-easier/] Eric

The EPA’s recent regulations are vital strides toward reducing these heavy financial and social burdens. Approximately [540,000](http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111221MATSimpactsfs.pdf) asthma attacks will be prevented by the agency’s mercury and cross-state air pollution rules each year, and the proposed carbon restrictions have the potential to further decrease asthma’s prevalence. The EPA’s new regulations will also curb coal plants’ mercury emissions by [90 percent](http://www.americanindependent.com/215419/clean-air-ads-highlight-energy-debate-in-va), limit the spread of pollutants like nitrous oxide and sulfur dioxide [across state lines](http://www.americanindependent.com/215419/clean-air-ads-highlight-energy-debate-in-va), and set the first-ever [uniform national limit](http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0327/EPA-issues-new-rule-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-Where-does-that-leave-coal) on allowable emissions from new power plants.

The evidence is clear: People of color are disproportionately likely to bear the health costs of polluting energy sources, but the EPA’s historic new rules will help transition us to a cleaner energy future that will [safeguard our environment](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2011/02/02/9121/epa-and-greenhouse-gases-101/) and all communities.

### Ontology – Kelley

#### Anti-Blackness isn’t historically calcified

Kelley 17 Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

### Ontology – Cikara and Van Bavel

#### Libidinal economy is a hoax -- neurophysiological phobias and philias are malleable thru habit forming -- cohesion around institutional change solves.

Cikara & Van Bavel **’15** [Mina and Jay; June 2nd; Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University; Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University; Scientific American, “The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems,” <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>; GR]

It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups.

There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions.

Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves.

Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions.

Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.)

Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them.

Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances.

The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices.

Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions.

Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers.

Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them.

A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress -- our progress -- would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better."

The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course, this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### Psychoanalysis is nonfalsifiable

Robert Bud and Mario Bunge 10 {Robert Bud is principal curator of medicine at the Science Museum in London. 9-29-2010. “Should psychoanalysis be in the Science Museum?” [https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806-200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum/}//JM](https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806-200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum/%7d//JM) (link credit to EM)

WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

### A2: Warren

#### Warren’s understanding of fungibility is ahistorical

Mahoney, 19—M.A. candidate in Liberal Studies at Dartmouth (Sommer, “(de)Humanization and Onticide: Lexicography for Ontology,” CLAMANTIS: The MALS Journal: Vol. 1: No. 5, Article 5, dml)

Calvin Warren would pause here to reassert his claims about slavery—that slavery’s economic violence created and reaffirmed the white identity, and did so through the commodification of the slave into a fungible object. My argument against him is twofold. First: if we can trace the history of the moral schema that produced this fungibility, does that not mean that fungibility was invented, and can be uninvented? Is it not possible (not a universally recognized truth, but a possibility) that there is a way to unmake the schema that created whiteness and ritually sacrificed blackness? Perhaps Calvin Warren would argue that no, there is no way—because the black ontology is being perpetually sacrificed and destroyed, there is no way to stop that cycle. It is an endless feedback cycle, he would argue—and as it spins, it maintains its integrity (sacrifice and creation), and progresses forward, consuming each black ontology as each black baby is born. But here we can return to Kate Manne. Ignore Warren’s protestations for a moment, and consider the second part of my two-fold argument: even if the morality of agency schema brought about white identity, is it possible that black people have consistency rejected and fought off these assaults on their ontology? Is it possible that music, art, dance, religion, protest and defiance—all of which were rich traditions in slave culture—indicated a truth that white violence could not reach because it cannot understand? Here I would like to propose a new way to look at dehumanization: (de)humanization. The parentheses indicate liminal space between action and thought, the place where destruction and construction are in harmony. To de-humanize, to take away humanity, is an action. By definition, it is an action that can only be done to a human. To strip away humanity, the perpetrator must actually (like Manne suggests) recognize their victim as human. You wouldn’t call a monkey a “monkey!” as an insult because a) you recognize this to be a factual statement, and b) a monkey has no capacity to understand what an “insult” is, and cannot feel insulted. A person, especially a black person, can feel embarrassed, threatened, or degraded by being called a monkey. If slavers actually thought black humans were not humans—why build an ontology around (de)humanizing? How could that practice withstand the test of time: either it would have to stop, because black people were successfully denied humanity and there would be no more reason to (de)humanize, or the very attempts of de-humanization actually reaffirm the essential humanity possessed by each human.

#### You can’t have metaphysics without ontology

Heckman 17 (Ian Heckman, PhD candidate in philosophy and aesthetics, "What is the difference between metaphysics and ontology?", Quora, June 4 2017, <https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-metaphysics-and-ontology>, mmv)

Ontology is the study of what things exist and what kinds of things they are. A completed ontology is an ontology that states what things exist in the world. There might be one individual thing in which everything else is merely a property of that one thing (Spinoza). There might be lots of little things, namely fundamental particles, and things like chairs and tables are really just arrangements of those particles. (Reductionism). It’s about carving up the world and seeing what really exists and how many things exist.

Once we have an ontology, we can finish building the rest of our metaphysics. A completed metaphysics is a full picture of reality. This is not just a picture consisting of what things exist, but it is a picture which understands the objects posited by the ontology both how they work, and how they interact with one another. This picture is ultimately much more informative than merely an ontology.

For example, an ontology of the mind might posit two fundamental substances, a spiritual substance and a material substance. But then a metaphysical but non-ontological question is how do these two substances interact? And more importantly, how can they interact, given that their natures are so substantially different from one another? And this gives rise to the mind-body problem.

It should be clear that a complete metaphysics is always going to include an ontology, but not vice versa. You can always posit entities without saying much about understanding them. But you can’t understand how reality works without knowing what kinds of entities exist.

#### Hope is good for black people – we cite the *best* study

Davidson et al 2010 (Collin L. Davidson, MS, LaRicka R. Wingate, PhD, Meredith L. Slish, MS, and Kathy A. Rasmussen, MS, "The Great Black Hope: Hope and Its Relation to Suicide Risk among African Americans", Suice and Life-Threatening Behavior, 40(2) April 2010, The American Association of Suicidology, <https://guilfordjournals.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1521/suli.2010.40.2.170?casa_token=oe9ou4Of_jMAAAAA:uCu69dDS4qbVfEeARTq-LV4u_GPbZ8xXYPkMg_wgPzo9A9Ux18FQ_BWCm3XDbF1pq-d5lIU-_Mek>, mmv)

The results from this study are generally consistent with our hypotheses. Specifically, hope negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness while predicting acquired capability to enact suicide in the positive direction. These results suggest that as a whole, hope may serve to buffer African American individuals against suicide, consistent with previous findings in other ethnic groups (Davidson et al., in press; Range & Penton, 1994). As discussed above and in a previous study (Davidson et al., in press), the marginal positive prediction of hope for acquired capability to enact suicide may be due to the tendency of people with high hopes to set more goals and more challenging goals, thus possibly putting themselves in more situations where they would be likely to experience pain. If the experience of pain became frequent enough, these individuals would theoretically habituate to the pain resulting in higher levels of acquired capability to enact suicide. Further, it was found that hope and the pathways subscale significantly predicted suicidal ideation such that higher hope scores predicted less suicidal ideation. In contrast, the goals and agency subscales did not significantly predict suicidal ideation. This suggests that simply having the goal or agency to enact suicide is not enough—the strength of the relationship is in the pathway or plans to enact suicide. This is consistent with previous research that has shown that plans and preparations for suicide are one of the strongest predictors for suicide completion (Joiner, Rudd, & Rajah, 1997); stronger even than the desire to enact suicide. These findings may relate to the significant prediction of the pathways component to suicidal ideation. Taken together with the aforementioned results, this suggests that hope serves as a protective factor for both suicidal risk as described in the interpersonal-psychological theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005) and suicidal ideation. These results are contrary to previous findings (Davidson et al., in press) which showed that although higher hope did predict lower burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, hope did not predict suicidal ideation. It is possible that, among African Americans, hope plays a larger role as a protective factor for suicide in comparison to a predominantly Caucasian sample. Additionally, we investigated the differences between the two samples and found that the African American sample had significantly higher levels of hope, goals, and agency and that each of these scales had larger standard deviations than the predominantly Caucasian sample. It is possible that the larger variability of scores contributed to the likelihood of significant findings. Future research should aim to clarify this relationship. Finally, consistent with our third hypothesis, it was found that the components of Joiners (2005) theory of suicidal behavior together predicted suicidal ideation. These results offer further support for the validity of Joiners theory in conjunction with the existing empirical studies that support this theory. Additionally, these results further expand the generalizability of Joiner's theory to an African American sample. Although the components as a set predicted suicidal ideation, when examined individually, only burden-someness and belongingness individually predict suicidal ideation, while acquired capability does not. This finding is not consistent with a previous study that examined the theory in a largely Caucasian population (David- son et al., in press), wherein each component separately predicted suicidal ideation. Joiner proposed that for an individual to desire suicide, thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness must be elevated, whereas for an individual to physically carry out a suicide attempt, they must have higher acquired capability to enact suicide. Theoretically then, it may be that individuals who only have elevated levels of acquired capability may not have suicidal ideation because they have no desire to end their lives. Again, future research should further investigate this relationship. One limitation of the current study is that the sample is not particularly diverse, as it is composed only of people who self-identified as African American. However, it is of note that this is the first study to our knowledge to examine Joiners theory of suicidal behavior in an African American sample. It is ideal to generalize the presence of theoretical findings to many different populations. Regarding this situation. Popper (1959, p. 269) stated, "once a theory is well corroborated, further instances raise its degree of corroboration only very little. This ride however does not hold good if these new instances are very different from the earlier ones, that is if they corroborate the theory in a new field of application" (emphasis added). Although the participants in this study were African American, they were somewhat diverse in their place of living, and came from all over the Big XII conference area, including the states of Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, Texas, and Colorado. In line with the previous limitation, it is important to note that there is a great amount of diversity among Black people, lo elaborate, there are cultural differences related to the geographic location in which a person lives (all of our participants were living in the midwest), as well as their ethnic heritage and recent ancestors' country of origin (United States, Africa, Caribbean Islands, etc.). Given the heterogeneity among Black people in America, it is important that researchers attend to ethnic differences among Blacks in the study of suicide related behaviors. Future studies should work to investigate risk factors within Black groups. Some may consider the focus on a relatively low-risk group of participants (African American college students) a limitation of our study; however, a great deal of research on suicidal behavior and risk factors has been conducted with college samples. In addition, we specifically took the stance of examining suicidal behavior from a positive psychology approach, as suggested in Wingate et al. (2006). Given that the rate of suicide for African Americans has been consistendy low in comparison to Caucasian Americans, it may be beneficial to identify the protective factors that help to temper the risk. Once these protective factors are identified in African Americans, it may then be possible to implement and encourage these factors in other ethnic groups. This emphasis on buffers against suicide risk may serve to supplement the existing emphasis on suicide risk factors in clinical practice. Indeed, research has shown that hope tends to protect individuals from negative outcomes in mental health (e.g., depression and anxiety) and the current study and previous studies have suggested that hope can also protect against suicide risk (Davidson et al, in press; Range & Penton, 1994). It is possible that instilling hope in clients can provide incremental increases in client safety' above and beyond the common clinical practices of identifying and protecting clients from risk factors to ensure their safety'. Indeed, Stellrecht et al. (2006) highlighted the importance of applying research to the clinical setting and provided recommendations for using the interpersonal-psychological theory of suicide in risk assessment, crisis intervention, and general therapy. Specific to African Americans, it may prove beneficial for clinicians to use techniques that encourage increased feelings of belongingness within, and contributions to, the African American community. This could include having the client become involved in activities where they are a member of a group, where they give back, and where they have similarities to others in the group. Cognitive techniques could be used to address distorted cognitions surrounding feelings of burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. Similarly, drawing from hope theory, clinicians may be able to focus on challenging cognitive distortions related to a lack of hope, subsequendy increasing hope as a protective factor. They may also be able to capitalize on the hope that clients already possess when presenting to therapy, and work to generalize that hope to areas of the clients life where it is lacking. Though the current findings may inform prevention and treatment of suicidal behavior in the future, it should be noted that additional research is required to confirm some of these potential applications. The findings from the current study are important in that they replicate and extend the findings of Davidson et al. (in press), which demonstrated that hope served as a protective factor for suicide risk in a largely Caucasian sample. As mentioned earlier, African Americans tend to be at higher risk for suicide due to overrepresentation in lower socioeconomic-status environments, associated stress, and discrimination, but they enact suicide at lower rates. Some researchers have hypothesized (see Gibbs, 1997) that this paradox is due to protective factors such as religiosity or strong family ties. The current study adds to these assertions by demonstrating that hope is potentially an important protective factor for African Americans. To our knowledge, this is the only study that has investigated suicide from a positive psychology perspective in an African American sample, and one of few studies to do so in a general sample.

### AT: Communication is Bad

#### Communication and meaning are possible and desirable – framing speech as pure flux destroys any benefits gained from intersubjective processes of meaning in specific political contexts

Merawi 11 (Fasil, Addis Ababa University, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, “Habermas and the Discourse of Modernity,” http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/3596/3/FASIL%20MERAWI.pdf)

As Culler sees it, Derrida raised three main objections towards Searle’s speech act theory. First, any speech act can be quoted and be analyzed in another context and the idea that meaning will be the same in another context, is something fictional. Habermas criticized Derrida for failing to recognize that what Austin meant by the fixation of meaning in everyday communication and the normal use of language, is based on idealizing presuppositions that are present in every communicative action (PDM, 195-196). Second, Derrida argued that, for a normal speech act to be successfully employed, meaning needs to be arrested, and this to be done by presenting general rules and conditions under which a given utterance is to be employed and analyzed. But speech acts can have different meanings depending on the contexts. Here, Derrida speaks of ‘grafting’ i.e. that a speech act can be quoted in another context. So, the contexts are infinite and one cannot come up with a theory of the employment of speech acts specifying where and how they should be employed since meaning is contextual, and the contexts are many. Here, culler supports Derrida’s argument by claiming that even the “intentions of the speakers...are to be interpreted in different contexts.” (PDM, 197) Searle objected to Derrida’s second argument, by asserting that, what prevents flux and fluctuation of meaning is not found in what is uttered, but the general assumptions in which it is uttered. So, when using speech acts on a day to day level, participants are operating within a set of assumptions that define what something normally means and does not mean. Further, the assumptions within which speech acts occur, are not theoretical constructs that are built to arrest meaning, but necessary assumptions behind the process of communication. Finally, Derrida, against Searle argued that, it is the potential of the text to be interpreted in many ways and not our intentions and assumptions that make different interpretations possible. So, the text by itself plays a context creating function. As Habermas sees it, as long as participants in an intersubjectivist communicative process are oriented towards understanding, then meaning will not be deferred. Wrong interpretations and abnormal usages of language could be simply identified as something that hinders consensus and understanding. Idealizations that are found beyond communicative action and the fact that the various claims raised during communication are open to critique, and can be empirically tested will easily help to “distinguish between ‘usual’ and ‘parasitic’ uses of language” (PDM, 199). By ‘parasitic’, Habermas meant that the normal use of language in everyday communication is for reaching understanding. Other artistic, metaphorical and non-literal usages of language are derived from the normal usage. Further, eventhough ‘parasitic’ usages of language prevail in everyday communication; still actors are able to bypass these usages since they are oriented towards reaching understanding. By revising the Derrida/Searle debate and employing his arguments as well, Habermas believes that, he managed to defend his communicative rationality with its validity claims. In everyday communication the infinite flow of meaning, poetic and rhetoric elements are puts aside for the sake of understanding. Having done this, Habermas wants to refute the idea that there is no distinction between logic and rhetoric and that all texts can be analyzed on literary and rhetorical terms. The issue as, Habermas sees it, is the acceptance that all language contains literary and rhetorical elements, while at the same time defending philosophy and the special forms of inquiry against the domination of literary elements, and hence the viewing of their validity claims as something impure and contaminated with artistic and metaphorical elements. Habermas, claims that Derrida’s general notion of text as a mixture of Heterogeneous elements, makes him blind to the fact that in everyday communication there is the possibility to raise and defend claims in reference to the three validity claims, and that the various specialized forms of inquiry are also oriented towards solving specific problems (PDM, 205). Habermas thinks that there is an affinity between Rorty and Derrida in relation to their views on language, communicating subjects. In Rorty, the languages of the sciences and other forms of inquiries create the contexts that necessarily determine everyday communication. Further, the capacity of validity claims to challenged inherited horizons is unacknowledged. (PDM, 206) Furthermore, both Derrida and Rorty, failed to distinguish between everyday interaction in which distinct validity claims are raised, and the various forms of inquiry that are geared toward solving specific problems (PDM, 207). Derrida is accused by Habermas of failing to distinguish between how language has a capacity of making the world visible and intelligible and how it can be used to solve specific problems. So, Derrida in his general notion of a ‘text’ tried to merge all the sciences, including philosophy, criticism, art, literature and so on under one category of literature. Habermas claims that on the one hand, we have everyday world of communication based in the different validity claims, while on the other, the various specialized forms of inquiry that are geared at solving specific problems. Philosophy and literary criticism are found between the two. Literary criticism connects everyday world and the artistic realm, while philosophy, is related to the forms of inquiries in having a universalistic dimension. Philosophy facilitates disputation of claims between everyday world and specialized inquiries. (PDM, 207-208)

### AT: Debate is Bad

#### Agonistic debate SOLVES collapse and oversaturation of meaning

Bryan S. Turner 4, Dean of Social Sciences at Deakin University, Australia, “Baudrillard for Sociologists,” in Forget Baudrillard?, 2004 edition, p. 80-83

#### While, as far as one can tell, Baudrillard was not influenced by Bell’s vision of the role of technology and the media in shaping postindustrialism, he was influenced by Marshall McLuhan’s analysis (Gane 1991b:48) of the impact of new media on the transformation of modern culture, especially in The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1967). McLuhan was particularly sensitive to the idea that we live in a processed social world where human beings live in a complete technostructure. This technological environment is carried with us as extensions of our own bodies, but McLuhan did not adopt a pessimistic view of the age of anxiety, because his ‘technological humanism’ (Kroker et al. 1984) and Catholic values committed him to the idea of the immanence of reason and the hope of an escape from the labyrinth. Indeed, a global technological system could become the basis of a universalistic culture. Although he was fully aware of the sensory deprivation which he associated with the impact of the mass media, he none the less remained committed to the hope that these negative effects were not fatal. Baudrillard, who as we have noted was deeply influenced by McLuhan’s idea that the content of messages was relatively unimportant in relation to their form, has embraced a very nihilistic position with respect to our processed environment.¶ Baudrillard’s pessimistic view of the fissure in the historical development of the modern is based on his view of the masses. Baudrillard’s analysis of the masses is a product of the Situationist responses to the May events of 1968, when it became increasingly obvious that the critical social movements of modern society would not be dominated by Marxist theory or directed by a vanguard of the working class. The crisis of May 1968 had not been predicted by Marxism or by mainstream sociology, but they did validate the claims of Situationists like Guy Debord in the journal Internationale Situationiste. However, if the crisis had been unanticipated by conventional political analysis, then the sudden collapse of the students’ and workers’ movements of 1968 found no easy explanation in the framework of mainstream social sciences.¶ Baudrillard’s concept of the inexplicable nature of the mass depend a great deal on the unusual circumstances surrounding the May events. By 1973 with the publication of The Mirror of Production (Baudrillard 1975), Baudrillard was already moving away from an orthodox Marxist view of production, arguing that Marxism, far from being an external critique of capitalism, was merely a reflection or mirror of the principal economistic values of capitalism. Instead of engaging in the production of meaning, a subversive, oppositional movement would have to challenge the system from the point of view of meaninglessness. Subversion would have to rob the social system of significance. In taking this stand, Baudrillard followed the Situationist claim that whatever can be represented can be controlled (Plant 1992:137). The mass events of 1968 offered a promise of the nonrepresentational moment, the pure event of authenticity, which could not be explained, and therefore could not be manipulated. Baudrillard, in dismissing Marxist theory as a means of representing events, sought to replace the idea of a mode of production with a mode of disappearance.¶ In taking this attitude towards modern social movements, Baudrillard’s argument also rests on the various meanings of the word ‘mass’. Baudrillard is thus able to make allusions to the idea of physical substance, matter, the majority and the electrical meaning of earth. The translator’s note to In the Shadow of the Silent Majority points out that faire masse can mean to form a majority and to form an earth. Baudrillard argues by allusion that the mass absorbs the electrical charges of social and political movements; the mass thus neutralizes the electrical charge of society. This use of allusion, parody and irony is typical of Baudrillard’s mode of analysis, which is a type of sociological poetics, a style which is likely to make sociologists feel uncomfortable (Gane 199la:193). There is here also a continuity with the style of Dada and the Situationists. The poetic and striking character of Baudrillard’s style has no counterpart in professional social science, least of all in the British context.¶ Baudrillard’s ‘sociological fictions’ (1990a:15) are striking and challenging, but they are not ultimately convincing. Arguments which depend on allusion, allegory and similar rhetorical devices are decorative but they are not necessarily powerful. The notion of ‘mass society’ already has a clearly worked out sociological critique. The idea of ‘mass society’ might have been relevant in describing the new markets which were created in the post-war period with the advent of innovative technologies, which had the immediate effect of lowering prices and making commodities available to a mass audience. However, the trend of sociological analysis in the last two decades has been to assert that mass audiences have been broken down into more selectively constructed niches for more individualized products. It is controversial to argue that industrialization necessarily produces a mass society, characterized by a common culture, uniform sentiments or an integrated outlook. The idea of a mass society was often associated with the notion that the decline of individualism would produce a directionless mass as the modern equivalent of the eighteenthcentury mob. Critical theorists like Adorno and Marcuse associated the massification of society with authoritarianism and a potential for fascism. Of course, Baudrillard’s version of mass society is based on a particular view of the mass media creating a hyperreality in which the real has been absorbed by the hyperreal; meaning has imploded on itself. Although Baudrillard’s analysis of hyperreality is postcritical (Chen 1987), he does adopt in practice a critical position towards American civilization, which is the extreme example of massification. Rather like critical theorists, Baudrillard believes that the (bourgeois) individual has been sucked into the negative electrical mass of the media age. However, sociological research on mass audiences shows that there is no ground for believing that media messages are received, consumed or used in any standardized manner, and the majority of social scientists working on culture have attempted to argue that cultural objects in the age of the mass media are appropriated, transformed and consumed in diverse forms and according to various practices (de Certeau 1984). In fact, sociologists, largely inspired by the Situationists, have argued that everyday life is resistant to massification and that the concrete reality of everyday life-situations is the principal arena within which opposition to massification can be expected. Everyday life was regarded by both Guy Debord and Henri Lefebvre (1991) as the foundation of authenticity. Baudrillard, by arguing that criticism belongs to the period of modernism and not to the age of hyperreality, has ruled out opposition to the system, at least at the level of public debate and formal politics.

### AT: Meaning isn’t Real

#### They get coopted by fascism. Info’s not dissuasive—shared meaning-making is inevitable and can generate positive value and political change.

Bailey, 20—Assistant Professor in Politics in the School of International Studies at the University of Nottingham (Mark, “Cassirer, Fatalism and Political Myth: Historical Lessons in the Consequences of Pessimism for International Relations,” *Pessimism in International Relations*, Chapter 4, pg 57-64, SpringerLink, dml)

Specifically, Heidegger’s work was instrumental in sowing a public mood of deep pessimism about the future in its assertions that humanity is defined by Geworfenheit, the condition of being involuntarily ‘thrown’ into the stream of time, leaving it permanently a prisoner of the conditions and temporality of its existence.12 Coupled with the successive political and economic crises of the interwar period—which provided considerable apparent veracity to the principal theses of both Spengler and Heidegger)—this climate of fatalism and pessimism was fundamentally explosive, potentially creating ‘a pliable instrument in the hands of the political leaders’.13 In making these points, Cassirer recognised that a culture of fatalism also represented the death of politics. As Colin Hay explains, ‘fatalism and resignation are the antithesis of politics. The extent to which our destiny is determined by processes beyond our control is the extent to which it is non-political… Similarly, the extent to which we entrust our destiny to fate is the extent to which we deny ourselves the capacity to shape outcomes’,14 Unable to perceive an escape from their present torment, millions of Germans in the 1930s were prepared to surrender their political and ethical freedoms to those who proclaimed that they could.

It was an attempt to find answers to the questions raised by the rise of uniquely modern forms of political mythology that spurred Cassirer to write The Myth of the State. In answer to the crises of the time, the Nazis proved particularly adept at offering a carefully fabricated, superficially plausible and emotionally compelling account of the reasons behind the contemporary political and economic situation that made the complex and multifaceted beguilingly simple. Moreover, by capitalising on a deep sense of historical fatalism and pessimism, the Nazi account of the reasons for Germany’s woes effectively delivered them carte blanche to remake German society and culture in their own genocidal image.

Cassirer’s Historical Context

Cassirer was writing in response to a twin crisis in Continental philosophy and the increasing degeneration of the political situation in interwar Germany. In many respects, he was embarking on a doomed mission to save the existing liberal order, consummated in Germany in the formation of the Weimar Republic. He also sought to preserve the liberal, Kulturphilosophie tradition of figures such as Goethe, Herder and Humboldt from being consumed by reactionary and anti-rationalist political and cultural forces in interwar Germany that despised the fundamental optimism that underpinned this movement’s view of culture as the source of human self-liberation. The first of these twin philosophical crises was the impact of Darwinism on philosophy, which Cassirer argued had led to ‘a complete anarchy in thought’.15 The publication of the Origin of the Species (1859) resulted in a major shift in the character of anthropological philosophy from mathematical explanations of human nature to biological ones. It similarly encouraged a widespread belief that the empirical facts of evolution would similarly lead to a metaphysical revelation of the fundamental principles underpinning evolution’s dynamic processes of change. This would contribute to the uncritical projection of the telos of natural evolution onto the world of culture, and the concomitant belief that a cultural telos could be discerned by reference to the empirical facts of human cultural life. The result was a race to reduce the evolution of human culture to a primum mobile, so as to systematise human culture along ‘scientific’ lines in a quest to prove conclusively the essential unity and homogeneity of human nature. However, this race produced multiple theories of human nature that were at once reductive and utterly mutually exclusive in their different accounts of human nature’s essential motivating force. Moreover, they each exhibited a tendency to be inflated (deliberately or otherwise) into Grand Theories of everything. These exhibited tendencies that philosopher Mary Midgley later saw as reflecting a symbiotic relationship between ‘reductionism’ and ‘payoff’: the reduction of social phenomena to a singular cause that then becomes a universal solution to all problems.16

The appearance of this multitude of conflicting explanations concerning the underlying metaphysical principles of human nature resulted in a complete loss of an ‘intellectual centre’; an absence of any general frame of reference against which philosophical claims might be judged for their veracity. It also contributed to a growing personalisation of intellectual disciplines and the increasing ‘barbarism of specialization’ in philosophy and the social sciences as more and more disciplines emerged, focusing on ever-more limited aspects of human activity. This narrowing of focus, together with the tendency towards the formation of ‘schools’ of thought within, between and in some cases across disciplines, centred on individual scholars whose words quickly assumed quasi-theological and eschatological qualities in the hands of their numerous disciples. For Cassirer, this situation was increasingly intolerable, leading to a crisis in humanity’s knowledge of itself that presented a ‘grave threat to…ethical and cultural life’.17

The second philosophical crisis that Cassirer confronted was the growing emergence of Liebensphilosophie, the ‘Philosophy of Life’, in the early years of the twentieth century. This was a form of that fundamentally clashed with the kind of idealist philosophy of Spirit (Geist) that Cassirer’s work typifed. Closely associated with the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Bergson, Simmel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Scheler, Liebensphilosophie completely rejected the historicist optimism omnipresent in Cassirer’s work, which placed a deep-seated faith in the progress of the human spirit in history. In contrast, Liebenphilosophie asserted an equally deep-seated, reactionary and highly anti-rationalist pessimism, in which Geist ‘is seen not as a transformation of life but as alienation, an inauthentic relationship to Being’.18 Thus, Liebensphilosophie sought a more ‘authentic’ and immediate mode of existence through the rejection of modern rationalism and the perceived arid technicism of modern, liberal, capitalist civilisation. In particular, it encapsulated a deep disenchantment and regarded Cassirer’s Enlightenment-based Kantian liberalism as being fundamentally deluded in the face of the experiences of the war and the economic and political crises that followed.19 Cassirer himself was not entirely unsympathetic to many of the arguments of the life-philosophers. He was alive to the threat to modern society presented by technological alienation and the manner in which consumer capitalism portended society’s moral debasement, thanks to its reduction of life to a fruitless quest to satisfy material desires.20 Moreover, in the case of the life-philosophers’ understanding of the purely expressive nature of myth, he was in complete agreement, even as he contested their assertion that myth presented a more ‘authentic’ mode of existence than that of reason.

In response to these twin crises, Cassirer offered the three volumes of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, and a series of later works, such as The Myth of the State and The Logic of the Cultural Sciences. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in particular, can be seen as Cassirer’s attempt to provide, first, an answer to the crisis of self-knowledge that he held responsible for many of the failings of modernity and, second, to provide the general philosophical framework against which truth claims could be tested. Through all of these works, Cassirer continues to assert his fundamentally optimistic, liberal idealism. Here we learn that humanity is fundamentally a symbolic animal; it is the power to engage in the process of meaning-creation through symbolisation that separates humanity from other animals. No other creature has the power to create abstract meanings and concepts in the manner that, for instance, distinguishes humanity’s experience of time as a concrete past, present and future from the animal world’s experience of pure immediacy.21

These works reflected Cassirer’s need to balance the relationship between the various symbolic forms, from the pure irrational expressiveness of myth to the rationalist signification of natural science.22 They allowed Cassirer to identify the significant fallacies of both Liebensphilosophie and of the logical positivists, who had narrowed the focus of philosophy to purely logical questions.23 For one thing, as a fundamentally symbolic animal, all human meaning-creation, even at its most primeval and expressive in the form of myth, requires mediation through the process of symbolic creation. We simply cannot recognise anything as being meaningful without the process of conceptual formation that symbolisation involves. Therefore, for humanity, a world of pure immediacy cannot exist.24 Further, those such as Simmel who despaired of the process of self-alienation of creator from object of cultural creation discounted the truly democratising effects of culture. It presented a realm in which all could play their part, no matter how small it might prove to be. Rather than see culture as a source of alienation and pessimism, therefore, humanity needs to recognise that we are all participants in the dance of cultural creation; it is fundamental to our very existence as human beings and is therefore inescapable.25

However, perhaps the most potent critique of life-philosophy was one that Cassirer advanced only tenuously in the famous 1929 Davos debate with the figure often presented as his philosophical nemesis, Martin Heidegger. This critique can be effectively summarised in a single question: ‘if not this, then what?’ Cassirer challenged Heidegger’s radical rejection of any form of universality, rooted in the latter’s ontological insistence of the lonely finitude of Dasein—human existence—and of the nature of universality as the very expression of inauthentic existence. Similarly, for Heidegger, the temporal finitude of Dasein limited all products of culture to the same impermanence as human beings themselves. Pointing to the fact of linguistic communication, and by extension to a situation in which he and Heidegger could conduct such a conversation, Cassirer challenged this assertion. That linguistic communication was possible at all pointed to the necessary existence of some forms of intersubjective universality that made human social life possible, and which were therefore key to determining the very nature of our existence.26 This critique is potentially highly illuminating. It indicates one of the core reasons why Cassirer accused Heidegger and Spengler, and life-philosophy in general, of contributing, however unintentionally, to the climate of fatalism and pessimism in German society that afforded National Socialism the opportunity to occupy political and cultural space. In his extreme ontological solipsism, Heidegger undermined the possibility of a common morality, of a shared, intersubjective criteria for assessing that which is true and that otherwise. If this was Heidegger’s intention, therefore, with what did he intend to replace these things, other than a Darwinistic ‘war of all against all’?27 What then were the prospects for human civilisation other than a slide into the abyss?

In their cultivation of a culture of pessimism in German life, their rejection of reason as ‘inauthentic’, their purifying elision of truth in favour of the expressive irrationalities of myth, and their consequent failure to stand up to (and even, in Heidegger’s case, the acceptance of) the violent mythical fantasies of Nazism, many of the life-philosophers, and indeed the German academy in general, stood accused of a fundamental dereliction of their philosophical duty in warning of the dangers Nazism presented to cultural life.28 Moreover, in their active embrace of disenchantment with Enlightenment ideals and its consequent pessimism concerning the future, the life-philosophers and their followers forgot another of the aphorisms of the Nietzsche they so venerated: that when you stare into the abyss, the abyss stares back at you.

Political Myth, Philosophy and Pessimism in the Present

As when Cassirer was composing his later works, our contemporary period sees a liberal world order threatening to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. A combination of near-continuous economic and financial crisis, technological alienation, ecological destruction, cultural and demographic shifts, disillusionment with and distrust of the institutions of liberal democracy especially, and soaring rates of wealth and income inequality have contributed to the irruption of highly anti-rationalist, reactionary populist movements across the world. Accompanying the rise of these movements has been the emergence of a form of ‘post-truth’ political discourse that shows complete indifference to questions of truth or falsity and exhibits many of the characteristics of the technique of the modern political myth Cassirer articulated in 1945. None of these movements exhibit anything like the ambitions for global conquest and genocide of the Nazis, but nevertheless they reflect a profound, increasingly global, culture of pessimism and political disenchantment that portends great uncertainty with respect to the future. Of particular concern to this chapter is one of the fundamental questions that Cassirer posed in The Myth of the State with respect to Heidegger and Spengler especially: what has been the role of scholarship in precipitating this state of affairs? This is a question that brings the problem of ‘if not this, then what?’ to the very centre of critical analysis.

This question is of specific interest when considering the increasing ubiquity of post-structuralist forms of critical inquiry in the social science s. Is perhaps the cultural legacy of post-structuralism the exact opposite of what post-structuralists themselves actually intended? In short, to what extent has the post-structuralist determination to problematise all forms of ontological certainty, of fixed identity and secure foundations to knowledge, together with its often aggressively anti-rationalist rejection of both liberalism and the Enlightenment (for all the considerable flaws of both), actually become part of the problem, as opposed to part of the solution?29

For example, the post-structuralist claim that there are no authoritative ontological claims as to what is ‘real’, only a multiplicity of interpenetrating and competing interpretations of the nature of existence, historical events and the social world is seriously problematic. Rather than being a source of political emancipation, the bleak post-structuralist assessment of modern political communities contributes to a profound sense of ontological disorientation, not least in its linkage of the absence of truth to the operations of political violence in the form of power and the sovereign state.30 Moreover, it leads to the question as to whether such positions fuel the quest for ontological certainty that often fuel the discourses of reactionary populist political myths, not least in the form of some notion of the ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ community of ‘the nation’. Questions remain, therefore, as to whether post-structuralism, for all the undoubtedly valuable work it has done in identifying cultural, political, ethnic, racial, socioeconomic and other forms of (often hidden) exclusions and acts of oppression and violence, might not have ended up doing more harm than good in terms of presenting new forms of political possibility (which in the case of Foucault are deemed impossible, anyway).31

Rather than the radical, liberatory and emancipatory rethinking of contemporary life and history its adherents have often claimed, this line of argument posits that post-structuralism has instead been profoundly debilitating to the remaking of political life in a manner that might address the many issues of the relationship between power and knowledge (especially in contemporary capitalism). Instead of leading to a revolution in thinking and a rejuvenation of political communities, therefore, post-structuralism has served to inculcate a deep current of solipsism, pessimism, confusion and nihilistic cynicism in both popular and intellectual life that has served to open a considerable political space in which the political myths of post-truth have been able to thrive in the absence of any firm counterweight.32

These problems serve to bring us back to one of the fundamental questions in Cassirer’s philosophy that post-structuralism lacks an answer to: how can a ‘crisis in self-knowledge’ and ‘what counts as truth’ be addressed in an intellectual climate in which the possibility of either has been obliterated? In denying any ethical foundation to knowledge, post-structuralism denies any ethical foundation to politics and, in the process, negates the possibility of holding to account even the most ludicrously fantastical, outright fictional and frighteningly totalising accounts of political and historical events. This has proven profoundly destructive to the ability to maintain the kind of pluralistic and respectful dialogue necessary to the maintenance of functional, accountable, transparent and deliberative democratic politics advocated by Cassirer. Such a politics remains the starting point for any kind of emancipatory process focused on the delivery of social justice, not least to those amongst the silenced, oppressed and marginalised. However, it is difficult to see how such a politics is possible if it is not conceivable to at least agree dialogically on a set of processes through which claims to truth and knowledge can be verified, validated and accepted. This ontological dislocation begs the question as to how, and on what grounds, individuals may make rational and morally autonomous judgements in a polity in which the emotionally centred narratives of political myths have become dominant. Faced with this problem, the question of ‘if not this, then what?’ assumes a degree of importance that has arguably never been more acute since the time of Cassirer himself.

### AT: Calculation Bad

#### Calculative thinking key to prevent war---conservatives coopt this approach

Stanescu ‘14 [James, January 7, Professional Lecturer in Philosophy at American University, in Washington, D.C. Critical Animal, “Abstraction, Calculative Thinking, Global Warming, and Environmental Ethics; or the Polar Vortex of Thinking!,” http://criticalanimal.blogspot.com/2014/01/abstraction-calculative-thinking-global.html]

Moreover, we will not be saved by virtue, infinite responsibility for the infinite other, or voluntarism. What we need is better abstractions, more calculative thinking, more en-framing, and stronger institutional responses. As David Wood has shown, when it comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Katrina, global warming, and a variety of other events, it has been the conservative response to embrace the impossibility of calculative thought. Perhaps our project going further is to, as Isabelle Stengers has argued, to calculate again. This is not the calculative thought of the capitalist cost-benefit system, but a different calculation. It is, to steal a phrase from Jane Bennett, about mutually enabling instrumentalizations. Long quotation from Stengers ahead, so bear with me: The cosmopolitical Parliament is not primarily a place where instantaneous decisions are made, but a delocalized place. It exists every time a "we" is constructed that does not identify with the identity of a solution but hesitates before a problem. I associate this "we" with the only slogan Leibniz ever proposed: Calculemus. Let us calculate. It's an odd expression, constructed to conceptualize the possibility of peace during a time of war. But Leibniz was a mathematician, not an accountant or statistician. For him, calculation was not a mere balance sheet contrasting homogeneous quantities, calculations of interest or benefits that were presented as being commensurable. For a mathematician, the accuracy of a calculation and the validity of its result are relatively simple questions, "trivial" in the language of mathematics. What is important, and which is not in the least trivial, is the position of the problem that will, possibly, allow it to be calculated, the precise creation of relationships and constraints, the distinction between the various ingredients, the exploration of the roles they are liable to play, the determinations or indeterminations they engender or bring about. There is no commensurability without the invention of a measurement, and the challenge of Leibniz's calculemus is, precisely, the creation of a "we" that excludes all external measures, all prior agreements separating those who are entitled to "enter" into the calculation and those subject to its result. [...] Calculemus, therefore, does not mean "let us measure," "let us add," "let us compare," but, first and foremost, let us create the "we" associated with the nature and terms of the operation to be risked. It is not a question of acting in the name of truth and justice, but of creating commensurability. It is a question of knowing that the "truth" of the created common measure will always be relative to what such creation will have been capable of, knowing also that a radical heterogeneity preexists such creation, the absence of any preexisting shared measure among the ingredients to be articulated. (Cosmopolitics II, pp. 399-401).

#### Their definition of calculation is hopelessly broad---it castigates all action targeted toward an end, like reading their aff to win, having a strategy they endorse

Davison ‘1 [Aidan; 2001; Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania; *Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability*, p. 132-136]

We are cautioned by Heidegger not to rush headlong into action aimed at solving an evident but. he assures us, nonetheless inessential problem such as the destruction of a river valley through the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Heidegger insists that in our urgent hurry we will miss the real threat, which is not to the valley or even its displaced human residents, but to the pos­sibilities for human thinking itself. Yet there can be no doubt that our decision to sit quietly meditating on our breath or poetry involves many difficult practi­cal choices. To sit still *in the* midst of the restlessness of the technological world is as much‑indeed, is more‑ deliberate action than rushing out the door brandishing a placard. Simply sitting and reading Heidegger implies a host of practical judgments. To put aside books on integrated business management and be bothered with Heideggers ontological questions at all runs counter to the self‑assuredness and instrumentalism of the latemodern world. And remain­ing open to these questions, if we choose to be so bothered, is difficult amid the burly burly of technological life?r Contrary to Dreyfus. I consider that "ecological destruction, inextricably ontological and corporeal.The literature of radical ecophilosophy attests to this being so. My concern about the accumulation of carcino­genic *pesticides* and heavy metals in the tissues of my children is at once a concern with the technological diminishment of human pocsibilities and a concern with the practical task of living in more sane, more careful ways. Certainly my preoccupation with the well‑being of my children could be nar­rowly construed as a mere instrumentalizing concern with the survival of my genes Similarly ambivalent are alternatives to harmful, unsustainable practices offered via the ecomodernist drive for ecoefficiency. If I can afford them. I can choose from alternatives such as genetically engineered pest resistance, the sub­stitution of timber in my house, and of lead in petrol and paints, by more sophisticated synthetic products of industrial laboratories. However, history has shown the propensity of such solutions to create new sets of problems, for which new *sets* of technological solutions are soon required. This is, after all, the dynamic of technological profligacy that *defines* modernity There is thus much weight to Dreyfus' argument that to attempt to solve our problems in this way is to move another step further clown the path to fully technologized forms of life that obliterate the possibility of our encountering our relational selfhood. But where does this leave us as we negotiate the ambiguities of daily life? If I choose to reduce toxicity in my family's diet by the collection of rain water, by turning my backyard and local public land over to organic forms of food production, by adopting simple passive design methods to reduce the risk of termite damage, by cycling to avoid the combustion of fuel, or by bartering for the vegetable‑based paints made by a neighbor, am I necessarily falling prey to a death‑defying desire for control? Conversely, are philosophers who spend long hours meditating on Hólderlin or the *term in* their everyday practices, thereby released from the oppressive ontological grasp of technology! I think not.

### AT: Grammar Bad

#### Predictability via resolutional grammar is not anti-black, you can make arguments for why expert definitions should not be preferred and define one of the resolutional words using organic intellectualism but you didn’t counter-define a word in this debate

#### Grammar allows language and communication to be possible, it’s necessary for all understanding

Praise and Meenakshi, 14, Professors at VIT University ( Samuel and K. , “Importance of grammar in communication”, International Journal of Research Studies in Language Learning 2015 January, Volume 4 Number 1, http://www.consortiacademia.org/index.php/ijrsll/article/view/789/365)

The relationship between grammar to language is not simply a regulatory device but even something more than that. When grammar is prioritized over communication in the context of language, the term grammar is not used in the sense of a textbook, or in the sense of anything as specific as a set of rules of a language, such as gender, number, person, subject-verb or object-verb agreement, word order, subordinating devices and so on. In generative grammar the set of such highly abstract principles is called Universal grammar. The nature of this grammar which is the reality of language is not given but is to be hypostatized. Its reality is the fact that speakers have an internal knowledge about it although they are unable to externalize that knowledge. In this sense, then, language as it is known exists only as an epiphenomenon, as used by Chomsky. From such a perspective, it is easy to see how grammar is the real thing and language an appearance. Thus, what is called as grammar in this abstract sense is to be seen as a set of boundary conditions under which language becomes possible. Within the boundaries however various further possibilities exist, giving rise to a whole range of multiplicities and variations. Internal choices are also responsible for language change in course of time. Languages change because of many factors, sometimes accidentally but often due to contact situations. This is not denied when it is said that ‘grammar’ is a priori; for whatever roles these forces play, they do not change the basic shape of language. Grammar is also the pursuit of an activity as much the way Collingwood says what art is. In trying to arrive at an understanding of any activity, one must begin with a mass of experience related to that activity; and this experience cannot be acquired by philosophical thinking, or by scientific experiments, or by observation of the activity in other people, but only by a long and specialized pursuit of activity itself. Only after this experience has been acquired is it possible to reflect upon it and to bring to light the principles underlying it (Collingwood, 1925, pp. 8-9). From this it is clear, that one cannot reflect on grammar without actually doing grammar. These remarks of Collingwood, made in respect of the philosophy of art, underscore the importance of doing something well before venturing to talk about it, and that applies to the field of grammar without doubt. It is liked to be said by us that doing grammar and thinking about it are simultaneous and mutually supportive activities. In the end of history, does each speaker decide his or her own grammar? Many people believe that that is how it is going to be. If so then grammar gradually loses its authenticity and we will have only a naïve theory of language. But grammar has been continuously resisting that end, and in that resistance, history too may have some hopes of survival! 4. Different perspectives on competence According to Chomsky, Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance (Chomsky, 1965, p. 3). Chomsky clearly distinguished the description of language form (competence) and language use (performance) and established that the speaker-listener’s internal grammar that judges the grammaticality of sentences should be the main object of investigation for linguists. ￼100 Consortia Academia Publishing According to Dell Hymes communicative competence is “appropriateness of sociocultural significance of utterance” (Canale & Swain, 1980). Hymes (1974), retaining the idea of Chomsky’s underlying grammatical competence, looks at contextual relevance as one of the crucial aspects of one’s knowledge of language and claims that meaning in communication is determined by its speech community and actual communicative event in question, which consists of the following components he calls SPEAKING (a mnemonic code word): Setting, Participants, Ends, Act sequence, Key, Instrumentalities, Norms of interaction and interpretation and Genre (Hymes, 1974). These are broadly considered speech contexts in which real verbal interactions takes place. 5. Conclusion From what has been read before it is realized that without rules there is chaos. Grammar is merely a set of rules to preserve the written word. Without these standards there would be no continuity of language and over time communication of ideas would suffer. As people from different parts of the world try to talk in English which is influenced by their own mother tongue, there are errors in grammar and sentence pattern. If one can master grammar, He or She can unlock ideas and thoughts that were written across time and place. Proper grammar is very important. Correct grammar keeps from being misunderstood and lets us effectively express our thoughts and ideas. The way we communicate is extremely important in our profession and society. While modern technology and social media have less formal forms of communication, we are expected to produce perfect grammar in professional settings. Glaring errors in spellings and punctuation are judged before the content of the work. Grammar gives language users the control of expression and communication in everyday life. Mastery over the words help speakers communicate their emotions and purpose more effectively. Even though changes in grammar are made from old to contemporary, grammar can change its shape according to the trend but the importance or the role played by grammar still remains the same.

### AT: “Truth is Violent”

#### “Truth bad” is a flagrant double-turn---the entire aff makes “strong truth” claims

#### If they can describe their truth claims as contingent, so can we

#### Making truth claims is inevitable, vital to solve either team’s impacts, and unrelated to “imposing” truths violently

**Eagleton ‘3** [Terry; 2003; Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University; *After Theory*, Basic Books: New York, NY, p. 105-9]

If it is true that a situation is racist, then it is absolutely true. It is not just my opinion, or yours. But of course it may not be true. Or it may be partially true - in which case it absolutely is partially true, as opposed to being completely true or not true at all. Defenders of absolute truth are not necessarily dogmatists. In any case, dogmatism does just not mean thumping the table with one hand and clutching your opponent by the throat with the other. It means refusing to give grounds for your beliefs, appealing instead simply to authority. There are plenty of courteous, soft-spoken dogmatists. Holding something to be absolutely true does not mean affirming it against all conceivable evidence and argument, and refusing in any circumstances to concede that you are mistaken. Those who believe in absolute truth may well be the kind of people who are pathologically cautious about accepting anything as true unless it seems plainly undeniable. They may stumble through life in a haze of scepticism and a miasma of doubt. It is just that when they do, perhaps once every decade or so, come grudgingly to accept a proposition such as ‘The head gardener has just shot himself through the foot’ as true, they recognize that its opposite cannot also be true, and that its being true for them means its being true for everyone else as well. Nor does ‘absolutely true’ mean true independently of any context. We can only judge the world from within some kind of framework. But this does not necessarily mean that what is true from one viewpoint is false from another. Elephants may be sacred for you but not for me, if this represents a difference between our ways of signifying them. But it cannot be true that elephants really are sacred, in the same way that they really have four legs, and that they are in the same sense not sacred. Cultures make sense of the world in different ways, and what some see as a fact others do not; but if truth simply means truth-for-us, then there can be no conflict between us and other cultures, since truth is equally just truth-for-them. This is tolerable enough when it comes to the sacred status of elephants, as well as being extremely convenient for us if we hold that forcing sexual relations on toddlers contributes to their emotional well-being and psychological stability in later years, and the culture next door does not. Since their view is entirely relative to their own way of life, it can naturally have no effect on our behaviour. In any case, if each cultural framework constructs the world differently enough, it is hard to see how they could share the same proposition in common. A different world yields a different meaning. Absolute truth has nothing to do with fanaticism. It does not necessarily mean the kind of truth to which you are fervently committed. ‘Erlangen is in Germany’ is absolutely true, but one would not go to one’s death for it. It is not the kind of truth which sets the blood coursing and quickens the heartbeat. It does not have the same emotional force as ‘You strangled my great-aunt, you despicable bastard!’ Most absolute truths are pretty trivial. Much the same goes for the word ‘absolute’ when used in some moral discourse. For Thomas Aquinas, ‘absolutely wrong’ does not necessarily mean ‘very, very wrong’. The word ‘absolute’ here is not an intensifier. It just means ‘shouldn’t be done under any circumstances’. Aquinas thought rather strangely that lying was absolutely wrong, but not killing; but he did not of course believe that lying was always more grievous an offence than killing. Being of reasonable intelligence, he appreciated well enough that lying is sometimes pretty harmless. It was just that for him it was absolutely wrong. Absolute truth is not truth removed from time and change. Things that are true at one time can cease to be true at another, or new truths can emerge. The claim that some truth is absolute is a claim about what it means to call something true, not a denial that there are different truths at different times. Absolute truth does not mean non-historical truth: it does not mean the kind of truths which drop from the sky, or which are vouchsafed to us by some bogus prophet from Utah. On the contrary, they are truths which are discovered by argument, evidence, experiment, investigation. A lot of what is taken as (absolutely) true at any given time will no doubt turn out to be false. Most apparently watertight scientific hypotheses have turned out to be full of holes. Not everything which is considered to be true is actually true. But it remains the case that it cannot just be raining from my viewpoint. Why does any of this matter? It matters, for one thing, because it belongs to our dignity as moderately rational creatures to know the truth. And that includes knowing the truth about truth. It is best not to be deceived if we can possibly help it. But it also matters because a ludicrous bugbear has been made of the word 'absolute' in this context; and because if the relativist is right, then truth is emptied of much of its value. As Bernard Williams points out, relativism is really a way of explaining away conflict.2 If you maintain that democracy means everyone being allowed to vote, while I maintain it means that only those people may vote who have passed a set of fiendishly complicated intelligence tests, there will always be a liberal on hand to claim that we are both right from our different points of view. If true loses its force, then political radicals can stop talking as though it is unequivocally true that women are oppressed or that the planet is being gradually poisoned by corporate greed. They may still want to insist that logic is a ruling-class conspiracy, but they cannot logically expect anyone to believe them. The champions of Enlightenment are right: truth indeed exists. But so are their counter-Enlightenment critics: there is indeed truth, but it is monstrous.

### AT: Power

#### Power’s argument is the opposite of the aff---she’s a Marxist who thinks the government should provide forms of social insurance through reforms, and thinks some debates are good

Power 13 (Nina, “What might a world without work look like?,” The Guardian, Proquest)

As with all major institutional entities – law, prison, education – to question work is to tamper with reality itself. As with law, prison and education, it is almost always "never a good time" to talk about reform, or the abolition of existing structures. The ideological mishmash represented by the word itself is worth examining. Paid employment is an economic necessity for all but a tiny percentage of the population, but "work" is tied up with miasmic qualities that touch on social and even quasi-religious elements: identity, status, community, habit, duty. Business Today: sign up for a morning shot of financial news Read more The Tories, as ever, seek to exploit these complex social, moral and economic factors in the crassest way possible. Just as the "big society" sought to cynically exploit genuine fellow feeling by turning social and cultural life into an unstable amalgam of philanthropy and volunteering – thus eliminating the role of state provision – the recent campaign opposing "strivers" to "scroungers" and pledging to support "workers not shirkers" is an opportunistic mobilisation of the residual idea that to work is to be a good person. This idea, reinforced by TV shows (The Fairy Jobmother, for example), implies that to be unemployed is a personal, moral failing, and that if you just tried harder, got a haircut or on your bike, or changed your attitude, employment would fall into your lap like a leaf dropped by a benevolent Job-God. The reality of attempting to make work a moral, personal issue, rather than a global, structural, economic one has devastating consequences, not only on those who are unemployed or precariously employed, but on those deemed "fit to work" when manifestly they are not. The stripping of disability benefits by Atos and the Department for Work and Pensions did little to push those deemed fit to work into jobs, but left many impoverished and suicidal. When work is used as a moral stick to beat the population with, it is clear that the imperative is less to actually employ people than to cut government spending, with the bonus that the most vulnerable can be used as political scapegoats. Campaigns against unpaid work as a condition of receiving benefits – workfare – and cuts affecting disabled people have drawn out the truth behind government schemes. Boycott Workfare and Disabled People Against Cuts, among others, have drawn repeated and serious attention to the punitive nature of deeming people fit for work, or attempting to place people in jobs when the jobs don't exist or are unpaid. The value of labour as such – from internships across the creative industries and media to the pittance paid to factory workers across the world – is deliberately undermined by those who profit from it, as it always has been. But as wages bear less and less relation to the cost of living, it seems as good a time as any to ask if the underlying fantasy is that employers will one day be able to pay their workers nothing at all, because all those issues like housing, food, clothing, childcare will somehow be dealt with in another, mysterious, way. In the current state of the UK economy, as identified by John Lanchester, the labour market looks very strange: The "truly weird and not at all understood fact is that this self-same economy has been energetically producing jobs. In the quarter to October, in the middle of this Stygian economic gloom, the British economy added 82,000 jobs. That's an all-time quarterly record. From the normal economic perspective, this makes almost no sense." As Lanchester notes, these jobs are part-time and low-paid; jobs with some security – those in the public sector where women dominate – are being eliminated, for good if the Tories have their way. Employment, presented as an all-encompassing existential imperative, nevertheless exists less and less to provide a living, let alone a life. But against this backdrop – rising inflation, increasing job insecurity, geographically asymmetrical unemployment, attacks on the working and non-working populations, and cuts to benefits – a debate about what work is and what it means has been taking place. Some discussions at Occupy focused on what an anti-work (or post-work) politics might mean, and campaigns not only for a living wage but for a guaranteed, non-means-tested "citizen's income" are gathering pace. The chances of a scratchcard winning you a life without work are of course miniscule, but as what it means to work becomes both more obscure and increasingly desperate, 2013 might be the perfect time to ask what work is, what it means, and what it might mean to live without it. As Marx put it in his 1880 proposal for a workers' inquiry: "We hope to meet … with the support of all workers in town and country who understand that they alone can describe with full knowledge the misfortunes from which they suffer and that only they, and not saviours sent by providence, can energetically apply the healing remedies for the social ills that they are prey to." In other words, the best place to start would be with those who have a relation to work as such – which is to say nearly everyone, employed or otherwise.

#### Their article also got taken down because their author was spreading transphobic hate speech---reject her scholarship

**Hostis Journal 16** ZINE: “It’s Not a Debate, It’s War!” Posted on April 8, 2016 by hostisjournal. Accessed February 1st 2020. <https://incivility.org/2016/04/08/zine-its-not-a-debate-its-war/> || OES-SW

On Hostis’s removal of Nina Power’s ‘zine ‘It’s Not a Debate, It’s a War’:

We are removing this pamphlet as an act of solidarity with transfeminism. Hostis has always defined politics as acts of partisanship in the ethical game of alliances. Our actions follow from the conviction that there is no room for debating reactionaries. There will always be intense heartache in the decision to introduce distance between people, concepts, and projects that once established friendships. But that is why these actions bear such an important title: politics.

#### This should put the bombastic rhetoric of policing and how institutions “dictate the boundaries of ‘reasonable’ discussion”---she’s an alt-right free speech hack complaining about censoring her hate speech towards transgender, black, muslim, and jewish people

**Stupart ND** Linda Stupart is an artist, writer, and educator from Cape Town, South Africa. They completed their PhD at Goldsmiths in 2016, with a project engaged in new considerations of objectification and abjection. “On trauma, paranoia, and fascism (and on Nina Power).” No Date Listed. <https://www.thewhitepube.co.uk/on-trauma> || OES-SW

Without Nina Power, I may never have broken into academia in the UK. She supported me emotionally, financially, and professionally, in ways that were sisterly and generous. These things – friendship, trauma, and love – make it hard to divest of a person. Equally, for myself and many of my peers, there is an overwhelming feeling of having failed both Power, and ‘the movement’, now that it is clear that former feminist activist and comrade[1], Nina Power, is openly aligning herself with violent ‘edgelord’[2] alt-right men[3]; transphobes[4], and has definitively divested herself of contemporary feminist thought[5]. I do think it is important to clearly say that right now, Power should not be speaking as a feminist in public (since she has clearly said she has no allegiance to contemporary feminisms); and to interrogate the harm her ideas are doing in academic, social, and political circles, particularly to transgender people, but also all those most affected by the rise in alt-right sympathies, including people of colour, women, and the Muslim and Jewish communities. \*\*footnotes inserted below for the above paragraph: 1. Though Power is well known as a feminist, she also worked on anti-racist and anti-police violence campaigns, including anti-fascist protests, working with Defend the Right to Protest, and supporting families of people who have been murdered by the police. 2. Someone who attempts to seem edgy or cool by doing and saying intentionally harmful, socially unacceptable and ‘politically incorrect’ things, often online. 3. D.C. Miller is most well known in the UK for being the sole counter protestor at the demonstration to shut down LD-50 gallery, after it was discovered they were hosting confirmed alt-right commentator, Nick Land, and open ethno – nationalist Brett Stevens, among others. Miller, like many in the alt-right, ‘ironically’ flirts with fascism e.g. performing as esoteric fascist and artist, Julius Evola, in Athens. Miller has, on his public twitter account, also referred to [sic] ‘transsexual’ people as having a “psychotic” relation to the symbolic; defended Richard Spencer as having ‘done nothing wrong’, threatened the young women who run the White Pube (“time is running out for these textbook psychopaths”) and, as I discovered in writing this, had much to say about me, including: “Linda identifies as an iceberg, and her pronoun is ‘Ugh’”, “meet the new curator of the r\*\*\*\*d biennale”; and referred to me as “grotesque” etc. Power has recently also cheerfully appeared with Miller in Youtube videos hosted by Justin Murphey, most well known for being suspended from his academic post at Southampton University for comparing abortion rights to necrophilia, continuing that “"Y'know, you could actually justify necrophilia on grounds of queer politics or even more mainstream feminist politics” and responding to criticisms of ableism from students with, “And there is a difference between ableism and calling r\*\*\*\*ds r\*\*\*\*ds." 4. Power has herself compared gender dysphoria with eating disorders, and gender affirming medical interventions with self-harm. She has also uncritically attended ‘Woman’s Place’ meetings, a group dedicated to keeping transgender women out of women-only spaces, with a focus on support services for women who have faced violence. Furthermore, posting on her public Facebook account, Power came out in support of Helen Steel and Venice Allen around the time of the Gender Recognition Act consultation in 2018 when both Steel and Allen were focused on the transphobic bullying of then-teenager Lily Madigan, who had been voted into a Women’s Officer position in the Labour Party. In Power’s 2019 video with D.C Miller and Justin Murphey2, ‘Hate Speech, Feminism, & Paganism’, Murphey introduces Nina Power by saying she has “gotten into trouble recently” due to a “deviation on some relatively uncontroversial fact of reality”, which Murphey then clarifies as being “around trans issues”. Nina smiles, and does not contest this. 5. In her 2019 video with D.C Miller and Justin Murphey, ‘Hate Speech, Feminism, & Paganism’, Power states, “I do not have an allegiance to any of what is called Feminism today”

### AT: Psychology Args

#### Every arg about a neurological drive compelling racism is warrantless and believing it ensures fatalistic attitudes that turn any other positive impact to the aff

Hook, 21—Associate Professor of Psychology at Duquesne University (Derek, “Pilfered pleasure: on racism as “the theft of enjoyment”,” *Lacan and Race: Racism, Identity, and Psychoanalytic Theory*, Chapter 2, pg 36-39)

What is immediately striking in these extracts is the role played by affect, or more accurately yet, by the “pained stimulation” of the aroused passions of enjoyment. What both authors highlight—and this speaks to the analytical value of the concept—is that forms of excess stimulation (the “negative pleasure” of jouissance) underlie and propel Symbolic and political constructions of otherness. Different cultural modes of enjoyment are, furthermore, fundamentally discordant. We have then not so much a “Clash of Civilizations”—to reference the Samuel Huntington’s (1997) much cited thesis—as a clash of enjoyments. Moreover, the difficulty that we have in realizing “full” enjoyment—something that is impossible in Lacanian theory for “castrated” speaking beings—is dealt with by imagining the supposedly unimpaired and inevitably disturbing enjoyment possessed by cultural/racial/sexual others. In short, the fact that we cannot attain the jouissance we feel we deserve results in perceptions of an unhindered, illegitimate, and undeserved enjoyment on the part of others. As Sheldon George notes: “the other’s jouissance, or enjoyment, [is] … the very core around which … otherness articulates itself” (2016: 3). Political jealousy, as Žižek calls it, is thus (at least in part) the result of incompatibilities and more importantly yet, perceived sacrifices of jouissance. Jouissance: unserviceable tool of political analysis? Despite having offered only a brief introduction to the above Lacanian ideas, we should pause here for a moment to voice a number of prospective methodological and conceptual problems implied by the racism as (theft of) enjoyment thesis. Doing so will help us focus the expository comments to follow, and indeed, to highlight the potential analytical advantages the thesis may have to offer. The first critique, which applies to a wide historical range of psychoanalytic theories of racism (see Cohen, 2002; Frosh 1989; Stavrakis 1999), is that of psychological reductionism. Simply put: the complexity of the various historical, discursive, and socioeconomic causes of racism are invariably deprioritized and accorded a peripheral explanatory role once the domain of the psychological is privileged. Accounts of the psychological factors underlying various instances of racism are thus not only de-historicizing and hopelessly generalizing; they are also invariably depoliticizing. A second critique: is jouissance not a hopelessly open-ended concept? Virtually any cultural behaviour, bodily intensity or libidinal activity can, it seems, be considered to be an instance of jouissance. In view of racism, for example, the other’s enjoyment can refer to everything from their incomprehensible cultural customs and/or religious beliefs (epitomized, for example, in odd food and dress restrictions), to perceived aspects of their distinctive physicality/sensuality (their food, the way they dance, the sound of their music), to attributions of superabundant vitality (they are excessively promiscuous, religious, lazy, etc.)? The concept of jouissance seems thus to be both underdifferentiated and overly inclusive, applying to a potentially endless array of behaviors and experiences. Without a clearer sense of how to differentiate what qualifies as enjoyment and what does not, the concept loses analytical value. A third line of critique: different modes of enjoyment are implied within the literature, without being properly distinguished. In Žižek’s descriptions of racism and jouissance, for example, jouissance is used broadly to refer to: visceral or passionate modes of experience (the “thrill of hate”); an array of enviable possessions (our “libidinal treasures”) perceived as under threat by cultural others; and a type of noxious “surplus vitality” possessed by such others. So, whose enjoyment are we most fundamentally concerned with in these notions of racism as jouissance, the other’s, or our own? What is the relationship between these two types of jouissance? And how are they related to a third mode, namely the “negative pleasure” of making—experiencing—such troubling attributions in the first place? Fourth, there is ever-present problem of de-contextualization in “shorthand” applications of the term. This leads to a situation in which enjoyment itself is treated as a causative force beyond adequate consideration of a series of accompanying concepts (the frame of fantasy, the operation of the signifier, the role of the law, the “object a” as cause of desire) that necessarily accompany its proper psychoanalytic application. What auxiliary terms must thus be utilized alongside the concept if it is to serve us as a viable analytical tool? Critique 1: the notion of enjoyment as psychologically reductionist There is a crucial passage that is repeated in a number of Žižek’s earlier books (1992, 1993, 2005) and that serves as perhaps his most direct exposition of racism as the theft of enjoyment: What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always [a kind of ] possession: the “other” wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our “way of life”) and/ or he has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. In short, what gets on our nerves, what really bothers us about the “other” is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment (the smell of his food, his “noisy” songs and dances, his strange manners, his attitudes to work—in the racist perspective, the “other” is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour)” (1992: 165). While this seems, in many ways, a gripping account, from a sociologist or historian’s perspective, the degree of reductionism is staggering. The multiple complex sociological, economic, and socio-historical variables underlying distinctive historical forms of racism are brushed aside in favor of a generalizing psychoanalytic formula. Racism = reaction to perception that the (perversely enjoying) other has stolen our enjoyment. This reduction of racism to an affective equation is evident also in Žižek’s precursor in this conceptual domain, Jacques-Alain Miller: Why does the Other remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of him, for our hatred of him in his very being? It is hatred of the enjoyment in the Other. This would be the most general formula for the modern racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of a particular way the Other enjoys … The question of tolerance or intolerance is … located on the level of tolerance or intolerance toward the enjoyment of the Other, the Other who essentially steals my own enjoyment (Miller, cited in Žižek 1993: 203). The depoliticization (indeed, the implicit psychologization) inherent in such a conceptual move is surprising inasmuch it is something that Žižek has proved critical of elsewhere. In a 1998 text, for example, Žižek outlines the charge of psychological reductionism against standard psychoanalytic explanations of racism, which offer a way of explaining racism that ignore … not only racism’s socioeconomic conditions but the sociosymbolic context of cultural values and identifications that generate reactions to the experience of ethnic otherness (1988: 154). Surely this also applies to the racism as theft of enjoyment formula outlined above? Explanations of racism as jouissance are surely prone to psychological reductionism inasmuch as they often appear to privilege a series of psychoanalytic assumptions (drive, fantasy, libido, projection, etc.) as existing prior to—or independently of—considerations of economic, historical, political, and socio-symbolic context?

#### And, they preclude genuine solutions---only evaluate replicable scientific claims

Singal ’22 [Jesse; 2022; science and culture journalist, described as “America’s best social science journalist,” by Jonathan Heidt, former science editor at New York Magazine; *The Quick Fix: Why Fad Psychology Can’t Cure Our Social Ills,* Farrar, Starr, and Giroux paperback edition, p. 6-10]

WHAT I SOON REALIZED is that our society’s fascination with psychology has a dark side: many half-baked ideas—ideas that may not be 100 percent bunk but which are severely overhyped—are being enthusiastically spread, despite a lack of hard evidence in their favor. The IAT is one example, but there are numerous others. The popularity of these ideas, as well as the breathless manner in which they are marketed by TED Talks and university press offices and journalists and podcasts, is not harmless. It misallocates resources to overclaiming researchers when others are experiencing a funding crunch, and it degrades the institution of psychology by blurring the line between behavioral science and behavioral pseudoscience.

Perhaps most important, these ideas are frequently being adopted by schools, corporations, and nonprofits eager to embrace the Next Big Thing to come out of the labs and lecture halls of Harvard or the University of Pennsylvania. As the decision-makers who work in these institutions have grown more fluent in science and cognizant of the need to look to behavioral scientists for guidance (a good thing), they’ve also become more susceptible to half-baked behavioral science (a bad thing). And this explosion of interest in psychological science has occurred at a time when, if anything, people should be more cautious about embracing new and exciting psychological claims. As we’ll see, many findings in psychology—including those featured in introductory textbooks—are failing to replicate, meaning that when researchers attempt to re-create them with new experiments, they are coming up short. This so-called replication crisis has cast a giant shadow over the entire field of psychology, and the best available evidence suggests that a sizable chunk of published psychological findings may be false (though the size of that chunk is a source of heated debate). Many psychologists themselves may be unwittingly helping to promote half-baked science that seems to be built upon a solid foundation of published research. In all likelihood, we’ll look back wincingly at some of the popular theories being taught and developed today and, all too often, transformed into sleek interventions that promise to alleviate our ills.\*

THIS BOOK IS AN ATTEMPT to explain the allure of fad psychology, why that allure is so strong, and how both individuals and institutions can do a better job of resisting it. It is important to improve our understanding of how behavioral scientific information circulates in the public realm, because only sound knowledge will earn us the improvements we wish for. Just as we can’t enact successful environmental and energy policies while denying global warming, and we can’t improve global public health without taking a stand against anti-vaccination myths, we will never solve the pressing social issues of the day—racism and inequality and the education gaps and so many others—while relying on claims about human behavior and how to change it that are half-true at best.

The spread of half-baked behavioral science can’t be explained apart from the present state of American political and intellectual life. The country has suffered from decades of rising inequality paired with interminable political dysfunction, and as institution after institution has seen its legitimacy crumble, there’s been an ever-intensifying focus on the individual. We’re living in what the Princeton historian Daniel Rodgers calls an age of fracture, the title of his invaluable 2011 book. “Conceptions of human nature that in the post–World War II era had been thick with context, social circumstance, institutions, and history gave way to conceptions of human nature that stressed choice, agency, performance, and desire,” he explains. “Strong metaphors of society were supplanted by weaker ones. Imagined collectivities shrank; notions of structure and power thinned out.”3 In this dispensation, we are taken to be discrete individuals floating around in markets, increasingly responsible for our own well-being and increasingly cut off from the big groups and institutions and shared ideas that gave American life so much of its feeling and texture and meaning in the past. (Of course, many Americans, by dint of their race or gender or religion or sexual orientation, would not want to return to that past.)

Americans are also living with the consequences of what the political scientist Jacob Hacker has termed “the great risk shift”: as the nation’s social safety net has frayed and ever more risk has been off-loaded from companies and the government onto overburdened Americans, economic insecurity has crept higher and higher up the income and wealth ladders. This only exacerbates the sense that everyone must fiercely defend their gains and stand vigilant against the possibility of sliding down into a less advantaged position. The combination of the age of fracture with the great risk shift likely affects what sort of behavioral science wins out in the marketplace of ideas: it likely shifts the focus toward improving and optimizing and repairing individuals rather than understanding how they are influenced by big, roiling forces largely beyond their control.

Within psychology, particularly social psychology, these tendencies have given rise to what I call Primeworld,4 a worldview fixated on the idea that people’s behavior is largely driven—and can be altered—by subtle forces. Central to Primeworld is, well, “primes,” the unconscious influences that, according to some psychologists, affect our behavior in surprisingly powerful ways: holding a warm drink makes people act more warmly toward others, claims one finding, and being exposed to stimuli connected to the elderly makes people walk slower, claims another. The proponents of Primeworld suggest we can work toward “fixing” individuals by helping them to understand the influence of primes and biases. Their accounts have three main characteristics: big, imposing social structures and systems are invisible, unimportant, or improved fairly easily; primes and biases have an outsize influence on societal outcomes; and these primes and biases can be fixed, to tremendously salubrious effect, thanks to the interventions offered by wise behavioral scientists.

This worldview treats complicated problems as though they can be significantly ameliorated or solved with quick fixes: with cute, cost-effective interventions by psychologists. Over and over, throughout this book, we will see situations in which otherwise brilliant researchers examining some of the most complicated problems known to humankind have adopted the tenets of Primeworld. Whereas a social scientist taking a broader view might look at a problem like “the education gap” between white and black students and explain that it has many complicated causes, ranging from segregated schools to early-life experiences to the impact of tutoring, Primeworld adherents will take a different tack. They will stress that a great deal of progress can be made by optimizing the individual participants in the system, whether students (perhaps via increasing their “grit,” meaning their ability to stick with difficult problems tenaciously) or teachers (perhaps via IAT-based trainings).

The point is not that Primeworlders deny that there’s a bigger world out there, beyond primes and biases; if you asked them, they would quickly acknowledge that yes, there is. The problem is that their work speaks for itself, advancing a set of very specific, very zoomed-in priorities. As a result of their evident excitement over exploring biases and primes and the potential to optimize individuals, almost everything else fades into the background, indistinct and all too easily ignored. But it is increasingly clear that Primeworld simply hasn’t delivered. Over and over, it has been shown that the interventions its members favor simply don’t warrant the hype they generate, and there’s strong reason to believe that they fail because they neglect to attend to deeper, more structural factors that are not easily remedied via psychological interventions.

As this book will show, this does not mean we should give up on applied behavioral science entirely. Psychology has produced some ideas—particularly certain so-called nudges and interventions targeting institutions rather than individuals—that have held up well under scrutiny, and is likely to produce more as methodological reforms take hold (which, as we will see, has already begun happening).

Still, there are good reasons to be wary of the styles of psychological research that have seized public attention in recent years. And yet we fall for quick-fix, half-baked behavioral science over and over again.

### AT: Fairness K

#### The aff can identify a correlation, but not a causal link between K debates and increased participation. Comparatively larger factors are improving, but their unevidenced, monocausal explanation hinders actual progress

Habig 10 — Jason Habig, Speech and Debate Coach for Hathaway Brown School in Ohio, serves as North Coast District Chairman in the National Forensic League, 2010 (“Assisted Rhetorical Suicide: A Response to O’Rourke and the Future of Policy Debate in Ohio,” *Rostrum*, Volume 84, Number 6, February, Available Online at http://nflonline.org/uploads/Rostrum/0210\_029\_030.pdf, Accessed 04-05-2012, p. 29-30)

This leads to the biggest problem with O’Rourke’s objections to Policy Debate. For while he correctly points to declining support for Policy Debate in Ohio, he completely misunderstands its cause; because so many others uncritically accept his analysis, O’Rourke’s arguments will only serve to feed people’s misunderstandings about Policy and further weaken its support. When you talk to Policy Debate coaches in Ohio about what is responsible for declining numbers, answers include a lack of financial resources in a state that continues to have an [end page 29] unconstitutional form of school funding, an increase in the number of other, less time-consuming forensic options for students, a lack of coaches willing to make the time commitment, and the strict limits on school transportation more than 120 miles outside of our state lines. Yet when you ask some non-Policy forensic coaches, they likely will respond with some of the same straw person ~~man~~ arguments that O’Rourke employs. This disconnect is troubling because it illustrates a sharp division within our community and perpetuates the myths and rumors about what “good” Policy Debate looks like, which are killing support for the activity in Ohio. Moreover, O’Rourke’s claim that Policy Debate is becoming the stomping ground of elite private schools is sheer fiction, as almost 75 percent of the Policy Debate teams qualified to Ohio’s state tournament in 2008 were public.2 Successful Urban Debate Leagues, many with a Policy Debate focus, have been successful throughout the nation, and efforts are underway to bring such a program to Cleveland. Organizations like the National Debate Coaches Association have made lesson plans and prepared evidence for Policy Debate free with universal access, beginning to eliminate some of the financial barriers that have hampered Policy Debate in Ohio and nationwide. Clearly many within the Policy Debate community are taking the steps necessary to increase participation in the activity by addressing these real causes of the activity’s contraction; the misunderstandings created by articles like O’Rourke’s hinder this progress significantly.

#### Their attempt to vacate debate of fairness for some forecloses the experimental curiosity needed to make possible flourishing communicative infrastructures --- only engineering debate as a space for creativity and curiosity can diminish the fearful resentment at the heart of policing

**Berlant and Helms 12** [Gesa Helms, Marina Vishmidt, Lauren Berlant, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, “Affect & the Politics of Austerity: An interview exchange with Lauren Berlant,” *Variant* 43, Spring 2012]

Can we bear to reinvent “new relational modes” across the incommensurate scenes of work-nature-intimate stranger, and not just among lovers? Can we bear to see the good of education neither as citizen-building toward monoculture (even “in difference”) nor as engineering vocational allegories of self-worth, but a space for the kinds of creativity and improvised interest that cultivate in people a curiosity about living (how it’s been and how it might be) that’s genuine and genuinely experimental and not, as you say, aspiring to an unbreachable rational space? If we are educated in experimentality and curiosity, alterity’s comic mode of recognition-in-bafflement, then we diminish our fear of the stranger and of the stranger in ourselves, the place where we don’t make any more sense than the world does, in all of our tenderness and aggression. We would refuse to do the speculative work of policing and foreclosing each other that lets the state and capital off the hook for exhausting workers and pressuring communities to clean up their act, not be inconvenient, and to be sorry they tried to live well. To make possible the time and space for flourishing affective infrastructures, of grace and graciousness, such as those I’ve described could make happiness and social optimism possible not as prophylactic fantasy or credit psychosis but in ordinary existence. All of the hustling that goes on amongst the working and non-working poor and the generally stressed has to do with the desire to coast a little instead of work and police ourselves to death. But right now there’s not a lot of easy coasting going around outside of the zones of disinhibition that provide episodes of relief from the daily exhaustion, and people seem to think that if they’re policed, if they’re always auditioning for citizenship and social membership, so too should others be forced to live near the edge of the cliff and earn standing, the right to stand. Welfare used to be called ‘relief’. ‘Relief’ must have said much more than it was bearable to say about the capitalist stress position.

So then, you ask, how can we reroute shame for making a better social world. Is turning a “shame on you” back on the state effective for organizing not only social justice but an image of a better state, better labor relations, better sociality amongst strangers whose class and collective interest is really not the same, really not ambitious to produce the same better good life? Partly I’m a pragmatist: whatever works to interfere with the reproduction of mass injustice, in this case, the projection of the burden for revamping the cushion and the net onto the people who need the cushion and the net, while the wealthy hoard more of that for themselves. But I still think the battle to be thought through and won is at the level of the imaginary: to confront how powerfully exceptional the neoliberal and democratic economic bubbles of the last 60 years are, how expensive individualism is, how the idea of a mortgaged future needs to be confronted in its stark realities, how entirely different models of collective dependence need to be forged in relation to the reproduction of life because there is no money and the poverty is both material and imaginary. I don’t think it’s about converting shame, therefore, into pride or anything. I think it requires a hard confrontation with and a very difficult process of changing what the reproduction of life means in both pragmatic and phantasmatic terms. What this means will vary, but its impact on the political and on the social relations of labour will be astonishing, because it has to happen: there will be politics, and there will be sacrifice, and there will be a chaos of wants responded to badly and with a bigger burden on the already vulnerable unless they converge to rethink their own investments in inequality and xenophobia, the ready-to-hand fear formations. In Slow Death6 I argue that the long process of delegating worse life and earlier death to the poor and hyper-exploited is now becoming general through the population, such that mental health and physical health are at war (as seen in the amount of alcoholism and obesity rampant wherever a commodity culture reigns as the collective scene for forging pleasure in a now beyond which there is no future) and that mental health is winning (if what we mean is affective, appetitive relief from exhausted sovereignty). Can people bear to fight themselves for better versions of the good life for everyone? Or are we now spiralling down the rabbit hole of liberal culture, where people will only dig in and fight for the right to their individual pleasure?

### AT: Racial Battle Fatigue

#### There is no univocal black radical tradition---some black people like traditional policy debate, and some don’t. Allowing them to speak on behalf of all of them is paternalistic and encourages withdrawal from meaningful change.

Reed, 12-27-21—Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania (Adolph, interviewed by Jason Myles and Pascal Robert, “Adolph Reed Jr. on race reductionism and liberational politics,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvYcl7xkD70>, 1:14:05-1:19:22)

Well, there is no Black community. I mean, not like that. Not that comes fully formed and whole with an interest that can be imputed or that overrides all the discrete interests that are at play. And I think this is one of the problems with notions like Black freedom struggle and stuff like that, that there’s a lack of historical specificity that leads the radicals to posit the ideal constituency at a level of abstraction that doesn’t help you connect with actual people’s actual concerns.

And this is, I think, perfectly demonstrated in how radicals moved from generic Black Power radicalism and the warrants, like putting Black faces in previously all-white places and Black economic development stuff, to construct these three different variants of what I would argue are the same ontological fantasy. That’s why it’s called an ideology. Pan-Africanism, culturalism, and the scientific socialism that the new communists embraced.

Because in each case, the move was to withdraw from – And there was a comparable thing going on in SDS too, by the way, or coming out of SDS – But to withdraw from the plane of mundane struggle where people’s lives were played out. To go into the closet, basically, or the sanctuary, and develop some abstraction called an ideology, that in each case was understood to be like an internally consistent belief system. Like a religion, basically. That’s what they all were. And the politics that was warranted from each of these ideologies was in some way apocalyptic. So, when people used to talk about shit like when the revolution comes. Well, in the first place, that’s not the way stuff works. And granted, I was the last [inaudible] so what the hell, right, because they weren’t the only ones doing it.

So, what radicals saw was… We hit the streets like moonies, basically, or Jehovah’s Witnesses, or whoever the people are who go around and ring your doorbell. And by the way, it used to work back in the day, a long time ago, that when they rang your doorbell you’d just say, I’m Catholic, and they’d run away like they’d just seen Satan. But that apparently doesn’t work anymore.

But anyway. So what political action was considered to be was proselytizing the ideology, not trying to organize around concrete programs and undertakings that would make people’s lives better. And that brings us back into the thin and abstract character of the symbols of new radicalism. Like, you knew that you were a Panther because you had that beret and that jacket. You knew you were a Nationalist because you had the dashiki and a beard like Maulana Karenga, and you knew you were Pan-Africanist because you dressed like a loser.

But none of those had any concrete content. I know it felt like it to the radicals. The radicals felt that all this stuff was deeply meaningful. But only to congregants in the church and to competitors from those other two churches. And again, bourgeois politicians, both the elected type and the war on poverty type, or the rest of them, were able just to take advantage of that stuff because they had an institutional program to offer people.

So, I think, yeah. I think it’s correct that the radicals weren’t able to overcome the class character or the class forces that were shaping Black politics, but they weren’t able to overcome it because they never engaged with it. Because part of the deal was denying their existence. And see, that’s when you get constructs like, or odd notions of what class meant. It had more to do with behavioral and consumption preferences than with… And see, this takes back to the notion of racial authenticity as the basis for politics. Right?

#### Racial battle fatigue caused by things outside of debate, and even within zero reason ballot solves

#### Meliorism, or pragmatic hope, better combats racial battle fatigue---aiming for proximate, possible goals solves their offense---it’s uniquely true in the context of refining demands over a series of debates

Stitzlein ’18 [Sarah; 2018; Professor, University of Cincinnati School of Education; Contemporary Pragmatis, “Hoping and Democracy,” 15]

What ought I hope for? This question guides our pursuit of the good life and its answer is often shaped by our social, political, and educational experiences. We aren’t born with ready-made hopes; rather, we shape them through our interactions with others, our growing sense of what is possible as we learn about our environment, and our experiments with the world to see what we can do within it and to change it. Other people play an important role in this process, especially through institutions like schools, social arrangements like families, and political practices like democracy. They shape the traditions and expectations we inherit, as well as the ways in which we test, challenge, and revise what has been passed on to us. Despite this, hope is too often described in individualist terms that fail to encapsulate the full process of hoping and its potential impact on shared living. Many theologians link hope with an individual’s faith in a deity who will act on his or her behalf, 1 some philosophers employ a narrow understanding of hope as an individual’s desire for an outcome in the face of uncertainty, 2 while many more psychologists describe hope as an individual’s use of willpower and “waypower” to achieve clear goals. 3 Instead, I will offer a pragmatist account of hope, which is firmly rooted in the experiences of individuals and grows out of real life circumstances, yet cannot be disconnected from social and political life. 4 I extend my account to show how a pragmatist view of hope is necessarily connected to other people and can be used to enrich our experiences in communities. Moreover, such hope can help us to better face current political struggles and social problems, all the while building a democratic identity together. 5 In this article, I will explain how pragmatism offers an enhanced understanding of hope and its role in our lives together. To examine the ways in which shared hoping and the shared content of our hopes shape our identity and our work together in democracy, I consider both how and what we hope. Unlike other accounts of hope that are largely divorced from life’s circumstances, such as theological accounts that direct our attention to deities and psychological accounts that tell us we must hope for our goals regardless of real world constraints, pragmatist hope is noteworthy because it is firmly rooted in reality. 6 Moreover, a pragmatist account addresses some of the current obstacles we face in American democracy and is capable of transforming or improving them. Perhaps more importantly, such hope can be directly and indirectly cultivated within citizens, thereby offering a feasible way that democratic life can be strengthened.

1 Present Context

Before looking at hope in detail, let’s briefly first take stock of current conditions that relate to hopelessness in personal and political life. In pragmatist spirit, the account I offer here must attend to real conditions. Unfortunately, these are conditions where hope is struggling, where democracy may be in jeopardy, and where the dominant form of hope that we do see is largely privatized. To begin, a recent study using the World Values Survey and other polling sources finds that democratic citizens have “become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives.” 7 Those citizens have increasingly withdrawn from democratic participation, whether that be through formal institutions or alternatives in the public or civic spheres, such as joining in movements or protests. There has been a dramatic shift in how the wealthy view democracy, with 16 percent of them now believing that military rule is a better way of living and an astounding 35 percent of rich young Americans holding such a view. 8 There are likely many factors impacting this current state of affairs and I will touch on a few here. 9 First, in terms of hope most overtly, Alan Mittleman rightly notes that “the legitimacy of politics is damaged in proportion to its failure to fulfil the hopes it has engendered.” 10 Indeed, several recent American candidates ran on messages of hope and yet the visions evoked have often failed to be fulfilled in reality, crushing the heightened expectations of citizens. Politicians often use the rhetoric of hope, but they tend to distort what hope really is and what it requires of citizens, as I will explain later. Instead, they make reference to the supposed destiny of the nation with God as its backer. Or, as in the cases of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, some citizens place their hope in the leader himself, invoking a messianic figure. These forms of hope entail no more citizen action than, perhaps, donating to a campaign or wearing an iconic t-shirt proclaiming “hope.” Instead, I will argue that, rather than passively relying on the hope promised by politicians, citizens must participate in shaping and fulfilling hope, making such hope more genuine and robust. Second, structural violence and inequality, common amongst poor and racial minority communities in America, has wreaked havoc on hope. In some cases, it has eroded hope. 11 In others it has rendered hope exhausting, 12

**[footnote 12 begins]**

Calvin Warren, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” cr: The New Centennial Review, 15 (2015), pp. 215–248. Shannon Sullivan, “Setting aside hope: A pragmatist approach to racial justice,” in Pragmatism and Justice, ed. by Susan Dielman, David Rondel, and Christopher Voparil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

**[footnote 12 ends]**

with marginalized citizens told that they must never give up hope and that they must keep trying to earn a better life for themselves, in part through improving their own character regardless of the stagnant harmful practices of others. Many of those citizens are left either nihilistically without hope or perpetually chasing a vision of justice that is (perhaps sometimes intentionally kept) out of reach. 13

**[footnote 13 begins]**

Calvin Warren, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” cr: The New Centennial Review, 15 (2015): 215–248.

**[footnote 13 ends]**

I intend to describe a form of hope that is more sustainable and more attuned to the real conditions of life that we can control and others where we have limited control. Third, citizenship in America has increasingly become centered on individuals, personal responsibility, entrepreneurship, and private success. Historical accounts of rugged individualism have now joined forces with calls to educate children in grit and expectations that one will fight to earn one’s position and goods in a competitive marketplace. 14 This environment lacks trust in others and discourages collaborative effort. Often those who have not been successful in the past, or do not see viable avenues for being so in the future, fatalistically accept these conditions and become passive about countering or changing them. While others who have enough resources and power to be comfortable with the present conditions, indulge in the privilege of being cynical or apathetic. Some spread these states of hopelessness or jaded negativity through memes and messages on social media, especially about the role and effectiveness of government, rendering cynicism a collective practice. 15 Cynics, left believing that their political efforts are useless or ineffective and perhaps that everyone acts on self-interest, are left to look out merely for themselves, without a sense of responsibility to act on behalf of themselves and others. Indeed, cynics may mock others who do not hold such views as naïve and out of touch with reality. Cynicism functions as a distancing maneuver, separating citizens from each other, from formal democratic institutions, and from civic organizations, where visions of an improved world and action to achieve it tend to occur. My notion of hope aims to span those divides. Finally, what is left of hope has become privatized. 16 This is exacerbated as neoliberalism continues to assert Margaret Thatcher’s claims, “There is no such thing as society, only individuals and families,” and “there is no alternative to the market.” Hope is reduced to a mere drive to achieve one’s own limited dreams, or those of one’s children, typically only through financial terms and material goods. When citizens are rendered isolated competitors, they lose the ability to detect social problems and the motivation to ameliorate them, especially if the effects on one’s self or family are not immediate. Economist Tyler Cowen describes these citizens as the new “complacent class,” who are content with the way things are as long as they are not directly harmed and as long as they can stay surrounded by people and things that confirm their experience of the world. In their complacency, the members of the complacent class are unable to “inspire an electorate with any kind of strong positive visions, other than some marginal adjustments.” 17 I aim to show how hope is better understand as a social and political endeavor that brings us into contact with others as we craft visions of the future. In sum, these changes in citizens’ lives and views debilitate individual citizens and democracy as a whole. They keep us from recognizing and solving collective problems and from leading better lives together. Citizens sit around waiting for reasons to hope, sometimes becoming swept up in campaign rhetoric when election cycles come around, rather than acknowledging that hope is generated through action as subjects working together, as I will argue. I will turn now to depict a pragmatist account of hope that can be formally cultivated in schools and informally in our lives together—a way of hoping together that may better support democratic life in these challenging times.

2 Pragmatist Hope

I offer here a pragmatist account of hope, largely based in the philosophy of John Dewey. Notably, Dewey himself does not provide such an account, even though hope underlies much of his work and was evident in his own personal life as he encountered considerable despair at the loss of two of his children and his wife, while also facing two world wars. I construct a view of hope from Dewey’s well-articulated elements of inquiry, growth, truth, meliorism, and habits. Pragmatism begins with the real and complicated conditions of our world. It brings together intelligent reflection with inquiry, habits, and action so that we can understand and change our environments to better align with our needs and desires. Hope plays an important role in that process.

Inquiry, Growth, and Truth

For Dewey, hope often arises within the midst of despair, when we have lost our way and are struggling to move forward. Dewey describes these moments as “indeterminate situations.” He turns to the process of inquiry via the empirical method to help us explore those situations, consider possible courses of action, and test out various solutions. It is inquiry that helps us to understand, act upon, and reconstruct our environments and our experiences so that we are able to move forward out of the indeterminate situation. In a richly cognitive and often social practice, inquiry invokes curiosity and problem solving to move us out of ruts. Indeed, this method combats the stagnation of fatalism by urging us to formulate and try out solutions. Growth describes how reconstructions of our experiences through inquiry develops physical, intellectual, and moral capacities, actualizing them and helping them inform one another so that they continue in a chain that enables one to live satisfactorily. We grow when we learn from inquiry into indeterminate situations and create ways to re-establish smooth living that carries us from one activity to the next. Many people wrongly assume that growth necessarily has an end—as if it were “movement toward a fixed goal.” 18 We tend to think of growth as only progression toward some specific outcome, such as mastering bicycle riding or graduating from high school. But this way of thinking tends to place the emphasis on the static terminus, rather than focusing on the process of growing as itself educative and worthwhile. Dewey’s alternative view of growth does not neatly and linearly move toward a fixed goal. Instead, he describes trajectories that are more complicated, often shifting with the environment. Moreover, holding onto a fixed goal may be undesirable because doing so employs a limited or possibly foreclosed vision of the future. Instead, as changes occur in one’s environment, Dewey asserts that people must continually inquire into moments of uncertainty and changing circumstances, develop new hypotheses about those situations, and revise their aims. Dewey works with what he calls “ends-in-view,” which are relatively close and feasible, even if difficult to achieve, rather than overarching goals at some final endpoint in the future. Those ends-in-view guide our decisions and hypotheses along the way, keeping us resourceful in the present. In Dewey’s words, the discovery of how things do occur makes it possible to conceive of their happening at will, and gives us a start on selecting and combining the conditions, the means, to command their happening…there must be a realistic study of actual conditions and the mode or law of natural event, in order to give the imagined or ideal object definite form and solid substance—to give it, in short, practicality and constitute it as a working end. 19 For Dewey, ends and means are intelligently considered in light of each other, with both being revisable, and neither abstracted from the other. Each fulfilled end-in-view sustains our hope by highlighting meaningful headway and directing our further action. Ends-in-view later become means to future ends, working in an ongoing continuum. This sustenance of hope differs from theological accounts which are difficult to sustain on faith alone and may leave believers frustrated at an apparent lack of action or improvement. It also differs from positive psychology and grit literature which tends to focus on large, far-off, and challenging goals that one holds tenaciously. Many people think of hope as goal-directed and future-oriented. While objects of hope for pragmatists may temporarily serve as ends-in-view, the practice of hope moves us forward through inquiry and experimentation as we pursue our complicated trajectory. It helps to unify our past, present, and future. Hope, then, is not just about a vision of the future, but rather a way of living in the present that is informed by the past and what is anticipated to come. Whereas utopian views of what could be may actually immobilize one and may exhaust one in the present, pragmatist hope is always tied to what one is doing and feasibly can do in the present, especially when equipped with knowledge of the past. Central to pragmatist philosophy, ideas become true insofar as they “work” for us, fruitfully combine our experiences, and lead us to further experiences that satisfy our needs. Pragmatists are concerned with the concrete differences in our lived experiences that an idea’s being true will make. Pragmatic truth expresses “the successful completing of a worthwhile leading.” 20 Unlike truth as a corresponding match between proposition and reality, pragmatist truth is something that occurs when the goals of human flourishing are satisfied, at least temporarily. Built into these criteria is consideration of the well-being of others, for successful leading through experiences almost always necessarily requires working and communicating with others. Additionally, the differences an idea will make are quite limited, and therefore less truthful, if relevant only to one person. While not a comprehensive vision of the good life, certain norms including equality and just communication are entailed both in these deliberations and the determination of truth. 21 We must consider how to flourish alongside others as we craft our ends-in-view. This differs considerably from other philosophical and psychological accounts of hope based on the desire of objects or states of affairs regardless of whether they are good for us or other people.

Meliorism

#### Political organizing isn’t labor draining, its energy producing

Loewe ’12 [B; October 15; an organizer and communicator, has served as NDLON's Communications Director, supported the Alto Arizona work against SB 1070 and Sheriff Arpaio, and participated in the organizing of the 2010 US Social Forum in Detroit; Organizing Upgrade, “An End to Self Care,” http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/blogs/b-loewe/item/729-end-to-self-care]

As long as self-care is discussed as an individual responsibility and additional task, it will be something that middle-class people with leisure time will most easily relate to and will include barriers to the lives of people without time to spare. It becomes one more unchecked box on a to-do list to feel bad about, an unreal expectation, or a far-off dream.

The movement is my self-care not my reason for needing it.

Don Andres awoke every morning at 5:00am to arrive at a street corner to look for work by 6:00am. He’d work a full day of heavy construction and still arrive at the 7:00pm meeting. He’d routinely fall asleep but he was there. Why? Because organizing together to improve conditions, to create alternatives, to band together, was the only option for how care could be anything but alien in his life as a day laborer. Being at the meeting was self-care.

Lack of care is systemic. Therefore resistance to those systems is the highest affirmation of care for oneself and one’s community. Movement work is healing work.

What self-care often misses is the reality that for the majority of people engaged in social justice movements, participation is out of necessity. That a collective effort in the form of social movement is the highest articulation of caring for one’s own self in a world designed to deny your worthiness of care. Too many people discussing self-care overlook the structural barriers that make access to the care they are speaking of impossible without the struggle they often discuss as the cause of their need to ‘take care of themselves.’

Even for someone like myself who has the majority of my materials needs met, I feel most alive, most on fire, most able to go around the clock, when I’m doing political work that feels authentic, feels like it pushes the bounds of authority, and feels like it is directly connected to advancing my individual and our collective liberation.

The truth is that we cannot knit our way to revolution. The issue is not that movements are taxing, because truly they are. It’s called ‘struggle’ for a reason. But they go from strain to overtaxing when we seek to fulfill our political aspirations through vehicles never meant to carry them like in non-political formations or some 501c3s.

The crisis of care is also a crisis of organization. Non-profits are built to do a lot of good, but they have inherent limitations that mean they are rarely built to fulfill our visions of the transformative organizing that would usher in a world where we could feel whole. Most engaged in social movements today are originally driven out of either a concrete material necessity and/or a deep connection to the wrong that accompanies inequality and a drive to make it right. However the majority of organizations available to us today are designed for gentle reforms but not the fundamental transformation our spirits crave. As a result, we try to transform a model unfit to nourish our hearts and then treat that frustration with tonics and diets and stretches instead of placing our efforts in creating a collective space that unleashes our heart’s creative desires.

Maria Poblet of Causa Justa Just Cause once said, “Burnout is not about the amount of hours you work, it is about the amount of political clarity you have.” What that means is that there is no chance of us consistently burning the midnight oil if we don’t at our core believe what we’re working on will get us to a new day and no amount of yoga or therapy or comfort food we supplement our work with will compensate for that. However, if we can see a better world just over the horizon, like a marathon runner nearing a finish line, we can find endless wells to draw upon as we work to usher it in. I have literally gone from being in debilitating pain and only being able to accomplish three hours of work each day to working 18 hour shifts the same week in a completely different context. The difference was not the conditions of my work. It was my connection to my purpose.

The problem with self-care is that there is an underlying assumption that our labor is draining. The deeper question is how do we shape our struggles so that they are life-giving instead of energy-taking processes. When did activities that are aimed to move us closer to freedom stop moving us?

#### Studies confirm---it combats burnout and racial battle fatigue

Reid ’18 [Caroline; 2018; “Activism as a Source of Strength for Black College Students at Predominately White Institutions,” https://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1588&context=honors\_theses]

Racism is deeply ingrained in American society, and white supremacy and the oppression of people of color has greatly contributed to the establishment of the very institutions that continue to perpetuate its existence today. Racism manifests itself in a variety of ways, and its most constant and daily appearance is in instances of microaggressions. These experiences contribute to feelings of invisibility, frustration, and anger, an experience known as racism- related stress, which research has shown to severely and negatively impact mental health. In order to combat the insidious effects of racism, Black Americans have utilized coping mechanisms for generations. This resiliency is astoundingly powerful, however, dealing with the omnipresence of racism is a constant and significant internal labor. For Black college students at predominately white institutions, microaggresions and systemic racism create a difficult environment to navigate. Unique opportunities in activism manifest themselves as tools to combat discrimination and racism-related stress. However, some argue that caution is needed in viewing activism as panacea for improving the lives of people of color, particularly Black people. Indeed, some research has suggested that activism is harmful to mental health, as it increases the intensity and frequency of experiences of perceived racism among some populations. This thesis includes a meta-analysis that examines the findings on the effects of activism on mental health. As a result of this analysis, a counter argument argues the potential of the utilization of activism as a source of strength that may combat the harms of racism, supporting the earlier claim that certain factors involved in activism may be protective in nature.

### AT: Sullivan 17

#### Their Sullivan evidence about battle fatigue is based on 3 sources –

#### One is a lifestyle magazine with no qualifications

#### Another one is a news article from the Boston Globe

#### We’ll insert this passage and footnotes ---

\*\*don’t read

Sullivan 17 - Chair and Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. She teaches and writes on feminist philosophy, critical philosophy of race, American pragmatism, and continental philosophy (Shannon, “Setting Aside Hope: A Pragmatist Approach to Racial Justice” page 238-239, <https://www.academia.edu/27794394/Setting_Aside_Hope_A_Pragmatist_Approach_to_Racial_Justice_2017_>)

De facto white class privilege in the form of racial microaggressions contributes to people of color's 'racial battle fatigue," which entails "the constant use' or redirection of energy for coping against mundane racism which depletes psychological and physiological resources needed in other important, creative, rand productive-areas of 'life" (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 40). Racial battle fatigue has been 'linked empirically to de- pression, tension, and generalized anxiety disorderin African Americans, and the stress associated with all of these 'psychological problems also contributes to physiological weathering that harms black health, contribut- ing to high rates of hypertension, cardiovascular-disease, pre-term birth rates, and infant mortality to name a few (Smith, Hung and Franklin 2012, 37, 40; D. Smith 2012). The effects of whige r4Cism literally get inside and help constitute they bodies of black people in harmful ways. They wear down the body's various systems by creating a high allostatic load via stressors that accumulate over tinie. The results are health problems such as disproportionately high rates of pre-term birth, infant mprtality, cardio- vascular disease, diabetes, and-accelerated physiological aging (Blitstein 2009). Racism also kills in Ways that are subtler but no less deadly than the lyncher's noose or the neighbor's bullet (Drexler 2007), These effects, moreoverj can'be transgenerational physiologically passed onto subsequent generations \*through 'varioås epigenetic changes (Sullivan 2013).

Works Cited/Footnotes







#### The only STUDY is bad news for the K –

#### Income was the *comparatively* the biggest factor– proves it’s not ontological and class outweighs

Smith et al 12 (William, Associate Professor in the Department of Education, Culture & Society and Associate Professor, Ethnic Studies Program (African American Studies division). He serves as the Associate Dean for Diversity, Access, & Equity in the College of Education and has a Presidential Appointment as the Special Assistant to the President & Faculty Athletics Representative, Dr. Smith coined the term racial battle fatigue as a theoretical framework to better understand how the biopsychosocial approach is a valuable method for examining the impact of race-related stress to the biological, psychological, and social factors and their complex interactions in the health of People of Color, Man Hung, Assistant Professor in the Department of Orthopaedics at the University of Utah. She is also affiliated with the Huntsman Cancer Institute, the Center for Clinical & Translational Science, and the Division of Epidemiology, Department of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah, & Jeremy D. Franklin, doctoral student in the Department of Education, Culture & Society at the University of Utah, “Between Hope and Racial Battle Fatigue: African American Men and Race-Related Stress,” Journal of Black Masculinity, Vol.2, No. 1)

\*MESS = mundane extreme environmental stress

Results As Table 1 shows, the Moderate Hope group had a slightly higher proportion of younger people whereas the High Hope group had slightly higher proportion of older people. Across all three levels of hope, at least a third of the participants had a high school diploma. Among High, Moderate, and Low Hope individuals, about 50%, 43%, 33% had at least some college experience or was a college graduate, respectively. While categories of annual household income were distributed rather evenly among the High and Moderate Hope groups, approximately half of the people in Low Hope group had an annual household income of less $30,000. Over 40% in the High Hope group were married. Approximately 34% and 32% of Moderate and Low Hope individuals, respectively, were married. Table 4 presents the relationship among age, income, education, racial microaggressions, and societal problems. We found that age and educational level significantly affected MEES. After controlling for age, annual household income, educational level, and racial microaggressions (b = 0.327, β = 0.258, p < 0.01) and societal problems (b = 1.199, β = 0.346, p < 0.01) still significantly affected MEES in the High Hope group. Racial microaggressions accounted for 6.4% of the variation in MEES, while societal problems accounted for 11.9%. However, when we looked at the group of African American males with Moderate Hope, we found that societal problems was not significant. Only racial microaggressions (b = 0.382, β = 0.317, p < 0.01) significantly predicted MEES in this group after controlling for demographic characteristics. The variations in MEES accounted for by racial microaggressions were 9.8%, a nd the variations accounted for by societal problems were 3.4%. Among African American males in the Low Hope group, the results indicated that none of the factors (i.e., ag e, annual household income, educational level, racial microaggressions, and societal problems) have any significant influence in MEES. Racial microaggressions and societal proble ms were no longer significant, and they only explained 3.4% and 0.5% of the variance in MEES, respectively. Altogether, age, annual household income, educational level, racial microaggressions, and societ al problems accounted for 24.3% of the total variation in MEES in the High Hope group, 27.7% in the Moderate Hope group, and 6.8% in the Low Hope group.

#### Concludes negative –hope resolves the problems of racial battle fatigue, optimism turns the k

Smith et al 12 (William, Associate Professor in the Department of Education, Culture & Society and Associate Professor, Ethnic Studies Program (African American Studies division). He serves as the Associate Dean for Diversity, Access, & Equity in the College of Education and has a Presidential Appointment as the Special Assistant to the President & Faculty Athletics Representative, Dr. Smith coined the term racial battle fatigue as a theoretical framework to better understand how the biopsychosocial approach is a valuable method for examining the impact of race-related stress to the biological, psychological, and social factors and their complex interactions in the health of People of Color, Man Hung, Assistant Professor in the Department of Orthopaedics at the University of Utah. She is also affiliated with the Huntsman Cancer Institute, the Center for Clinical & Translational Science, and the Division of Epidemiology, Department of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah, & Jeremy D. Franklin, doctoral student in the Department of Education, Culture & Society at the University of Utah, “Between Hope and Racial Battle Fatigue: African American Men and Race-Related Stress,” Journal of Black Masculinity, Vol.2, No. 1)

Hope appears to play a different role for the African American men in this study when compared to previous research. Race-related socialization appears to influence how much hope is healthy or realistic (Bowman & Howard, 1985; Brown, 2008; Fischer & Shaw, 1999; Neblett, Philip, Cogburn, & Sellers, 2006). African American men with high to moderate levels of hope had more stress associated with racial microaggressions and societal problems than did men who had low hope. Like similar findings in the study by Danoff-Burg, Prelow, and Swenson (2004), we are encouraged from our findings that hope works differently for African American men. Hope appears to be correlated with a more realistic assessment of the possibilities of experiences that African American men might face. Possessing a more realistic understanding of the potential for racist discrimination offers these men additional avenues for coping. Hope does not always have to be based in reality. Therefore, by having a more accurate understanding of racial microaggressions and societal problems, these men learn to avoid extremely harmful external control behaviors that can destroy typical or mainstream avenues for reaching their goals. It should be clear that we are not suggesting that African American men with low or moderate levels of hope are playing into a negative self-fulfilling prophecy or that they are not reaching their expected goals. However, we are suggesting that low and moderate hope men are taking into account additional realities that their high hope peers appear to overlook and therefore they are struggling with more self-reported stressors. Under these circumstances, the opening quote from Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is still appropriate in the present lives of African American men. Moreover, in our study, to be an African American man is to hope against hope that racial microaggressions, societal problems, and racial battle fatigue will diminish in the near future. Thus, we agree with Stevenson (1997), African American men must possess three important forms of racial socialization as forms of coping: proactive, protective, and adaptive. In our study, it appears that adaptive racial socialization might be playing a significant role in reducing stress among low hope African American men. Adaptive racial socialization is an orientation that recognizes the racial microaggressions and racist discrimination that pervades, identifies it, and then keeps it at bay long enough to develop room for creative counterstrategies (Stevenson, 1997). Consequently, high hope African American men, who tend to be slightly more formally educated, older, hold full-time jobs, higher incomes, and who married in greater numbers, are more at-risk from the relative safety that adaptive racial socialization provides. Maintaining or developing adaptive racial socialization strategies can enhance African American men’s belief in a world that is obfuscated with racists relations while promoting healthy self-development despite the obstacles they face (Stevenson, 1997).

### AT: Waren 11

#### Their ev is about Monopoly, but FW solves because we identifies the interpretation that causes it

**Waren 11**

Warren Waren University of Central Florida, Orlando, Using Monopoly to Introduce Concepts of Race and Ethnic Relations The Journal of Effective Teaching, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, 28-35

Pedagogical games are used to challenge our assumptions about how the world works (Waldner & Kinney, 1999). For example, the basic assumption of competitive games is fairness. This assumes that the world is fair (i.e., a meritocracy) and that individual effort or talent is the main factor in success (i.e., an ideology of individualism akin to Ross’ (1977) fundamental attribution error). In competitive games therefore, groups are treated equally and the best players win. But a pedagogical game may challenge the assumption of fairness directly by having structural inequality built into the game. The experience of a good player losing an unfair game creates cognitive dissonance—that cognitive dissonance is our teaching moment. I assume that students as game players can easily identify games that are “unfair” based on unequal outcomes for equivalent behavior. As a peda- gogical tool, I want it to be relatively easy for them to spot the explicit rules which cause the inequality.

#### the study their author cites indicates game simulations on the topic of race don’t produce solution-based thinking

Brezina 96. Timothy Brezina, “Teaching Inequality: A Simple Counterfactual Exercise,” Teaching Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 218-224. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1318814.pdf>

***\*NOTE: this is the same author that their Warren article cites, but it seems that Warren spelled “Brezina” wrong… (we place a copy of the works cited below to verify our claim)***

Frustration is another problematic re- sponse I have received from students. After conducting the thought experiment de- scribed above, one student stated that she understood how inequality "seems to be built into society," but did not see what could "be done about it." Credential infla- tion appears to be a matter ofspecial concern in this regard; even students who otherwise express little interest in societal inequalities seem to be highly interested in possible so- lutions to this problem. For current under- graduates, the process of credential inflation is much more than a simple, real-world il- lustration of stratification principles. They view the increasing numbers of college graduates, and the resulting decline in the value of educational credentials, as a relevant fact of life that threatens to undermine soci- ety's "promise" to reward those individuals who demonstrate effort and ability, and who do what is necessary to obtain high levels of education. Hence the question "What can be done?" Specifically, what can be done to ensure that motivated and able individuals, no matter what their numbers, will be pro- vided with real opportunities to achieve eco- nomic success?

***Warren Waren works cited page for reference***

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### predictability impact

#### It’s a unique case turn - the risk of extinguishing the game comes from strategic imbalances. Fairness is all that matters. Attempts to restore creativity by breaking rules fail. This turns every aspect of the case because their own anarchic impulses are actually strategic efforts to control and close down the open space of debate. That formal condition supercedes their content

Armstrong 2k (Paul B. Armstrong is Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History 31.1 (2000) 211-223

. "Play" is an aesthetic as well as an anthropological phenomenon of special interest to Iser because it is a particularly pervasive, useful, and revealing manifestation of doubling. In his vocabulary, play is not just a formal category but a general term for how differences engage one another. The basic structure of play is oscillation, or to-and-fro movement, a notion Iser borrows from his teacher Gadamer: If we examine how the word "play" is used and concentrate on its so-called metaphorical senses, we find talk of the play of light, the play of the waves, the play of gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, even a play on words. In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end; . . . rather, it renews itself in constant repetition. The movement backward and forward is obviously so central to the definition of play that it makes no difference who or what performs this movement. . . . It is the game that is played--it is irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who plays it. The play is the occurrence of the movement as such. 4 Play is not a subjective attitude or exclusively an aspect of the aesthetic experience but a potentially never-ending, ever self-renewing movement to and fro. Play sometimes shows itself in games that have a particular goal--the victory of one side or the determination of a single result--but this "instrumental play" (as Iser calls it) only achieves its end by [End Page 215] stopping play (the game is over). By contrast, "free play has to play against endings" (FI 237) and seeks to keep the back-and-forth of play in motion. In practice, free play is an idealization that can only be abstracted from the different ways games are played under specific conditions, with particular rules, toward determinate ends. As Iser explains, "the endlessness of play has to be conveyed by playing through specific possibilities, and this is done by means of games" (FI 257). Games are characterized by a "contraflow of free and instrumental play" (FI 247) that can take various forms. Games combine free and instrumental play according to different ratios. Keeping the to-and-fro in motion and aiming to establish a particular result are in a sense two aspects of play which may contradict each other, but they also depend on each other. On the one hand, no game can be purely instrumental without ceasing to be playful and becoming merely a means to an end. On the other hand, there is an instrumental quality to free play itself to the extent that each move back-and-forth is an attempt to establish meaning and decide the outcome. Even in instrumental games, however, no move has its meaning intrinsic to itself, but depends on a reply and a result it cannot entirely control: "every game begins with a move whose consequences can never be totally foreseen" (FI 261). The element of free play in all games is that no move is complete but always depends on what it is not, a future it has not yet reached. "Free play" and "instrumental play" are opposites that are deeply and profoundly linked to one another. The four categories of games, which Iser borrows from Roger Caillois--agon, alea, mimicry, and ilinx--show how free and instrumental play may combine to make games more open-ended or more directed toward finality. 5 As Iser explains, "the endlessness and the finality of play" are "two countervailing tendencies" (FI 264) that can interact differently in various kinds of games. Although agon (games of contest or struggle) and alea (where chance rules) are both defined by the ends of winning and losing, their valence may change in textual games. There "alea plays against agon, whose antithetical arrangement reduces the element of chance, whereas alea explodes" oppositions that seek to control or structure meaning and limit the play of accident (FI 261). "If agon aims to overcome the difference that arises out of antagonistically arranged positions, alea aims to intensify it, thereby making it into a rift that cannot be overcome, and reducing all play to mere chance" (FI 261). Textual games where conflict seeks resolution in the triumph of one position are countered by strategies aimed at opening up the possibility of unforeseeable, uncontainable consequences. If there are already elements of both free and instrumental play in games of conflict and of chance, then the counterflow between endlessness and finality becomes [End Page 216] even more complicated and contradictory when the different kinds of games combine. Iser describes mimicry as a game tending toward closure because it promotes "the forgetting of difference" (FI 262) between the copy and the original and opposes disruptions that might undermine the illusion of reality. But the element of free play in imitation's pursuit of verisimilitude is exposed by ilinx, the game of subverting all fixed positions in order to induce vertigo. This "carnivalization of all the positions assembled in the text" (FI 262) exposes the boundlessness and multiplicity of possible illusions given the ultimately ineradicable difference between the fictive and the real: "Ilinx may therefore be seen as a game in which free play is at its most expansive. But for all its efforts to reach beyond what is, free play remains bound to what it overshoots, because it can never quite extinguish the undercurrents and overtones of instrumental play" (FI 262). Even the subversion of roles in the interests of opening up meaning depends on instrumentally directed ends for it to undermine. Its liberating aims are significant only against the backdrop of the games of finality it undercuts. Free play and instrumental play are inextricably intertwined in the games texts play as they range between open-endedness and closure. According to Iser, "the text game is one in which limitation and endlessness can be played to an equal degree" (FI 265). On the one hand, "because of their forms, games must inevitably be limited; in contrast with play, they are designed for endings. The result ends play" (FI 265). Even with the most anarchic, disruptive, open-ended text, "the endlessness of play cannot be maintained, since the text itself is limited" (FI 257). On the other hand, in contrast to "result-oriented games, especially mathematical, strategic, and economic ones, as well as those of chance and skill, all of which are designed to remove existing play spaces," a text can take as its game the multiplication of opportunities for play, whether by "play[ing] against each other" the various games it includes or by demonstrating that they can be played without end, so that the "game is not ended by itself but by its player" (FI 265, 266). Although some determinate or didactic texts may aim to close off play in the interests of the results they desire, it is possible to play the games of even these texts in ways that keep open and expand their potentiality for meaning. Even the most instrumental text can, because it is a text, be read in ways that open it up to meanings and purposes it cannot limit (offering its games up for observation as games, for example, rather than submitting oneself to their ends, or engaging them with other modes of instrumental play governed by different notions of finality). Paradoxically, although all texts have limits because they are finite ways of playing particular games, the only ultimate limit on their capacity to [End Page 217] mean is the resourcefulness and energy of the player (or the history of readers) in keeping their play in motion. Because of these contradictions, textual games are especially illuminating models of the anthropological and social functions of play. Iser's exploration of the paradoxes of play is important not only as a clarification of the games of texts but also as an explanation of the usefulness of play as a particular way of deploying power. Both the endless to-and-fro of free play and the result-oriented moves of instrumental play entail the use of power. But the opposition of free and instrumental play distinguishes helpfully between ways power may be employed. In contrast to the widespread contemporary assumption that power aims only and always for dominance, the aim of instrumental play, to achieve victory and end the game by determining the result, contrasts with the uses of power for expanding the potential for meaning, which the to-and-fro motion of free play makes possible. The element of potential open-endedness in instrumental play suggests that even the use of power for masterful ends is not monolithic but contains a counter-movement onto which the subversive counterflow of free play can cathect. The need that free play has for limits and aims offers a critique of the dream of innocence of open-ended play without finality, but the disclosure of the playful element of instrumental games opens up the possibility that power can be used without the inevitability of coercion or violence. The mutually illuminating interaction of free and instrumental play in textual games can be seen as a model for the ethical use of power. Guided by such an ethics, instrumental play would become ironic about its ends by recognizing their limits and contingency. Such an ethics would also instruct instrumental uses of force that the achievement of their aims can be ironically self-defeating by putting an end to the game that had defined them. But such an ethics would also inform free play that its subversive, anarchic advocacy of an endless to-and-fro is empty without the forms and aims that give play meaning. The will to infinite expansion of free play would be countered by an ironic awareness of its inability to sustain itself without the other it opposes. The counterflow of free and instrumental play informing such an ethics would have the aim of preventing any one game from dominating all the others in the interests of keeping the space of play open. It would seek to have rival games engage each other with the recognition that their conflicts do not simply frustrate the will to dominance of each but can be mutually enhancing because opposing modes of play typically depend on and benefit from one another. The play-space opened up by such an ethics would be a democratic community of often incommensurable games [End Page 218] whose principle of interaction is not indifferent tolerance of the other but ironic and energetic engagement with difference. 6 An Iserian ethics of play would seek reciprocity but not consensus. This can be seen in the role of doubling in fictional play. Play is central to fictionality because, as a structure that doubles worlds, meanings, and forms against one another, the fictional is characterized by "the coexistence of the mutually exclusive" (FI 79). This "coexistence of the mutually exclusive" can be seen in the doubling of the fictive world and the real (from which it selects and combines its materials), in the kaleidoscopic multiplication of perspectives in a text (which may refuse to coalesce), in the interaction of opposing games (which pursue incompatible ends), or in the juxtaposition of the reader's experiential horizon with the worlds opened up by the text. In each case there is reciprocity between the doubled parties in that meaning is generated not by either pole on its own but by the to-and-fro between them. This doubling need not lead to resolution in order to be productive. The playful interaction of differences acquires energy and creativity from the resistance of doubled pairs to coalescing in a final synthesis. If and when unity is achieved, the play of doubling ends. The to-and-fro of play resists consensus because it depends on difference to keep it in motion, even as it requires reciprocity between the parties it engages so that the back-and-forth is not halted by violence or a lack of response. The doubling of play suggests that social and linguistic relations can be productive even if--or precisely because--they do not end in agreement. An important lesson of play is that difference need not issue in either solipsistic disconnection or violent discord if it can be staged as reciprocal exchange. The doubling of play shows that consensus is not necessary for reciprocity. Prior or final agreement is not required for meaningful exchanges to take place if conditions facilitating the to-and-fro of play between differences can be maintained. By the same token, reciprocity between opposing partners in an exchange need not thwart their ability to make and invent moves in the games through which they pursue their interests and aims. Indeed, opposing games often need one another more than they realize, and they can find their differences from one another mutually beneficial if conditions of playful doubling allow meaningful exchanges to occur. The ideal polis of play would be a community of difference based on nonconsensual reciprocity. The politics of play would entail the pursuit of this ideal. Such a politics offers an important response to the alternatives widely thought to represent the primary options available for addressing the challenges of difference. An ideal of play based on nonconsensual reciprocity opposes Habermas's notion that cultural oppositions constitute [End Page 219] a condition of fragmentation that should be overcome by noncoercive, cooperative negotiation guided by the goal of agreement. 7 Iser's explication of the values of doubling suggests that Habermas errs in assuming that consensus is an implicit ideal of language that successful communicative action undistorted by force aims to bring about. Differences may not be the result of a splitting off of faculties in the interests of specialization, but may reflect irreconcilable oppositions between games based on mutually incompatible rules, assumptions, and aims. Habermas's goal of establishing conditions of undistorted communication where no force rules other than the force of the better argument may still be valuable. But its value arises not because agreement about the "better argument" will result from uncoerced exchanges or even because power can ever be banished from such interactions (as the contradiction in the formula "no force other than . . ." implicitly recognizes). Rather, as an attempt to establish conditions of reciprocity that rule out violent intervention to decide the to-and-fro of an exchange, Habermas's model of uncoerced negotiation would facilitate play in Iser's sense of a potentially ever-renewing doubling of positions which resist synthesis or unification. The counterflow of various forms of play that Iser describes would help to establish and maintain such exchanges not by banishing force--an impossible dream--but by setting up interactions between opposing assertions of power that would counter each other's will to dominance. A play-space of reciprocally interacting positions offers an alternative to the model of consensus as an image of how communication undistorted by violence might enable differences to engage one another. Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms--is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. [End Page 220] The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play. Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity. As a rule-governed but open-ended activity, play provides a model for deploying power in a nonrepressive manner that makes creativity and innovation possible not in spite of disciplinary constraints but because of them. Not all power is playful, of course, and some restrictions are more coercive than enabling. But thinking about the power of constraints on the model of rules governing play helps to explain the paradox that restrictions can be productive rather than merely repressive. Seeing constraints as structures for establishing a play-space and as guides for practices of exchange within it envisions power not necessarily and always as a force to be resisted in the interests of freedom; it allows imagining the potential for power to become a constructive social energy that can animate games of to-and-fro exchange between participants whose possibilities for self-discovery and self-expansion are [End Page 221] enhanced by the limits shaping their interactions. Whether the one or the other of these possibilities prevails in any particular situation is not intrinsic to the structure of power; it depends, rather, on how games are played. Iser summarizes much of his thinking about literature, play, and human being in his notion of "staging." According to Iser, "staging is the indefatigable attempt to confront ourselves with ourselves, which can be done only by playing ourselves" (FI 303): "Staging in literature makes conceivable the extraordinary plasticity of human beings, who, precisely because they do not seem to have a determinable nature, can expand into an almost unlimited range of culture-bound patternings. The impossibility of being present to ourselves becomes our possibility to play ourselves out to a fullness that knows no bounds. . . . If the plasticity of human nature allows, through its multiple culture-bound patternings, limitless human self-cultivation, literature becomes a panorama of what is possible" (FI 297). The ultimate political value of literature lies not so much in the content of any particular representation as in its laying bare for observation and analysis the power of human plasticity to stage itself in ever-changing cultural forms. As a demonstration of how play can facilitate the productive doubling of mutually exclusive forms of life, literature also offers a model for how the differences through which human plasticity stages itself can beneficially interact. If "only by being staged can human beings be linked with" one another (FI 303), then playful nonconsensual reciprocity is a political form of life particularly conducive to enacting socially useful relations of difference. Iserian play has political implications because it would allow decentered human beings to produce and exchange versions of themselves in a kaleidoscopic social world.

### at: affs that play with langauge

#### Wishing for law to disappear won’t get rid of the technocratic law scholars of the world --- their linguistic indeterminancy makes it impossible to hold leaders accountable

**Passavant 10** - Associate Professor of Political Science Habart and William Smith College

(Paul, “Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever,” Constellations, 17 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.2010.00614.x)

For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not cultivate, pluralism, whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has also become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.” Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben exemplifies these tendencies within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.∂ In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.∂ Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.∂ Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? The most conservative United States Supreme Court justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations, as this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy.∂ In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, contrary to Agamben's expectations, actually **facilitate** aspirations for unitary sovereign power. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.∂ Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of John Yoo, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?∂ In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.∂ Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.∂ In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, Congress amended FISA in the summer of 2008 to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration Department of Justice lawyer Bruce Fein has decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates.”5 Perhaps **law is being deposed** as Agamben suggests.∂ Both Agamben's and Fein's observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would call disciplinary power – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 They also indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8∂ In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.

#### That means they can never address material injustices like torture and internment --- voting negative restores sovereign checks which are categorically more effective

**Passavant 12** - Associate Professor of Political Science Habart and William Smith College

(Paul, “Democracy’s ruins, democracy’s archive” in Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and Sovereign Formations eds. Buchanan et al p. 60)

Here is where we can dramatically contrast Derrida's and Fitzpatrick's attention to law with Agamben's aversion to the concept of responsibility because of its relation to the juridical (Agamben 2002: 20ff.; Mills 2008: 102-4). If one is motivated by justice, if one wants to give force to the requirements of justice or make the powerful more just, then one must calculate, with a spirit of justice, what decision to make.9 One cannot simply maintain the point of suspense. Not if one wants to prevent the awful possibility of camps. Therefore, the experience of passivity, this openness to innumerable possibilities described by Agamben, is like the infinite responsiveness required by considerations of justice in the suspended moment prior to a legal decision. To leave matters at this suspended point is consistent with Agamben 's antijuridicism, since responsiveness is only one dimension of the law; pure receptivity would be vacuous and ultimately nothing. The demands of justice, however, mean that we **must** make a determination - one that admittedly will come too late. Consequently, to leave matters at a moment of passivity or receptivity, as Agamben does with his embrace of pure potentiality, is to do neither law nor the work of justice. The categories of ontology in themselves do not enable us to address the most pressing injustices in contemporary law and politics today, such as the revival of camps. To translate our terms of political theory into the terminology of ontology, as the new ontologists do, leads to significant confusions. To **embrace** pure, **infinite**, or unthinkable **possibilities** for their own sake gives us **no normative grounds on which to resist camps**. To contend that the opposite of sovereignty is contingency or potentiality does not suggest another force or capacity of greater normative value than sovereignty. Furthermore, if pure sovereignty is 'determinant', for example, then it cannot be described ontologically as 'absolute necessity'. Absolute democracy, exterior to sovereignty, is also an impossibility. 10 In contrast to Agamben, though, let us give credit to the achievements of the people in the centuries of struggle against the tyranny of absolute monarchy, and consider the quest for popular sovereignty. Democracy is already an articulated concept - an articulation of demos or people, and kratos (or kratein), which refers to having power, the force of law, rule, or to have or to be right (Derrida 2005: 22). That is, 'democracy' itself refers to popular sovereignty, a situation where people are sovereign, or where people govern themselves. In a democracy, people give themselves laws, and share power equally. By referring to popular sovereignty, I emphasize the normative element of democracy: it is right that the people should rule, the people have a right to rule. This is the rule or law of democracy. A new beginning is always both less and more than democratic. A new beginning must borrow its terms. Likewise for a democratic beginning: the people of popular sovereignty do not invent the language of their self governance out of nothing. Indeed, the possibility of democracy is **given by language**, and the many discourses of democracy, with **meanings attributed** to these words, **rules of grammar**, and discourses that the people did not give to themselves. The beginning of democracy cannot be absolutely democratic. When we begin - even a project of democracy - we begin from a place or a position already given to, or **imposed** upon, us (Derrida 2000, 2002b) . Our beginnings are always less than democratic as they have been legislated in advance of us. Additionally, because we must borrow our terms, the 'people' of popular sovereignty are always more than themselves. The 'people' of popular sovereignty share their power with others who preceded them. Furthermore, democratic acts are oriented to the future, to keeping democracy that is, they are oriented towards future incarnations of democratic subjects. Moreover, because democracy opens itself to others, the 'anyone' of democratic participation may include those who lack a commitment to democracy. Therefore, the 'people' of democracy are always more than themselves. There is never just democracy here. There is always democracy plus something else. The 'people' of popular sovereignty are also always less than themselves. Never fully present, and defying origins, democracy reaches out to others in order to be. These others are past and future. Because we must begin somewhere, on some haunted grounds, using terms the meaning of which has, to some extent, been previously determined by others, democratic beginnings are always less than democratic. Concrete democratic acts are necessary to fulfil promises or claims for democracy. But, like considerations regarding justice, there is always a limit to our knowledge, or a finite limit to our accounting of a problem, or our memory. In these ways, democracy is always lacking. There is never just democracy here. Because popular sovereignty is lacking at any moment, **it requires a supplement**. **This is law**. When we take a position - such as a position for democracy - we rely on law to recall the commitments necessarily implicated within this position. To bring our (democratic) selves back to ourselves. Law occupies the area of a-position, in between the determinate commitments necessary to making life more democratic or more just, and the infinitely responsive dimension of democracy, of justice; in between our democratic position and that to which we must respond if we are to maintain our democratic position. Like 'law', democracy's condition is always unresolved, calling for incessant decisions and judgements. Democracy also persists through a relation of negativity - in condemning and addressing manners of tyranny. Democracy takes a position - comes from a position- as law 'comes from and returns to a position'. Law is where we keep our commitments to democracy, reinstituting and re-sending these commitments in the moments of decision, when, as always, our commitment to democracy seems to be dissipating and we must respond to a different challenge. Democracy must be open, but in this opening it risks becoming something other than democracy. Alternatively, democracy risks being trapped by past determinations in the face of new and different challenges - an enclosure that would render democracy less than democratic in its lack of responsiveness. Law resolves, for the time being, these paradoxical dimensions of popular sovereignty. 11 In sum, displacing inquiry from politics to the categories of ontology will not resolve pressing injustices. Moreover, both absolute sovereignty and absolute democracy are impossibilities. While sovereignty must take on certain democratic attributes to achieve extension- like sharing power through institutional assemblies and assemblages - democracy always begins in a place with terms in some way legislated for it by an other in advance. Both sovereignty and democracy must contain paradoxical, if not contradictory, attributes in order to be. And both rely on law for temporary and unstable resolution of these ambivalent tendencies. That which enables either the absolute sovereignty of a tyrant or a recording of a democratic success, however, makes these forms of power vulnerable to ruin. **Tyranny requires the assistance of scriveners**. Likewise, democratic struggles produce victories that can never be absolute as its plural institutional assemblages create opportunities for ruinous resistance to democracy's commitments. Democratic victories are always partial - succeeding in one place or another, while remaining vulnerable to the John Yoos of the world who remain embedded deep within the bureaucracies of the modern state or who remain in its assemblies. They will come with remainders and they will be lacking in some way. Camps, or democracy's ruins In his book The Powers of War and Peace, which finds that the president is not bound by international law, John Yoo, a member of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) between 2001 and 2003 in George W. Bush's administration, and the author of the infamous 'torture memo' of August 2002 ,justifies the internment of Japanese Americans in **concentration camps** during the Second World War by the US government (Yoo 2005). He does this in the context of illustrating a distinction he makes between 'total war', in which Congress augments executive war powers with a public declaration of the [actual existence of hostilities, and other wars that are conducted without such a public declaration by Congress. He finds internment camps to be constitutional when they are created under the 'pressing public necessity' of a 'total' war. Nevertheless, Yoo is typically ambiguous about whether the wholesale round-up of Americans or others would still be constitutional without such a congressional declaration. He says, 'one doubts' whether 'courts' would have allowed 'wholesale internment' of 'Panamanian Americans', 'Yugoslavs', or 'Iraqis Americans [sic]', in reference to recent conflicts conducted without the benefit of a congressional declaration of war, although he does not clearly rule out the possibility that courts might have upheld such actions. Moreover, his speculations are on the subject of court action; he does not clearly state whether he believes such an action to be properly constitutional even if he is clear that internment should be considered permissible when there is a congressional declaration of war (ibid.: 151, 333). To support this position he cites favourably in a singular endnote the repudiated, though never overruled, Supreme Court decision Korematsu v. United States (1944), which sustained Fred Korematsu's conviction for refusing to abide by the military's internment order applicable to 'all persons of Japanese ancestry', and remaining in a prohibited area: his hometown (Yoo 2005; Irons 1983) . During the 1940s the United States fought a war against the Nazis' camps. Today, however, the United States maintains a camp at a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and another at the Baghram airbase in Afghanistan. 12 In these camps, hundreds of people have been subjected to **executive detention**, and many have been **tortured** (ICRC 2007). Every law is a sending, and this deeply worried a dissenter from the majority's opinion in Korematsu, Justice Jackson, who was concerned that the validation of racial discrimination would lie around like a 'loaded weapon', to be picked up by a future tyrant claiming 'urgent need'. Law, Jackson realized, has a 'generative power of its own', and every repetition of the principle of 'racial discrimination in criminal procedure' and the 'transplanting' of 'American citizens' would embed the principle more deeply in Americans' 'law and thinking', enabling its expansion to 'new purposes' (Korernatsu v. United States, with Justice Jackson dissenting at 246). These, as Jackson recognized, would be ruinous repetitions. Legal struggles, or democracy's archive **How are we to resist** the ruinous aspects of **tyranny** and keep faith with democracy? Messianic postmodernism would have us **abandon law** to oppose **absolute and total sovereignty** in the name of absolute democracy, for Hardt and Negri, or to experience pure potentiality, for Agamben . I have shown, however, that neither absolute sovereignty nor absolute democracy can exist as such. The perfect absence of democracy and its pure presence are both foreclosed by the force of necessary iteration, iteration that enables both democracy and tyrannical sovereignty to be, spectrally. Moreover, pure potentiality gives us **no position** from which to oppose the particularities of tyranny, such as **camps**. Drawing from Fitzpatrick, I have also indicated that law facilitates the resolution of (popular) sovereignty's - of democracy's - paradoxical dimensions for the time being: the determinate political position of democracy with democracy's openness and responsiveness, for example. Law subjects political power to sharing. It is where democracy is claimed, permitted, and promised. Even as law is always already 'ruined, in ruins, ruinous', law also provides for democracy being posited and **preserved** (Derrida 2002a: 273). Law is where sovereignty is divided or shared, and it is how we (re )send democracy (Derrida 2005: 34). It is where we enact our fidelity to democracy where we cut into history and **take a position** on democracy (Derrida 2002a: 289). Law is where we take a position on democracy. Law must come from a position, and there must be a position, or a place, to which law can then return. Law is how we enact our commitment or responsibility to democracy and to justice, the commitments and responsibilities we have made here to those impossibly necessary tasks. In this, law assists our memory and acts as a resistance to forgetting even as law's repetitions are generated by the fact that we have always already forgotten some of these commitments. **We cannot keep** such **infinite responsibilities in mind at once**. In this resistance to a forgetting that constantly tracks us, law is like an archive (Derrida 1995: 76, fn. 14). An archive is where archives, and archiving, take place (Derrida 1995: 2). There where a social order is exercised. Archive, deriving from the Greek arkhe, articulates a principle of beginning, a law according to which a practice was begun, a place of depositing, and the question of who exercises legitimate hermeneutic authority- who has the 'right to make or represent the law' (ibid.: 1-3). The notion of an archive implies a particular region of thought or place, as well as a law - no archiving without law (ibid.: 40). An archive both conserves and generates. It gathers in preparation for a future. It is a promise to others, to our legatees (ibid.: 36). On the one hand, when one interprets an object of an archive, one's interpretation becomes inscribed into the archive. The archive is a spectral corpus that never closes since the archivist produces more archive: the archive opens out to the future (ibid.: 67- 8). Yet, on the other hand, an archive must also exclude: 'No archive without outside' (ibid.: 11 , emphasis removed). The laws of an archive - principles of value and classification will regulate not only that which has been included and how it is to be included, but also that which should be excluded to conserve this trust, so we know how to go on in the future (ibid.: 40). Nevertheless, as Derrida points out, even that which we exclude shapes our laws as its phantom continues to haunt us (Ibid .: 61). By thinking of law as where we take a position, for democracy, for example, and by thinking of law as an archival practice, we cross a conceptual argument with an ontological one. The conceptual argument that we share our powers, our law-making, with others indicates the impossibility of either the pure absence of democracy or democracy's pure presence. Therefore, even if law and politics do not have in essence a tendency towards democracy (which is implicated in the conceptual argument) , there remains an ineradicable democratic element. 13 Law as archive meets this conceptual argument with on tic and ontological principles. An archive takes place. It is deposited somewhere. There is no archive without substance: there is no archive without a trace (Derrida 1995: 26-7). Could the claim of popular sovereignty, could a democratic beginning or performative speech act, could the exercise of self-government, could politics take place where the people, there, decide to give themselves laws, and could this democratic sending or legacy disappear without a trace? Could the struggles against tyranny disappear, totally, without a trace? Would it be responsive or responsible to democracy or to justice to try to make these things disappear in order to constitute an absolutely new ontology? Such a beginning, like any beginning, would have to take place somewhere and therefore it would have to account for what had given place to such a beginning. This is the paradox of a democratic beginning: it is never equal to itself, it is never just democracy. It begins in ruins. This is where and how we begin, even if we want to begin democratically. But this is not all bad. Not if there is a resistance to forgetting these struggles against tyranny as we begin again. We are constituted by democracy's archive, by democracy's remainders. By its echoes. We are not totally foreign to democracy. Not now, and perhaps not ever. Our contemporary politics takes place within the echoes of languages (some even dead? Or would that be an impossibility?), making possible our constitution as political subjects and even as subjects capable of democracy in ways beyond or perhaps behind our ability to comprehend (Heller-Roazen 2005). Constitutional law in the United States bears the impression of confronting fascism nowhere more disturbingly than in the internment of Japanese Americans, and the Supreme Court's infamous decision Korematsu v. United States upholding the conviction of Korematsu for violating the Order, which Yoo cites favourably. How has this case been archived previously? The dissenters in Korernalsu recognized at the time that the decision had fallen into the 'ugly abyss of racism' , that the ' legalization of racism' plays no justifiable part in a 'democratic way of life' (with Justice Murphy dissenting at 233, 242). One of the dissenters expressed concern regarding the decision's dangerous repetitive potential, as I have already mentioned. Peter Irons is the author of the definitive study of the law and politics around the internment of Japanese Americans. Discussing his sources, Irons notes that the decision faced immediate and scathing criticism in major law review articles published as early as 1945. Writing in 1983, Irons finds that in the 'years since the publication of these articles ... not a single legal scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions' (1983: 371). Aside from the fact that this legal decision found that courts must apply 'strict scrutiny' (a legal term of art meaning that the classification in question must be subjected to the most searching inquiry and that there is the greatest presumption against the constitutionality of the governmental policy at issue) to racial classifications, legal scholars do not view this legal opinion as 'good law'. The decision was made at a time when racial segregation was still allowed in the United States, but the Supreme Court found racial segregation to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Law students and others who study constitutional law are taught how the racial classification in Korernatsu cannot stand up to the most basic forms of equal protection analysis (because the classification is underinclusive by failing to include German or Italian Americans, and because it is also over-inclusive by including both loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans; all of this lets us see that the governmental policy is motivated less by security concerns and more by racism) .14 The conviction of Korematsu has been overturned because the government was found to have committed misconduct through the suppression of evidence and the inclusion of misinformation. And the United States has both apologized and paid reparations to those interned or their families (Sullivan and Gunther 2004: 668- 9, fn. 3). As matters of law and policy, everything about Korematsu, except the notion that there is the strongest presumption against racial classifications, has been repudiated and apologized for. The democratic narrative of Korematsu, based on this archive, is shame and a sense of responsibility for overcoming the outcome of the case, while maintaining the strongest presumption against invidious racial classifications. The ruling was represented as a failure in the struggle against tyranny when it was issued, and in the manner it has been archived since. Yoo's legal opinions attempt to eviscerate the narrative archiving the outcome of Korernatsu as wrong, and the principle of racial discrimination as wrong for a democratic society. These, as Justice Jackson recognized, are ruinous iterations. The ideas that a president's word is law or that racial guilt is an acceptable premise for government must be excluded to keep democratic commitments or to send the possibility of a legacy hospitable for democracy. Any archive must have an outside. But an archive also constitutes resources to be drawn upon- at present, and for the future. Taking a position No wonder, then, that messianic postmodernists - those who wait for being alien to law - wind up invoking law either to denounce present injustices or to seek a better, more just, or indeed a more democratic and Jess tyrannical future. If these are our purposes - if we are taking a position against tyranny- then being passively open to **infinite possibilities** or potentialities will **not** actively further those commitments. This is why, when we have specific purposes or commitments to which we are faithful, such as taking a position for democracy, or when we critique a process of repetition sedimenting the tyranny of camps in order to open the space for their rejection , we **invoke the law** and draw from democracy's archive. Likewise, when Agamben seeks to preserve a community of the faithful who will think the 'relation of every instant to the Messiah', who will 'strain forward' towards salvation, he puts aside the antinomialism of Homo Sacer to embrace 'messianic law', or the law of faith (2005b: 76-8, 95). There would be an infinite number of actions (not) to do if the faithful are to make messianic potential become active or operative, if they are to live exclusively in the joyful announcement ( euaggelion). To be sure, these infinite actions and inactions implicated in pistis (faith) would exceed any finite list of dos and don 'ts exemplified by the Mosaic law of the Ten Commandments, and messianic law, or nornos pisteos, refers to this excessive aspect. How can the faithful know or remember what is required of them at each moment to dwell within messianic law if law is not textualized? Agamben explains, ' [I]t is not a letter written in ink on tables of stone; rather, it is written with the breath of God on hearts of flesh'. It is 'not a writing but a form of life ... ''You are our letter"' (2005b: 122, quoting 2 Cor. 3:2, emphasis in original). This privileging of the spirit over the letter of the law attempts to make calculable, measured law identical to incalculable, immeasurable life by emphasizing the excessive aspect of law, and maintaining law's openness or responsiveness to the future. Through infinite openness, law and life are one, with no ruins or remainders. If, however, 'law' is not to be merely vacuous, infinitely open to anything and everything, hence **no law at all**, then we must not forget what it means to be faithful to the rnessiah. Appropriately, then, Agamben does not fully forgo textualizing law, citing St Paul 's recapitulation of the entirety of God's law with the formula 'Love your neighbor as yourself.' It helps to learn, to know, to remember what is required of the faithful, to recall the messianic. To this end, Agamben refers to law as a '"pedagogue" leading to the messiah' (2005b: 76, 120, citing Gal. 3:24, emphasis added). Law is an archive even for those faithful to the messianic. Similarly, in State of Exception Agamben critiques recent practices in the United States, such as the camps at Guant<inamo Bay and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. He argues, 'At the very moment when it would like to give lessons in democracy to different traditions and cultures, the political culture of the West does not realize that it has entirely lost its canon' (2005a: 18). Here, Agamben denounces the United States, among others, for having lost its law. He condemns people in the United States for forgetting their law and losing their archive, their aide-memoire. Indeed, Agamben rightly denounces them - us - for it. His denunciation - accusing them, us - for forgetting our law pays homage, **as Jean Baudrillard would have noted, to the law** (1988: 173). His denunciation relies on recalling a law, an archive, and its presently forgotten, suppressed, or repressed democratic

### at: predictability bad

They are predictable in ways that link to their offense but don’t solve ours—they just map Baudrillard onto the topic regardless of what the topic says, they play the same music every round, they read the same AKall joke every round, they make the same examples of activists and phrases---proves they are like Deep Blue on the level of form – they make it predictable for them so they only have to debate cap and T

Minimal predictability does not mean sameness or total control---every topical debate plays out differently ie we’ve had several radically different Middle East debates and none of our ASB debates this week have had the same 2NR in them, but the diff is that people knew what the hell they were talking about and had the necessary ev to engage effectively---they explode lims

#### They link worse to predictability bad because they reduce the entire world to indeterminacy and [text/simulation/etc]---the conclusion is always the same because applying their method to any text or debate practice always produces [the implosion of meaning]

Friedrich 12—Department of Classics, Dalhousie University (Rainer, The Enlightenment Gone Mad (II) The Dismal Discourse of Postmodernism’s Grand Narratives, http://www.bu.edu/arion/the-enlightenment-gone-mad-ii-the-dismal-discourse-of-postmodernism%E2%80%99s-grand-narratives/)

--- “masquerade[ing]” was in the original article ---

FROM ICONOCLASM TO MESSIANISM:¶ THE GRAND NARRATIVE OF DESTRUCTION¶ “What remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, . . . an idea of justice—which we distinguish from law or right and even from human rights. . . . And deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice. Mad about this desire for justice.” —Jacques Derrida¶ deconstruction reveals itself as a totalizing metanarrative in several modes. Through its “axial proposition . . . that there is nothing outside the text,”30 it presents itself as a pantextualism (à la “all the world’s a text, and all the men and women merely readers”). Thus, what ordinarily passes for extra-textual reality, say, historical events such as wars and revolutions, are declared by Paul de Man to be “texts masquerade[ing] in the guise of wars and revolutions,” while “death is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament.”31 Asserting that writing is prior to speaking as the condition of its possibility, it sets itself up against logocentrism as a grammatocentrism—as totalizing as it accuses logocentrism of being. Designed to subvert the claim of any text and discourse to an adequate ground—to a logos that enables it to produce a stable, determinate, decidable, and coherent meaning or truth—deconstruction operates as a totalizing negative hermeneutics. As a negative hermeneutics, patent in poststructuralism’s wholesale assault on Western rationality, its grand narrative is in its origins largely iconoclastic.¶ ICONOCLASTIC DESTRUCTION¶ Its chief narrator, Jacques Derrida has been dubbed by a Swiss journal Herr der Brüche, “Lord of Ruptures.” The sobriquet is apt, as iconoclastic Deconstruction’s aim is indeed the exposure of ruptures and their subversive force in texts and discourses. To savor its Grand Narrative one has to go along, counter-intuitively, with a certain topsy-turviness in its main tenets. The priority of writing over speaking is one of them; reality equaling textuality, another. A third one derives from deconstruction’s idiosyncratic reading of Saussurian linguistics,32 according to which the material elements of language (phonemes, signifiers) and of its conceptual meanings (the signifieds) are constituted through opposition to, and difference from, other phonetic and semantic elements. The deconstructionist reading has the linguistic sign (= signifier + signified) attain its identity from differential relations as the condition of its possibility: hence its bizarre and mind-boggling tenet of the priority of difference over identity.¶ Now, the linguistic sign, arising as it does out of such a differential matrix, is said to connote all the differences from which it sprang as the basis of its identity. This makes the determination of meaning problematic: so much so that meaning is declared indeterminate, or rather its determination deferred indefinitely. Thus it is not just difference that is operative in the production of linguistic signs and their meanings, but difference cum deferral. Both terms are fused in Derrida’s neologism différance, exploiting the double meaning of French différer (‘to differ’/’to defer’). Différance, then, denotes both the production of meaning from difference and the simultaneous deferral of its determination. Hence the Grand Narrative’s postulate of the fundamental indeterminacy and undecidability of meaning in all linguistic entities: every linguistic entity, by virtue of its being embedded in a polysemic network of differential/ ‘differantial’ relations, has an overabundance—a surplus, an overload—of signification whose various elements are at odds with one another, thus preventing univocal meaning from being determined and decided. As a result, the determination of meaning is postponed to the Greek Calends. (Obviously, the meaning of deconstructionist tenets is exempted from fundamental indeterminacy and undecidability; for they are treated as determinate self-evident truths and eternal verities: a deconstructionist ceases behaving as a deconstructionist, as much as Nietzsche ceases acting as a perspectivist and skeptic, when they are advancing their own philosophical enterprises.)¶ Différance, then, is deconstruction’s principal and originary (and yes, Derrida’s protestations notwithstanding, foundational and unifying)33 force, inscribed in the very tissue of language—quaking, quivering, and reverberating in each and every of its textual and discursive productions. Universally operative in all texts and all discourses, différance both generates effects of meaning and truth and, by holding their determination in interminable abeyance by the play of differences, undermines them at the same time. In this way, the movement of différance imparts to language and discourse a Dionysian turbulence and disorder, and, what is the same, inscribes in them deconstruction as an inherent force (of which more below). As Roland Barthes remarked in an obiter dictum: poststructuralism seeks to show not the order but the disorder of a text. Or, as the Herr der Brüche would have it, not the coherence of a text but its ruptures.¶ Nevertheless, the texts and discourses of the Western intellectual tradition are generally assumed to make the rightful claim that there is at their center a grounding and controlling logos in one form or another, giving rise to an intelligible textual order; and that they arguably do express and constitute a degree of semantic stability in the form of decidable and determinate meanings and truths. The Grand Narrative of deconstruction concedes this, but it hastens to add that this is all a phantasmagoria fabricated through a ruse of logocentrism: ever since Plato, we are told, Western logocentrism has been, and still is, attempting, with apparent success, to arrest or, if you will, freeze the movement of différance. By forcing a freeze on its Dionysian turbulence, it is extracting from, or forcing on, texts determinate meaning and decidable univocal truth, eclipsing in the act the differential tissue that is the origin of all signification. In the process Western logocentrism, so the grand narratives goes, either coercively assimilates and homogenizes, or, failing that, excludes, marginalizes, and represses all that which does not fit the conceptual order and determinate meaning it is said to have arbitrarily extracted from, or forced on, texts and discourses. In short, by freezing the movement of différance (and suppressing the inherent self-deconstruction) in texts, logocentrism does violence to all that is other than itself. It stands accused of wholesale repression of alterity. But différance does not take it lying down. This core force of language strikes back by mobilizing the army of deconstructers to unfreeze differance, by re-activating the inherent deconstruction of texts and discourses: it has the repressed Other return in the form of paradoxes, aporias, incoherences, illogicalities, and contradictions that subvert the seemingly stable meaning of the texts and turn their apparent logocentric order into Dionysian chaos. The “deconstruction of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos,” and “particularly the signification of truth,”34 is to restore the reign of différance. Différance exacts merciless vengeance from logocentrically ordered texts for having tried to escape it. In the end these texts, hitherto merely indeterminate and undecidable as to their meaning, are determinately and decidedly reduced to clusters of paradoxes, self-contradictions, and aporias—and predictably so, as this is deconstruction’s routine. With every deconstructive operation, Logocentrism takes a whacking—but hey, didn’t it ask for it?¶ The strikingly raw negativity is patent in the verbs that describe the deconstructive operation: “unravel,” “pull down,” “annihilate,” “dismantle”. There are the occasional affirmative claims: that deconstruction is bearing witness to the repressed Other and aids its re-assertion, restoring in the process the vibrant life of a Dionysian turbulence and liberating anarchy to language that logocentrism is said to stifle. But the forms in which deconstruction has the Other assert itself belie this claim: paradox and aporia, by their very nature, effect in texts and discourses [is] not turbulent life, but the opposite—paralysis, death.¶ Equally striking in Miller’s concise description is the inadvertent disclosure that deconstruction’s conclusions are always already built into its premises—thus its routine procedure amounts to one huge petitio principii. Feed any text, any discourse into the preprogrammed interpretative machine called deconstruction, and you know in advance that it will inevitably come out at the other end, with depressing regularity and predictability,38 as an ensemble of undecidable aporias and paradoxes—as a text or discourse turned against itself, with hidden ruptures laid bare, its structure collapsed, its meaning imploded. Miller’s deconstructive reading of Wordsworth’s poem A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal39 is a paradigmatic case in point. By smuggling into it all sorts of thematic and referential contraband, the deconstructive critic turns the poem into a cluster of contradictory significations. The overall experience is to be, in Miller’s description, that of “an aporia or boggling of the mind.” It is an arbitrary procedure that is to make sure that the outcome is always what the totalizing grand narrative of deconstruction has postulated and known all along: namely, that all texts will turn out to be self-lacerating, aporetic, self-contradictory, full of fissures and internal ruptures—in short, self-deconstructive.

## at: baudrillard

### Baudrillard Bad

#### Baudrillard’s entire theory is sexist, racist, and ableist. Symbolic exchange, which the aff uniquely defends, reduces individuals down to an object to be categorized which eliminates effective use of counter-simulacra in protests

Andrew Robinson, 2-7-2013, “*An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard and Activism: A critique*,” Ceasefire, <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-14/>. ZKMSU

There are serious limits to Baudrillard’s work, in terms of his hostility to ‘minority’ struggles. Many of his formulations are inadvertently sexist and racist. There are also times when Baudrillard comes across as ableist in his critiques of the therapeutic. There are also times when Baudrillard attacks activism in strong terms: Hippies reproduce capitalist ideology; Feminists displaying images of porn are actually being seductive, against their will; The left is keeping capitalism alive with its moral critiques and its quests for meaning. There are times when it is hard to tell if Baudrillard is a reactionary, attacking the concerns of progressives, or an ultra-left, criticising every rebellion as insufficiently extreme. If one looks past such problems, however, there are important implications in Baudrillard’s work for emancipatory practice. Baudrillard’s work was clearly an influence on Negri’s early work. Ideas such as the reduction of the system to command, the spread of diffuse apparatuses of power and the panic of the system in the face of its own arbitrariness reappear in texts such as Time for Revolution. The idea of the ‘code’ or system functioning as a self-propelled irrational machine is also reminiscent of primitivists such as Fredy Perlman. Baudrillard seems to see the regime of the code as the high-point of civilisation, in an almost anarcho-primitivist sense. Where he differs from such analyses is that he sees the core of civilisation not in technology or the domestication of desire or the ‘political principle’ of state power, but in the denial and suppression of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is partly thinking through the issue of diffuse power. In capitalist and statist social regimes, power is immensely concentrated. He also gives a particular spin to the distinction between expressive and instrumental. We can link the idea of the ‘code’ to preventionism and its impact on protest. As discussed above, Baudrillard’s idea of initiatory groups could also be applied to activist ‘neo-sects’. Baudrillard also offers answers to some of the big questions of today regarding psychological barriers to revolt. The loss of reality might explain why hope for liberation seems so hard to come by, and why revolutionary movements now seem to lack a clear vision of transformation. The Immediatist Potlatch would be an example of gift-exchange as political action. Occupation of the remainders and waste-grounds of cities has been a constant aspect of dissident practice, from Traveller communities such as Dale Farm and shanty-towns in the global South, to reclaimed factories used as squats, to projects such as South Central Farm. Reversibility could also be thought of in terms of vendettas and cost-imposition. These return to the system the power it exercises, reversing it. Another useful way to extend Baudrillard’s work is to cross-read it with Open Marxist views of capitalism as a process which must constantly be reproduced to exist. Simulation is not a finished process. It has to be constantly repeated in order to be kept active. The process of deterrence (or counterinsurgency) is therefore an ongoing process. Baudrillard is often misread as celebrating the end of reference and the triumph of self-referential signs. It is easy to see how this misunderstanding came about, since he advocates outbidding the system in its own disintegration. He doesn’t think it’s possible or desirable to “go back” to production or fixed meanings. But the central point of his work is still anti-capitalist. He sees the system as unable to provide anything referential or emotionally meaningful. He sees it as a kind of totalitarian engine of permanent mobilisation for the empty goal of its own reproduction. Even in his ‘fatalistic’ later works, he remains fiercely opposed to the code and the system. Baudrillard’s critique of Marx is interesting, and I think largely valid. What he puts in place of Marx’s theory is, however, contentious. His recent work gives the impression of a disillusioned Situationist seeking to find an alternative to revolution in a world where none is apparent. As a result, he finds ways to read conformist mass practices as unconscious resistances, irrational systemic functioning and implosion, and so on. Baudrillard is also too prone to conflate system collapse with liberation. There are scenarios of implosion which would not lead to liberation. One might, for instance, think of climate change due to overconsumption as a scenario of system-collapse. This would bring about the end of the code, but also possibly the end of humanity. In some ways, the idea of implosion echoes Sing Chew’s theory of world-system collapse. Based on previous episodes of collapse, Chew argues that the world-system will collapse when it reaches its ecological limits. It won’t explode; it will collapse inwards and break down as the processes which sustain it are reversed. Each ‘civilisation’ is followed by a ‘dark age’. Populations move outwards from cities, power is diffused, and local knowledge replaces global knowledge. This is not quite what Baudrillard has in mind, but similar enough to be suggested as an effect of continued implosion. Or maybe implosion should be compared to the ‘extraordinary communities’ of disaster, to the sudden collapse of the system’s management structures after which people take over their own self-management (as in Argentina), to the fraying round the edges of a system which can no longer secure the code at its more remote limits (as in Africa). Perhaps as the code burns itself up, we will be left occupying wastelands where we are finally free, but at great cost. Hence, an implosive collapse of the system might give rise to a hope for other social forms. It might, after all, be liberation in disguise. What of the crucial concept of ‘symbolic exchange’? Baudrillard’s discussion of symbolic exchange oscillates between three poles. Firstly, it refers to the experience of living in an embedded society, with rituals, exchanges and local knowledges. Secondly, it refers to the crisis-effects of the decomposition of the code, which create symbolic exchange as their effect. Thirdly, it refers to a kind of experience beyond the regime of simulation, through arbitrary connections. The political effects of the process Baudrillard advocates is thus rather ambiguous. Does the rise of symbolic exchange herald a return to embedded forms of social relations, to some kind of modern band or tribe which reproduces aspects of embedded forms, or something else entirely? The recovery of immediacy, connectedness, uncoded relations, ‘exchange’ between signs and the world, are important aspects of disalienation. However, I have issues with the Lacanian view of the subject which underpins Baudrillard’s theory of symbolic exchange. It is possible to endorse Baudrillard’s view of the death of value in capitalism and the creation of a self-reproducing code, without necessarily seeing the alternative in terms of symbolic exchange and death. A wide variety of other theories are attempting the same thing – from ‘anti-civilisation’ theories to Agamben’s ‘whatever-singularity’. It might be more useful to hitch Baudrillard’s critique to a more affirmative theory, than to attempt to follow his ‘fatal’ strategies. Another important aspect of Baudrillard’s work is his awareness of the close relationship between sign-value, status, and conformity. People are held back by their attachment to status. Baudrillard says that the exploited can demand only the minimum, but lower their status and they can demand everything. This observation relates to the rise of exclusion and autonomy in movements of resistance. By becoming autonomous, endorsing a position outside the system and rejecting the competition for status, the ability to resist is reclaimed. We can’t fight capitalism in determinate forms because it no longer has a goal, or determination. But we can fight its ‘secret weapon’: the reproduction of labour as an ideology or imaginary. This might, for instance, be expressed in the refusal of work. One of the areas in which Baudrillard’s work is particularly useful is media critique. Media power allows all kinds of shenanigans in international relations. In Haiti in 2004 for instance, the US could simulate an entire crisis so as to invade and remove Aristide. The media reproduced the US narrative to the letter. In this case, simulation aids the powerful. In Rwanda, according to Peter Uvin, the opposite happened. External attempts to promote civil society led to a simulated civil society, produced by local elites to capture aid flows. Arguably, states in some African countries are themselves simulations, set up to attract external aid. In such cases, relatively marginal groups extract resources through mastery of simulation. Baudrillard also seems to have a sharp sense of the strategic issues facing resistance today. On the one hand, political positions and subjective standpoints are codified as representable and quantifiable: as yes/no options on opinion polls, as particular niche markets susceptible to market research and targeted advertising, as psychological labels conducive to particular drugs or CBT methods, as variables to be added to a Facebook profile, and so on. On the other hand, managerial procedures (classroom management, prison management, parental management, crisis management, protest management) are invented to provide a prior meaning and a predetermined response to each irruptive event. If a dirty protest, then tape up the cell; if a refusal to move, then send in an ‘extraction team’ using ‘pain compliance’, and so on. The effect is that every option available to resisters has already been encoded, given a meaning and a response. This makes the system seem impossible to fight. Its framing of the available options turns it into a kind of habitus, or second nature, which most people don’t even see as a social construct. The code makes it difficult to resist, because any act of resistance is reinscribed, either as another yes/no choice, or as another social problem to be managed. These are challenges which can be met. Baudrillard’s analysis suggests that the system is vulnerable to any act which disregards consequences or is irreducible to the existing frame of possibilities, which is not a “rational action”. This is why the loss of fear has been so central in understanding revolts, from Tahrir Square to Tottenham. In addition, the system remains vulnerable, both to new tactics which it hasn’t thought of yet, and to any event on such a scale that it overwhelms available resources. Just-in-time production has reduced redundancy within systems. The result is that they don’t have the resources to spare, to cope with any events beyond the usual. This is suggested by Baudrillard’s view that the police simply simulate repression. As long as people are broadly conforming, the simulation works. The moment the unexpected happens, the police become unable to repress effectively. If Baudrillard is right, then the slightest thing escaping the system’s rationality is enough to pose a challenge to it. The idea of involution suggests that the system is beginning to fray around the edges. As control is tightened, peripheral areas slip out of control. This phenomenon is widely discussed in relation to the global South. But fraying can also be seen in the system’s apparent incapacity to respond to emergent events, because of just-in-time production and the maintenance of systems lacking redundancy. Something like the August insurrection can spread on the basis of unexpectedness, rapidity and limited police resources. Baudrillard’s theory of deterrence needs to be reconsidered in light of recent events. We have seen in 2011 that it is still possible to create events: the London unrest, the student protests, Occupy, the Wikileaks saga… The system does not actually have the power on the ground to prevent revolts, occupations, movements. Even the system’s vice-like grip on future significations is being partially broken through movements like Occupy, which conveys different future images in its own rhetoric. Anonymous turns the anonymity of statistical indifference into a source of strength, using tactics based on the very vulnerability to excess the system creates – such as distributed denial of service attacks (using an excess of web connections) and leaking of documents (relying on the obscene overexposure of information in the Internet). The difficulty, rather, is in sustaining events and expanding new frames of meaning. The system monopolises and determines the effects of events, and kettles them in time and space. Firstly the system controls the ways in which events are signified to non-participants. Secondly the system, having once faced an event, will prepare in detail to prevent it “next time” – so it is hard for events to become waves. And thirdly, the system unleashes a dreadful wave of repression after each event, attempting to foreclose its irruptive force and restore the pervasiveness of terror. Resultant feelings of futility, anxiety and vulnerability are corrosive of movement-building and of repeated cycles of similar events. The movement of revolt towards a terrain of refusal of meaning is also partly an effect of the system’s move towards coding. The apparent lack of demands in recent waves of social unrest (e.g. the Mark Duggan uprising, the banlieue revolt, the Greek insurrection of 2008, the Occupy movement, summit protests), and even many of today’s “terrorists”, is perhaps a result of the prevalence of the code. The presentation of demands risks reinscription as simply a militant version of a position already encoded within the system. People respond with actions which counterpose their own expressiveness to the code. This is also perhaps why theorising the conditions of possibility for an Event has become such a popular theme in contemporary radical theory. Another possibility could here be added. It is possible, in open-ended surveys, to give responses deemed too complex to be codable. In principle, a more heterogeneous humanity would escape the code through each individual’s irreducibility to prior categories. There are also certain texts, such as Cabal, Argot and Barbarians, which argue for incommunicability as a necessary part of radicalism. The system demands that everything communicate in its terms. Therefore, esoteric language is an effective resistance. Baudrillard’s theory also helps to explain why his appropriation by leftists has been strategically unsuccessful. Collectivist theories such as Negri’s are limited in that they fail to see the overexposure to the social. The masses do not feel a simple lack of the social but an overexposure – both in the pressure to consume sign-values, and in telepresence. Collectivist alternatives open up a vertigo, seeming like more of the same, but even more totalising. Of course, Negri’s alternative would be a disalienated sociality, not a more totalising simulation. But if Baudrillard is right, most people can no longer tell the difference. And the move Negri makes – to attempt to re-socialise what he takes to be an atomised field – is the wrong move to recompose disalienated socialities. It is not a move which leads from the masses, the social ‘obscene’ or overexposed, to a disalienated sociality. Recomposition requires first of all the decomposition of people’s connections to a dominant sociality. People need to rebel against this collectivism as a ‘new individualism’, an emphasis on desire and self-actualisation against the pressure to conform, before alternative social forms based on autonomy can be constructed. Today’s sociality rests on conformity rather than compassion. An authentic sociality can only proceed by rejecting and destroying this basis. At the same time, individuals cannot become free without transforming from a type of subject which internalises the code. The conception of self which is an after-effect of conformity, the neoliberal subject, is as much a barrier to self-liberation as to compassion. One limit to Baudrillard’s theory is his tendency to over-totalise. Baudrillard is talking about tendential processes, but he often talks as if they are totally effective. There are still, for instance, a lot of uncharted spaces, a lot of unexplained events, a lot of things the system can’t handle. While Baudrillard is describing dominant tendencies in the present, these tendencies coexist with older forms of capitalism, in a situation of uneven development. The persistence of the system’s violence is a problem for Baudrillard’s perspective: the smooth regime of neutralisation and inclusive regulation has not ended older modalities of brutality. At times, Baudrillard exaggerates greatly the extent to which the old authoritarian version of capitalism has been replaced by subtle regimes of control. He exaggerates the extent to which contemporary capitalism is tolerant, permissive and ‘maternal’. This may be because his works were mostly written in France in the 1970s-80s, when the dominant ethos was still largely social-democratic. What Baudrillard recognises as the retrograde version of capitalism associated with the right-wing was to return with a vengeance, especially after 911.

#### We’ve got a few questions for Baudrillard – postmodernism destroys objective reality and justifies horrific indefinite acts

Catherine A. MacKinnon, June 2000, “*Points against Postmodernism*,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, <https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3210&context=cklawreview>, Catharine Alice MacKinnon is an American radical feminist legal scholar. She is the Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, where she has been tenured since 1990, and the James Barr Ames Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. ZKMSU

In other words, the harm of second class human status does not pose an abstract reality question. In social life, there is little that is subtle about most rapes; there is nothing complex about a fist in your face; there is nothing nuanced about genocide-although many nuanced questions no doubt can be raised about them. These social realities, central to feminism, do not raise difficult first-order reality questions, not any more. It is the denial of their social reality that is complicated and raises difficult philosophical questions. Understand that the denial of the reality of such events has been a philosophical position about reality itself. Unless and until effectively challenged, only what power wants to see as real is granted reality status. Reality is a social status. Power's reality does not have to establish itself as real in order to exist, because it has the status as real that power gives it; only the reality of the powerless has to establish itself as real. Power can also establish unreality-like the harmlessness of pornography or smoking-as reality. That doesn't make it harmless. But until power is effectively challenged on these lies, and they are lies, only those harmed (and those harming them, who have every incentive to conceal) have access to knowing that that is what they are. So it has taken us all this time, and a movement that has challenged male power, to figure out that women's reality is also a philosophical position: that women's reality exists, including women's denied violation, therefore social reality exists separate from its constitution by male power or its validation by male knowledge. This analysis raises some questions about postmodernism that are not simply a report on my current mental state. They are: Can postmodernism stop the rape of children when everyone has their story, and everyone is presumably exercising sexual agency all the time? Can postmodernism identify fascism if power only exists in microcenters and never in systematic, fixed, and determinate hierarchical arrangements? How can you oppose something that is always only in play? How do you organize against something that isn't even really there except when you are thinking about it? Can postmodernism hold the perpetrators of genocide accountable? If the subject is dead, and we are dealing with deeds without doers,47 how do we hold perpetrators accountable for what they perpetrate? Can the Serbian cultural defense for the extermination of Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians be far behind? If we can have a multicultural defense for the current genocide, because that's how the Serbs see it, why not a German cultural defense for the earlier one? Anti-Semitism was part of German culture. Finally, for another old question, if you only exist in opposition, if you are only full in opposition to the modern,48 it has determined you. Don't you need an account of how you are not merely reiterating your determinations? From postmodernists, one is not yet forthcoming. The postmodernist reality corrosion, thus, not only makes it incoherent and useless-the pragmatists' valid criticism49- but also regressive, disempowering, and collaborationist

#### Boundaries between the simulation and material existence are inevitable- Baudrillard destroys our consciousness of these inevitable boundaries, leading to extinction

Hayles ’91, (N. Katherine, Prof. of English @ UCLA, The Borders of Madness, *Science Fiction Studies* #55 vol. 18, part 3, November 1991, http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/forum55.htm)

These writers differ from Baudrillard in openly acknowledging that their texts are fictional. In fiction it is possible to elide the materiality of the world and thus to erase the gap between simulation and reality. Baudrillard's stance, by contrast, is that the gap has also been erased for us here now, and erased everywhere.  
Resisting this claim is the continuing materiality of the world, which for convenience I will call reality. In reality, borders count. Consider Southern California, which comes as close to hyperreality as anything in the US. The bumper-to-bumper traffic that surrounds Disneyland has a material intractibility and a stubborn resistance to manipulation that make it quite different from the simulations within the park. Even within the boundaries of simulations, material intractability often breaks in. In a virtual reality simulation, when one moves one's head too fast for the computer program to keep up, the display breaks down. The trip through Disneyland's Space Mountain, with its vertiginous rocketing through simulated galaxies, is customarily preceded by several hours of standing in a barely-moving line under the hot California sun. Of course it would be possible to simulate these conditions, too. No one is likely to do so, however, for the point of simulations is precisely to overcome the limitations of physical existence. When Ballard in his introduction to *Crash* (Vintage ed., 1985) identifies the defining characteristic of the 20th century as "the concept of unlimited possibility" he articulates very well why we are fascinated with simulations. The borders separating simulations from reality are important because they remind us of the limits that make dreams of technological transcendence dangerous fantasies. Hyperreality does not erase these limits, for they exist whether we recognize them or not; it only erases them from our consciousness. Insofar as Baudrillard's claims about hyperreality diminish our awareness of these limits, it borders on a madness whose likely end is apocalypse**.** As Pynchon vividly demonstrated in *Gravity's Rainbow*, an obsessional desire to avoid death itself becomes the death it seeks to elide.

### L---Setcol

#### The aff’s understanding of signs as disconnected from their original referents is a colonial logic that decenters and delegitimizes Native perspectives and literature – we can discern knowable truth and that is the truth of genocide that permeates historical and modern manifestations of settler colonialism.

Gorelova 9 [Olena Gorelova; Native American Studies at Montana State University; Postmodernism, Native American Literature and Issues of Sovereignty; April 2009; <https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/1358/GorelovaO0509.pdf?sequence=1>]//eleanor

Postmodernism is all about bringing margins into the play and rejecting grand narratives. Michael Dear and Gregg Wassmansdorf point out in Postmodern Consequences that postmodernists learn to contextualize and reject meta-theories in favor of undecidability and microexplanations and renounce the universal truth. Nevertheless, Craig Womack’s statement that there is Native American truth and it is worth looking for (Womack 4) seems to be more convincing, especially in terms of quest for sovereignty and re-establishment of Native histories and their validity. It is way too premature for Native scholars to deconstruct history when we haven’t yet constructed it. We need, for example, to recover the nineteenth century, especially in terms of understanding what Native writers were up to during that time and how their struggles have evolved toward what Indian writers can say in print today, as well as foundational principles they provide for an indigenous criticism. (Womack 3) Deconstructing history and identity would negate the whole purpose of American Indian literature, which, by many scholars, is identified as a support of sovereignty. Postmodernism deconstructs identity and gets rid of Native American points of view, thus putting Native perspective as well as Native narrative and story out of existence. Womack points out that postmodernism has a “tendency to decenter everything, including the legitimacy of a Native perspective” (Womack 6). Therefore, on the one hand, it undermines the ideology of the dominant mainstream society by ridding it of the notion of “alien other” and introducing it into the positive world of differences. On the other hand, the loss of center leads to the loss of meaning and history, therefore devaluing Native perspective as well as five hundred years of colonization that is still on-going. This brings us back to the concept of simulacrum, where surface is all that matters and what replaces the meaning and truth. For the entire period of colonization that is exactly what Native American tribes have been fighting for – the deeper understanding of who they are and what they represent instead of the generalization of all the tribes by what lies on the surface. On the other hand, if one sides with Hutcheon, postmodernism is what questions the truth and history and states that they are problematic, therefore, opening the mind to new suggestions and viewpoints by questioning the meta-narrative of history performed by the mainstream society. Thus, the representation is not reduced to empty, but its process, forms, and outcomes are questioned. The problem here is that while such questioning of the Euro-American grand narrative might be eye-opening, postmodernism does not stop there. The concept of simulacrum (a copy of a copy) puts Native American literature in quite an interesting predicament since one of its purpose is to re-claim back one of the spheres of indigenous art as well as perform a historical function in many cases by portraying the Native perspective. The notions of postmodernism, if applied to Native American literature in this case, would suggest that Native American writers are recreating what has already been created; the main question in that case is what exactly are they recreating – their tribal tradition or texts about Native Americans produced by non-Natives with numerous errors and misinterpretations? Would postmodernism, thus, pose a danger of the implication of the latter variant? Then, the whole notion of tribal culture would be destructed. Regarding the purpose of Native American literature, postmodernism as art that mainly focuses on investigation of its own nature might not be adequate since it suggests the existence of literature for the sake of itself and its experimentation with itself. Native American literatures, on the other hand, serve a different purpose and mainly exist as the voice of the Native communities and a means to serve these communities in various ways in their pursuit of sovereignty. A glimpse of hope can be found in Hutcheon’s statement that postmodernism is all about ideology and history; therefore, the texts are historical and political, but they bear that character through parody. It does not seem that Native American literature is trying to parody the history told from the perspective of the dominant white society; it does not attempt to mock, but merely to tell the new story from its own perspective that has been silenced for so long. One has to admit that there are exceptions in Native American literature and some writers do use this approach to literary texts. For instance, Sherman Alexie uses parody on a regular basis. However, the question is whether it is perceived by the readers unaware of cultural realities as such. Maybe that is why Alexie is so often blamed for perpetuating stereotypes. According to Womack, Abenaki poet Cheryl Savageau, while in college, was labeled an essentialist by one of her professors because she published an article in a newspaper on Native writers and land issues. She wrote in correspondence to Womack: “The same professor who labeled me ‘essentialist’, said there was no truth, no history, just lots of people’s viewpoints. I argued that some things actually did happen. That some versions of history are not just a point view, but actual distortions and lies” (qtd. in Womack 3). Savageau goes on to say that it is curious that exactly then, when Native Americans are finally starting to tell their story from their perspective, all of a sudden there is no truth, but only points of view. She states that it is a political move by the EuroAmerican academia to safeguard itself from having to deal with all the minority stories, whether they are African-America, American Indian, or gay and lesbian. She points out that this “equality” of everybody’s stories frees the mainstream from accountability since there is then “no need to change anything, no need for reparations, no arguments for sovereign nation status, and their [mainstream] positions of power are maintained” 64 (Womack 4). Therefore, Womack underlines the importance of discovering and rediscovering what has been made implicit and making it explicit: “at least until we get our stories told, especially in terms of establishing a body of Native criticism in relation to nineteenth-century writings, postmodernism may have some limitations in regards to its applicability to Native scholarship” (Womack 4). Womack remarks the vital part that nineteenth-century Indian literature of resistance played in the establishment of Native American literatures. Indian people produced works that argued for the rights of the indigenous nations and criticized land theft. The fact that postmodernism lets the marginalized voices be heard by rejecting the meta-theory of the mainstream society seems, on the one hand, rather promising to Native American literature with respect to the fact that the voices are finally going to be heard. On the other hand, American Indian literary works to a great extent are dependent and subordinate to the meta-theory of Native American nations, which in our modern condition is a fight for independence and rights. “Native literary aesthetics must be politicized and that autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty serve as useful literary concepts. […] literature has something to add to the arena of Native political struggle” (Womack 11). Postmodernism is one of the most notoriously ambiguous terms in literature and it is far from including every literary work written nowadays. Postmodernism is a movement and thought that influences all spheres of life; therefore, it can be considered as a social epoch, aesthetic, a style in art, and a cultural dominant, all at the same time. It reconsiders the values of modern society and puts them into question. Craig Owens points out that however we decide to define it, it is usually treated as a crisis of cultural authority, i.e. Western European culture and its authority and domination are questioned, and it is brought to the public’s attention that encounters with other cultures do not necessarily have to happen through conquest or domination (Owens 57). Therefore, the main characteristic of the postmodern age, which gives Native American culture on the whole a new perspective, is the coexistence of different cultures. In theory, it puts an end to ethnocentrism. That is why Lyotard talks about meta-narrative (grand narrative) versus little narrative. Postmodern theory does away with meta-narrative as an overpowering and globalizing cultural narrative that dictates the rules, with the idea that it explains all historical experience from one perspective. But does that theory become reality? On the other hand, postmodernism brings about deconstruction and to a certain extent the devaluing of culture and identity. Paul Ricoeur wrote: When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a sort of cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are threatened with the destruction of our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we ourselves are an “other” among others. All meaning and every goal having disappeared, it becomes possible to wander through civilizations as if through vestiges and ruins. The whole of mankind becomes an imaginary museum: where shall we go this weekend – visit the Angkor ruins or take a stroll in the Tivoli or Copenhagen? We can very easily imagine a time close at hand when any fairly well-to-do person will be able to leave his country indefinitely in order to taste his own national death in an interminable, aimless voyage. (Ricoeur 278) This is basically what we know today as the postmodern condition, but as Owens states, it reduces difference to indifference (Owens 58). Therefore, this might bring about the undesired effect into interpretation of Native American literature. Can it be that instead of stressing the value of Native literary difference, the indifference to the Native viewpoint can be brought about by postmodern interpretations? The purpose, however, is quite the opposite; it is to prove the independence and value of indigenous literary traditions, as well as put it on an equal level with Western literature. Therefore, it is important for Native American literature to make a difference, not to create indifference originated by postmodern apathy. Thus, Womack stresses the need for a literary criticism that emphasizes Native resistance movements against colonialism, confronts racism, discusses sovereignty and Native nationalism, seeks connection between literature and liberation struggles, and, finally, roots literature in land and culture. This criticism emphasizes unique Native worldviews and political realities, searches for differences as often as similarities, and attempts to find Native literature’s place in Indian country. (Womack 11) Therefore, Native American literary criticism has to be with regard to culture, community, and its current issues, and its purpose is to support the continuity of this specific culture instead deconstructing it and turning it into a mere tourist attraction.

#### The 1AC’s nostalgia for a “pre-modern” era, where signs were connected to their original referent positions spectacle against indigenous “authenticity” – this violent appropriation of indigenous identity situates them as the anti-modern antidote to semiotic exchange in service of white identity formation.

Grande 18 [Sandy Grande is a Professor of Political Science and Native American and Indigenous Studies at the University of Connecticut with affiliations in American Studies, Philosophy, and the Race, Ethnicity and Politics program. Her research and teaching interfaces Native American and Indigenous Studies with critical theory toward the development of more nuanced analyses of the colonial present.; “Refusing the Settler Society of the Spectacle”; Handbook of Indigenous Education; March 2018; https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-3899-0?noAccess=true#page=1015]//eleanor

Debord’s central thesis or provocation is that life in a “commodity-saturated, massmediated, image-dominated and corporate-constructed world” engenders an increasingly isolated, alienated, and passive citizenry that unwittingly relents to a groupthink of market consciousness disguised as individual agency (Kaplan 2012, p. 458). His analysis illuminates the inherent paradox of spectacle; despite (or because of) its intention to illicit emotion and (re)action, spectacle produces alienation and passivity. Particularly in a mass-mediated, hi-tech society, the sheer volume of content alone can produce a deadening effect. But spectacle is both dialectical and self-perpetuating. Meaning, the resulting (individual and social) ennui searches for relief from the deadening effect and, in so doing, activates the production of ever more spectacular imagery, generating an endless and alienating cycle of (simulated) life in search of the “real.” As the search intensifies, so does the desire for anything perceived as “authentic” – authenticity is the antidote (For early and consistently excellent discussions of the desire for “authentic” nature and culture see the work of Dean MacCannell 1976.). It is this cycle – the positioning of spectacularity against “authenticity” and authenticity as the antidote to the (post)modernist condition – that compels this analysis, particularly in the wake of #NoDAPL. For as long as “Indians” have been situated as the (authentic) anti-modern subject, “Indian-ness” has perennially served as a favored foil (antidote) for whiteness. While many Indigenous studies scholars have examined the ways in which Native identity is appropriated in the service of white identity formation (e.g., Berkhofer 1987; Deloria 1969, 1998; Huhndorf 2001), my interest is cast more broadly. That is, beyond questions of white identity formation: How does the expressed desire for the imagined Indian serve the propertied interests of whiteness, which is to say settler statecraft? To explore this question, I begin with more mundane expressions of Indian-as-spectacle and move toward their deeper implications. Currently, there are 20 reality shows in circulation that stage interventions (read: provide antidotes) for the normative hegemony of white-middle-class life by depicting life on the “frontier” or “the wild.” (Among the current shows are: Survivor, Colonial House, Alaska Bush People, Frontier House, and Man vs. Wild.) Through their ubiquity and popularity, such shows evidence the extent of settler-desire for the imperialist fantasy of “pre-modernist” times at the same time they appease settler supremacy. They refract what McLintock (McClintock and Robertson 1994) refers to as “panoptical time,” (More specifically, McLintock (1994) defines panoptical time as “the image of global history consumed – at a glance – in a single spectacle from the point of privileged invisibility” (p. 128).) a key component of imperialist discourse that situates progress as fundamentally contingent upon on a “shadow other,” which is, of course, the savage (Pardy 2010). Indeed, as noted by Rosaldo (1989) “In this ideologically constructed world of ongoing progressive change, putatively static ~~savage~~ [pre-modern] societies become a stable reference point for defining...civilized identity” (p. 70). Native peoples are so much “a shadow” that with the exception of one show (Frontier House) they are not even present – literally eliminated from settler view. In this sense, progress is the central character, so critical to settler mythology that it drives a deep-seeded need to continually perform the fabled journey from ~~savage~~ [pre-modern] to civilized over and over again; settler-subjects playing out fantasies of the colonial encounter as theater. There was one reality show about Native peoples – Escaping Alaska – which, depicted five Alaska Native youth (identified as “Eskimos”) “secretly” plotting to leave their families and homeland in order to experience life in the lower 48. True to Debord’s thesis, the society of the spectacle can only produce grotesque caricatures. In this instance, Inuit youth are depicted as members of a virtual cult that apparently holds their members’ captive and in complete ignorance of the “outside” world. Baloy (2016) theorizes the oscillation between the complete erasure and hyperreality of Indigenous peoples in terms of “spectrality” (i.e., a state of haunting). She deploys the term “holographic Indigeneity” to describe the phenomena of Native peoples hyper-visibility “from some angles” and invisibility from others – always a constant presence even in moments of apparent absence (p. 209).

### at: baudrillard solvency mechanisms

#### The aff is a double turn---positioning the 1AC as a way to undermine meaning or representation is itself an imposition of meaning that reaffirms the system they claim to oppose. They just create a new hierarchy of meaning in which irony, subversion, ambivalence etc are defined in opposition to literalism, truth and reality---the 1AC is no more challenging to the system than the other forms of resistance they reject

Joseph Valente 85, “Review: Hall of Mirrors: Baudrillard on Marx,” Diacritics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 54-65

As intimated however, Baudrillard's revolutionary project has serious structural flaws as well. His call to deconstruct and transgress the general code is self-evidently quixotic, since by his own testimony the sign-form now fixes the limits of thought. So while decrying "the rationalist political illusions, the dreams of political voluntarism [wrought by] the repression of the symbolic," [MP 108] he offers precious little in their stead. He ultimately envisages a spontaneous, impassioned, almost mystical overthrow of the general code, but his previous delineation of political economy as a master-device of mobilization and co-optation renders this option paltry and improbable. The entanglements of his polemic on this point graphically illustrate the difficulties confronting revolutionary discourse.¶ Like Derrida, Baudrillard asserts that all binary oppositions convey a hidden hierarchy- use-value rebounds to the advantage of exchange-value, concrete labor is the satellite of abstract social labor etc.- which reproduce in miniature the definitive form of political economy. In order to transgress the code, accordingly, these hierarchies cannot simply be reversed, they must be subverted. In theory, symbolic ambivalence designates this subversion and symbolic exchange characterizes the realm of originary transgression. In theoretical practice, however, these terms only appear, and only can appear, in opposition to the logic of equivalence and exchange-value, in what amounts to a new hierarchy. Baudrillard invariably pronounces concrete qualitative use-value, whether of commodities or labor, abstract by comparison to the "richness of symbolic exchange." He thus installs the symbolic as the new, concrete qualitative base, reinscribing the line of division between (simulated) reality and its abstract reduction. As soon as it enters this binary scission, which is to say in its genesis as a concept, the symbolic object or relation is overdetermined as the anti-productive, reduced to the irreducible, reified as that which is in itself non-reifiable, and measured according to the uniform, rational standard of valence. Thus, at a higher level, commanding a greater range and depth of content, Baudrillard's critique mirrors Marx's critique mirroring the logical form of political economy. He is to Marx what he claims Marx is to Feuerbach.¶ A related contradiction appears on the anthropological or subjective side of things. Baudrillard's revolutionary discourse cannot admit to rising from or answering to any fundamental need or moral good, having already branded both idealistic fictions produced by the general code for its preservation and aggrandizement. Further, in holding the code to govern "all production, material or symbolic," Baudrillard's theory, a most rational production to be sure, inferentially defines itself as an expression of the code and an extension of its domain. This coopted status would in turn explain the tendency of his argument to establish, at a second level and against his better judgment, a new binary structure or scission. For whatever Baudrillard openly espouses, it is clear that he takes symbolic ambivalence and exchange as the arche (motive, impetus, matrix) and the telos (point, prescription, purpose) of his theoretical project. But as Derrida effectively demonstrates, the presumption of an end entails the presumption of an essence. Baudrillard restores the "keystone of ideology" as he does "concrete" reality and, in so doing, proves the code doubly inescapable. In explicitly denying human essence, he situates his revolutionary impulse as strictly a code-effect, by implicitly affirming Man's essence, he buttresses the code-form. The problem lies in the polemical gesture itself. Proceeding by and mirroring the logic of opposition, "the critique is perhaps only the subtle long-term expression of the system's expanded reproduction" [MP 50].¶ The specific character of human essence Baudrillard has hit upon deepens the impression that a Derridean double-bind is inherent to his enterprise. In order to make a clean break with the rational finality of the code, Baudrillard is driven to a position unmistakably akin to the noble savage mythos so prevalent during the earliest stages of capitalism. At that time, it served as an essential ideological force in the bourgeois revolution, countervailing the monarch's claim of divine sanction with an appeal to the empirically revealed law of Nature. Now the same mythos represents an ill-defined objective, without known means of attainment or substantive ideological consequences, just the sort of harmless opposition political economy entertains and perhaps even manufactures. Addressing the plight of Marxism in the monopolistic phase, Baudrillard avers that "the system can afford the luxury of contradiction and dialectic through the play of signs. It can indulge itself with all the signs of revolution. Since it produces all the responses, it annihilates the question in the same blow" [MP 126-27]. Symbolic exchange would seem to be just the sort of revolutionary diversion, a diversion for and from the revolutionary impulse, which Baudrillard remarks here. As Marx's privileging of the concrete was to the social abstractions of early capitalism, so Baudrillard's fetishism of the primitive is to the hyper-technical hyper-artificial tenor of today: a countersign and so a systemic simulation.

#### The aff’s reductionist view of military policy disconnects simulacra from their real institutional determinants---only countering simulations with better military scholarship can prevent endless intervention

Mitchell Hobbs 6, The University of Newcastle, Australia, REFLECTIONS ON THE REALI TY OFTHE IRAQ WARS: THE DEMISE OFBAUDRILLARD’S SEARCH FORTRUTH?, https://www.academia.edu/2569231/Reflections\_on\_the\_reality\_of\_the\_Iraq\_Wars\_the\_demise\_of\_Baudrillards\_search\_for\_truth

Although Baudrillard’s work on “simulation” and “simulacra” is valuable in highlightingthe relationship between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to be de-contextualised, his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of the contemporary mass media. For instance, asmedia theorist and researcher Douglas Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, Baudrillard does not help readers understand events such as the Gulf War, because he reduces the actions of actors and complex political issues to categories of “simulation” and “hyper-reality”, in a sense “erasing their concrete determinants”.

Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including theGulf Wars, sees Baudrillard’s theory as being “one-dimensional”, “privilege[ing] the form of media technology over its content, meaning and…use” (Kellner, 1989:73). In thisregard, Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of the newsmedia, nor the cultural practices involved with the production of news (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism thatundermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner,1989:73-74). Although Kellner (2003:32) believes that Baudrillard’s pre-1990s works on “the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign, simulation and simulacra,and the implosion of [social] phenomenon” are useful and can be deployed within criticalsocial theory, he prefers to read Baudrillard’s later, more controversial and obscure, workas “science fiction which anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies”

In order to understand war and its relationship with the media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond Baudrillard’s spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although our culture is resplendent with images, signs and narratives, circulating in aseemingly endless dance of mimicry (or, rather, simulacra), there are observable social institutions and practices producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solidmight melt into air (Marx and Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. Images and narratives can be traced back to their sources: whether they lie in Hollywood fantasies or government ‘spin’. In short, by assessing the veracity of competing texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed explanations of different events, the social sciences can acquire an understanding of the ‘truthfulness’ of media representations; of the ‘authentic’ in a realm bewildered by smoke and mirrors. As long as there are competing media voices on which to construct a juxtaposition of ‘truths’, sociologists can, to a certain extent, force the media to grapple with their own disparate reflections.

3 CONCLUSIONS

3.1 REST IN PEACE BAUDRILLARD?

In the final analysis, then, Baudrillard’s work on the Gulf War and the September 11terrorist attacks should (respectfully) be laid to rest. For although some, such as RichardKeeble (2004:43), have followed Baudrillard in arguing that “there was no war in the gulf in 2003”, such statements are somewhat antithetical to the truth aims of the social sciences. Baudrillard, being both an icon and iconoclast, pushed his language and arguments to rhetorical extremes in order to force the collapse of representations andarguments he saw as having supplanted truth. His fatal theory was in a sense intellectual ‘hype’, for a capricious world in which only ‘hype’ can be noticed. Yet in shouting his arguments he served to obfuscate their nuance and subtext, the very intellectualessences of his work and, ultimately, his contribution to the body of knowledge.

However, although fatal theory is of little practical use for media researchers seeking anempirically derived ‘truth’, Baudrillard’s oeuvre is still (somewhat) instructive, remindingus of the importance of de-mystifying reality. For although the voice of the scholar is that of a pariah in the entertainment driven public sphere, we must force our voices into thepublic sphere if we are to re-contextualise events such as the Iraq war, by providing audiences with better, more veracious accounts of events. Failing this, we will continue to find our ‘defence’ forces engaged in military operations under spurious casus belli arguments. Accordingly, despite the many faults of his work, Baudrillard should not beforgotten. For although his contribution was more of a slap-of-the-face than a gentlepush in the right direction, his ideas regarding simulacra and reality have helped to further our understanding of media spectacles (and their potential repercussions). In apost-Baudrillard world, as social inquiry (it is to be hoped) returns to a more empiricallyinformed understanding of the media, we should not forget the implications posed by thiscultural field. For if sociology seeks to explain the social world, then it must work to prevent the dislocation of reality from the ‘real’ that Baudrillard so feared.

### at: info dissuasive

#### They obviously link to this --- they present information, which means we are less likely to agree with and understand your args. Vote aff to reject their information if they win this arg, which makes us smarter and more capable.

#### Literal anti-war advocacy works---challenging elite consensus in favor of war by providing a different interpretation of the reality and meaning of events prevents a society-wide rally to war

Adam J. Berinsky 7, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict,” Journal of Politics, Volume 69, Issue 4, pages 975–997, November 2007

Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public will support military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict. Other scholars contend that the balance of elite discourse influences public support for war. I draw upon survey evidence from World War II and the current war in Iraq to come to a common conclusion regarding public support for international interventions. I find little evidence that citizens make complex cost/benefit calculations when evaluating military action. Instead, I find that patterns of elite conflict shape opinion concerning war. When political elites disagree as to the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. But when elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war.¶ In recent years, a charitable view of the mass public has emerged in the public opinion and foreign policy literature. Increasingly, scholars have attributed “rationality” to public opinion concerning war. Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public will support military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict and should therefore have a place at the policymaking table.¶ In this paper, I argue that military events may shape public opinion, but not in the straightforward manner posited by most scholars of public opinion and war. I draw upon and expand the work of scholars who contend that the balance of elite discourse influences levels of public support for war. Integrating research on heuristics and shortcuts with information-based theories of political choice, I demonstrate that patterns of conflict among partisan political actors shape mass opinion on war. It is not the direct influence of wartime events on individual citizens' decisions that determines public opinion, as “event response” theories of war support claim. Instead, consistent with the “elite cue” theory I advance in this paper, the nature of conflict among political elites concerning the salience and meaning of those events determines if the public will rally to war. To a significant degree citizens determine their positions on war by listening to trusted sources—those politicians who share their political predispositions.¶ I present evidence from World War II and the Second Iraq war, two cases that span 65 years of American history, to come to this common conclusion. In both wars, I find that significant segments of the mass public possessed little knowledge of the most basic facts of these conflicts. Thus, there is little evidence that citizens had the information needed to make cost/benefit calculations when deciding whether to support or oppose military action. Instead, I find that patterns of elite conflict shaped opinions both throughout the six years of World War II and during the Iraq conflict. When elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war. But when prominent political actors take divergent stands on the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. Furthermore, even in cases—such as the Iraq war—where prominent political actors on one side of the partisan divide stay silent, the presence of a prominent partisan cue giver can lead to divergence in opinion. In sum, while members of the mass public are not lemmings—they have agency to determine their own opinion and may even, in the aggregate, reasonably react to changing events—in the realm of war, any apparent rationality arises largely through the process of elite cue taking, not through a reasoned cost/benefit analysis. The mass public is rational only to the extent that prominent political actors provide a rational lead.

#### **Bush could have escalated the war further absent significant anti-war activism --- proves that information with clear goals works sometimes**

Heaney 12, Assistant Professor of Organizational Studies and Political Science @ Umich (Michael, “The Policy, Political, and Social Effects of the Antiwar Movement after 9/11,” <https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2012/07/02/the-policy-political-and-social-effects-of-the-antiwar-movement-after-911/>)

Of course, it is impossible to establish definitely the nonimpact of the antiwar movement on policy. Doing so requires the evaluation of counterfactual scenarios that cannot be tested empirically. For example, if there had been no antiwar movement at all – if nobody had protested the war policies of the Bush Administration – it is plausible to believe that the administration would have been emboldened to take more aggressive military actions, possibly invading Syria or Iran. Or, perhaps the Bush Administration would have had the confidence to pursue more ambitious conservative domestic policies. Personally, I am inclined to believe that the movement did have these types of restraining effects but, as a social scientist, it is impossible to demonstrate them convincingly. To claim that the policy and political effects of the antiwar movement were limited is not to say that the movement was unimportant. Indeed, the social effects of the movement may have been its most lasting contribution. The antiwar movement exposed millions of people to their first experiences with activism, which will likely shape the way that many of them think of, and participate in, politics for the remainder of their lives.[7]

The movement provided critical opportunities for activists to learn about new tactics and to implement them on unfamiliar terrain.[8] Alliances and conflicts within coalitions shaped the structure of the social networks of movement participants.[9] The movement provided activists with opportunities to explore their identities[10] and to create new organizations by hybridizing elements of intersecting social movements.[11] In many ways, we have only begun to see the long-term consequences of a generation shaped by the antiwar movement.

#### Direct opposition to violent policies like the War on Terror is effective---Debrix’s critique is reductive and prevents effective resistance

Upendra Baxi 9, Professor of Law in Development, University of Warwick, “Reading 'Terror': Reflections on François Debrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and Geopolitics,” Theory & Event Vol 12 Issue 3, Project Muse

6. Tabloid cultures, Debrix seems to be saying, deserve the dignity of that naming, not just because the mass production of mediatised political subjectivities now conflate narratives of both the dominant and rebel subjectivities, but also because these enunciate now some distinctive orders of truths, and theories, especially via the globally manufactured forms of 'aesthetics' of 'violence and by its engagement with postmodernity.' In a sense,' writes Debrix, 'postmodernity now constitutes 'a golden era of tabloid culture' (38.) Resisting high-minded gestures of dismissal of tabloid culture as 'trash' culture (6), Debrix urges us that we take it seriously because of the regime of overall 'truth effects' it produces, directed to reinforce WOT-talk. Overall, Debrix presents this rather as a matter of mood rather than of method.¶ 8. Tabloid culture(s) are differently technologically mediated than older forms of production of propaganda; the new technologies of digitalization now 'accelerate[s] the spiralling vortex of media-produced information' and images, in ways un-contemplated in earlier times (22.) If in earlier eras, ideology and propaganda aimed at fostering 'consistency, certainty, and truth,' today tabloid terror thrives rather on an extravagant excess of the production of these 'effects' (23.) In sum, tabloid culture/terror entails mediatised productions of hyperreality, which provide instant justifications for the 'WOT,' and in turn pioneer violent political truths; they overall thus become 'a most potent resource' for presentations of senses of generalized panic. as also for the production of the discursive effects of nostalgia, ethnocentrism, nationhood, and other forms of sinister 'narrative typography' that justify annihilation of the 'monstrous' other or the third, in the wake of reiterated 'terror' attacks. These effects remain integral to production of 'mediascapesvi ' as markers of contemporary globalization. Tabloid culture(s) celebrate the crises of 'nervous' rationality both for the purveyors of limitless WOT justifications for and the arcane habitus of contemporary thoughtways, which now speak to us via anxious discourse concerning the relation between 'philosophy' and 'politicsvii .'¶ 9. Terror has its own analytic. Contemporary 'terror' talk often ignores Marx's insight in Capital – that the rule of law remains inconceivable outside the reign of terror. Tabloid cultural industry and theory far from inviting any structural grasp of 'terror' rather invite us to a sort of epistemological break in the name of 9/11, and its variously iterated aftermaths. The analytic of terror thus foregrounds a particular type: indiscriminate violence caused by nomadic suicide bombers, within and across nations. The analytic thus formed remains ahistorical and fragmented. Ahistorical because it ignores monumental forms of 'terror' historically articulated by the series of radical evils of colonization, imperialism, and the 'Cold War,' and because it elides the everyday forms of lived experience of terror made visible by critical feminist, race, and LBGT theoretical discourses8 . And fragmented because it cannot attend to the structural violence always fully instanced by Marxian and post-Marxian discourses.¶ 16. Contemporary forms of 'terrorism' should, it is often said, understood more in terms of acts and its effects and less in those of perpetrator intention and agency. ' The 'new' terror consists in: [a] threat or use of violence, [b] directed against innocent peoples, [c] and further directed against others with the intention of coercing to adopt choices or actions they would not have otherwise madeviii .' The 'new' terror, under the auspices of intensely volatile and mobile cross-border suicide bombers, is said to be different from the 'old' terror, which was after all an acceptable (though intensely debated) 'political' project (whether of revolutionary movements directed at the overthrow of repressive regimes or the movements of self-determination and even 'wars of national liberation'). If the forms of 'old' 'terror' thus remained integral to transformative/emancipative praxes, the 'new' terror remains bereft of any such constitutive justificatory elements. If the old 'terror wars,' birthed a new era of contemporary human rights, and much else besides, its new forms, in a marked contrast, are said to threaten some of these very same hard-won civilizational/public goods. The new 'terror' thus remains an unmediated evil, perhaps because marked by the suicide bomber, as an agent of unethical violence, is simply said to 'enjoy' itix .'¶ 17 Justification for the 'new' terror can be divided into three strategies: normative, epistemological, and cultural/political. The first demands 'good reasons,' and both 'good' and 'reason' tend to be defined differently according to the ethical traditions one adopts. The second concerns a relationship between belief and truth: that is, between one's 'belief's contents' and 'actions that arise from it.' The third, which arises from political psychology, cultivates practices of 'group justification' theories that 'hold that people are driven by ethnocentric motives to build ingroup solidarity and to defend and justify the interests and identities of fellow ingroup members against those of outgroup membersx .'¶ 18. Tabloid Terror is expressly concerned with the cultural/political, as marking especially the tabloid culture's re-articulation of some foundational triumphalist beliefs about the idea of America. While it offers a tour de horizon of the agonal cultural politics within the United States, it does touch upon the epistemological questions raised by 'the primary or foundational beliefs in America's 'civilizing mission,' and its accompanying 'sense of moral conservatism and national exceptionalism' (65).¶ 20. Tabloid theory accentuates the state of cultural anxieties arising out of the very 'achievement' of the end of the Cold War, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Well before 9/11, Robert Kaplan asked whether the United States will 'survive the next century in exactly its present form' (50.) Kaplan wrote movingly about the shattering of the 'dreams of the Cold War' through the emergence of an 'epoch of themeless juxtapositions, in which the classificatory grid of nation-states will be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms and a 'new kind of war,' wars of 'communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity,' wars which 'will be sub-national, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically. This is how many states will ultimately diexi .' Samuel Huntington followed suit with his own 'neoconservative cultural anxiety,' fully manifest in his fulsome and fierce critique of multiculturalism and serial attacks upon 'America's lifestyle.' His American 'civilizing mission' entailed 'cultural renewal' not just for itself but as a vanguard movement aimed at keeping' the Western bloc Western,' regaining in the process 'geostrategic control over international relations' thus also fostering 'a sense of Western alliance, complicity, and common interest' (58.) Not to be left behind, Zbigniew Brzezinski passionately pleads for a revitalization of the 'Eurasian chessboard' (signifying here some narratives of the newly industrializing developing societies, inclusive of China and India) as a geographical and epistemic 'buffer' to allow a fecund scope for the United States not only to remain 'unique and superior' but also to violently 'span the entire surface of the globe' (63.)¶ 21. The survivalist imperative for the United States led directly to the quest for a diffuse and fiercer enemy, commencing its anxious itinerary (37-67) well before 9/11. The 'sense of moral conservatism and national exceptionalism' (65) was necessary but not sufficient for a triumphal reassertion of America's 'civilizing mission.' In a tragic irony, Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenants performed a singular service to the reinvention of this mission, creating a new geopolitics of solidarity manifest in WOT discourse as an event. Debrix describes this (not avoiding the embedded racist and sexist narratives), as a 'swirling black hole' contributing to 'a destructive fatality' for an ideology of an absolute superiority of the West over the rest of the world' (111.)¶ 21. Debrix suggests that productions of tabloid theory and culture render fungible the states, and estates, of the normative regimes of international law, international humanitarian, and human rights law/jurisprudence. Tabloid terror productions seem to have no 'use' for all these normative formats. He is correct that they are besieged by an ethic of ambiguity, even to a point of rendering illegible the normative proscriptions against killing/harming 'innocent non-combatant civiliansxii .' The WOT tabloid discourse thrives upon a constitution of corresponding normative/ontological 'lack'. Because the new 'terror warriors,' in any event, lie outside these normative regimes governing hostile acts between and betwixt state actors, recognized as proper subjects of international law, and civil war type insurgency actors as well, the WOT constitutes (to invoke Agamben) a 'zone of indistinction,' or (to evoke the phrase regime of international lawpersons) 'a regime of non liquet', situations where the normativity of international law provides neither any scope of formulating a problematique, nor any response to it. Thus it comes to pass that in a new medievalism of WOT enact some instant rhetoric of a new lex talonis.¶ 22. Debrix allows no narrative space for marked differences within-Euroamerican WOT talk, nor does he refer to global South-based critique. In Chapter 5, Debrix extends a Lyotard-inflected Kantian 'sublime' to 'the tabloid aesthetics of violence and the erasure of the event.' Debrix locates the sublime as a 'principal operating technique' by which tabloid cultural productions reduce the frightening experience of a sublime event (the spectacles of terror in New York, Madrid, London, and now Mumbai) 'toward a concept, another belief, or an exercise of reason that is finally able to impose its dominant truth as it were the prevailing everyday reality' (126.) Debrix's tales of (American) tabloid culture presenting the domestication of the sublime as an integral aspect of a 'regime of truth … equipped with its arsenal of inclusions and exclusions' (127) are persuasive, but the further claim that the WOT aesthetic may yet offer some 'differential possibilities for democracy in contemporary geopolitics and international relations' (127) is never fully spelled out.¶ 23. Debrix's category of the 'trivial sublime' poses similar problems. To explain it, he narrates the protest of Cindy Sheehan, the mother of a marine killed in Iraq, outside President George Walker's Bush's ranch in Texas (and subsequently joined my many mothers of soldiers and veterans of the Iraq war) as exemplary of the 'trivial sublime.' Sheehan's fasting serves as an 'irruptive event' which commands (media) attention in ways that 'brings haunting reality backing the face of those who champion a higher idea, ideal, and ideology' (141); yet it is trivially sublime (according to Florian Tréguer, whose analysis Debrix adopts) because it opens 'into nothing,' because it lacks 'conceptual horizon or an 'ideological depth', and because it does not question the 'daily and ordinary reality, where individuals die violent deaths as a result of the American agony of war' (142). The US Iraq war mothers' 'protest is trivially sublime because it remains 'without future and hope' (141) and keeps intact 'American war machine's terror' (142.) The protest 'shocks and destabilizes,' without at the same moment 'providing answers' or 'bringing in new hopes' (143-44 ) toward an actualization of 'democracy-to-come.' If this is the case, how may counter-publics ever re-script the 'sublime spectatorship of the Iraq War' (129-136) and indeed of the variously ongoing WOT?¶ 24. Contra Debrix, on my relatively untutored readings of, Slavoj Zižek, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jacques Derrida (137-140) suggest that resistance events may after all push the frontiers of tabloid cultures and even present an incipient critique of WOT, even if they possess 'no guarantee of political or democratic success' in American popular/public culture of representations of a different future to come' (141). Tabloid terror productions remain thus the registers of dramaturgies of the WOT desires sublimating orders/ disorders of deferred desires: desires as constituting a Lecanian lack, a site of hyper- reality where the future delineating acts of resistance further only feed the appetites of the of a global war machine . No wonder, then that Debrix can name as 'trivially sublime' the episodes/irruptions the forms of activist desire as none other than mere forms of mimetic desire xiii . What difference may then all the talk about the future of democracy-to-come may make for any narrative of the spectatorship of the sublime except via the endless return of the same: violent exchanges between and amongst the cadres of suicide bombers trained and equipped by the 'masters of terror' on the one hand and, on the other hand, the predatory violence of the WOT–warriors?.¶ 25. Debrix's enunciation of the 'trivial sublime' indeed puzzles: Was the worldwide massive demonstration of protest at the onset of the Iraq WOT nothing more than juridicalization of the trivial sublime based as this was on the insistence that outside the UN Security Council decisional authority that violence of the coalitions of willing states the invasion and occupation of Iraq was illegal and unjustified? If so, how may we ever essay any understanding of the antinomic relation between 'human rights and empire' xiv ? Tabloid Terror narratives present a new Leviathan-type construction of dominant sovereignty of mass media, which offers no (or little) space for counter-publics. Such narratives offer too little room for analysis of the 'subaltern' and de-globalizing media forms and formats critiquing critique the WOT rampages and predations. By avoiding discussing resistance figures such as Mohandas Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Aung Say Suu Kyi, the Dalai Lama, and the Palestinian people's movements, Tabloid Culture elides, possible efforts toward 'democracy-to-come.'

#### Baudrillard’s critique does not generalize to the thesis that all information-production is pure spectacle

Patrick Wilcken 95 Department of Anthropology, Goldsmiths’ College, University of London “The Intellectuals, the Media and the Gulf War” Critique of Anthropology 1995 15: 37

There are strong links between the theoretical meanderings described above and intellectuals’ response to an event like the Gulf War. The ’no comment’ approach was perhaps the most widespread in keeping with an indifferent critical climate, but for those who put their oar in, agnosticism was the order of the day. Baudrillard, for example, in his infamous article ’The Reality Gulf’ (1991a) written on the eve of hostilities, claimed that the war would not in fact take place. By this he meant that the media had created a ’hyper real scenario’ of fallacious commentary, empty predictions and reports of threats and counterthreats that were staged for the media in the first place. In Baudrillard’s opinion, the only real ’strategic cite is the TV screen from which we are daily bombarded’. There is no other reality; images and their referents are interchangeable. As a result we have on our hands, under the auspices of the UN as an ’extended contraceptive’, a ’Safe War’ (like safe sex) - ’a form of war which means never having to face up to war’ (1991a: 25).

Baudrillard’s piece as a description of the way the media worked during the crisis holds some validity,&dquo; but to go from there and suggest that taking any position on such an event by attempting to demystify the media ’simulacrum’ is simply mistaken - in effect just one more illusory exercise - is absurd to say the least. Baudrillard’s second article published in Liberation (1991b) entitled ’La guerre du Golfe n’a pas eu lieu’ (’The Gulf War Did Not Take Place’) goes even further in this direction. Baudrillard is willing to concede that in the event mass destruction did take place, but he goes on to argue that we must not be deceived into taking a moral stand on such an issue, but must instead engage in a sort of postmodern oneupmanship and reject all evidence so as to be ’more virtual than the events themselves’ (trans. in Norris, 1992: 194).

Baudrillard’s position is perhaps somewhat extreme, but its controversial avant-garde flavour assured it copy space. But similar sentiments dressed up differently begin to look disturbingly representative of the intellectual response in the media when one considers Michael Ignatieff’s article in the Observer (1991). ’The languages of moral concern hardly connect,’ writes Ignatieff. Some people decry the carnage on the road to Basra, others, like Ignatieff himself, support the war on the grounds that sanctions would have failed. But in the final analysis ’neither side has the slightest hope of convincing the other’ . What kind of critical commentary is this? Ignatieff’s relativist stance renders informed debate irrelevant and absolves him from having to defend his pro-war position.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Barbara Ehrenreich (one of Garafola’s new generation public intellectuals) in an article for Time magazine (1990), ’The Warrior Culture’, attributes the eagerness of the US to confront the Iraqis militarily to America’s culture of aggression. She starts off with a sort of Victorian anthropological chamber of horrors: dozens of ’pretechnological peoples’ including the Masai of East Africa and the North American Plains Indians rule that men cannot marry until they have killed in battle; in the Solomon Islands a chief’s status is reckoned by the number of skulls displayed around his door; Aztec kings use human hearts in religious rituals. America possesses just such a ’warrior culture’ with its unquenchable thirst for violence on television, its willingness to go to war on any pretext, and its warrior elite siphoning off nearly a third of the federal budget even in peace time. While left-wingers may blame this war on imperialism, Ehrenreich concludes, and right-wingers ’internationalism’ the real villain is in the culture itself.

Ehrenreich’s well-intentioned piece not only fails to convince ethnographically but, reducing international politics to culture, eliminates the possibility of dissent. Ehrenreich is arguing in effect, that Americans are unable to help themselves: their culture inculcates them with the urge to fight. Historical precedent, economic considerations and global power relations become irrelevant.

These three public intellectuals, highly visible in their respective countries, are unable to assess critically a major political event like the Gulf War. Baudrillard wants to live in ’virtual reality’, Ignatieff concludes that any adjudication is impossible and Ehrenreich reduces the conflict to specious cultural predispositions. Their lack of conviction, though, owes as much to the theoretical climate as to the requirements of the media. Baudrillard’s piece satisfies the market for the bizarre - the intellectual eccentric going over the top; Ignatieff encapsulates the views of the soft liberal readership of the Observer; while Ehrenreich’s article has obvious exotic appeal.

But even outside the requirements of the media, the Gulf War highlighted the general paralysis of the intellectual community worldwide. In the USA, Edward Said argues that intellectuals failed to join the debate because of their lack of ’affiliation with the public sphere’, provinciality and impotence (1991: 15). Even the editorial board of Dissent was divided over the issue, producing a wide spectrum of opinion. Todd Gitlin described the war as a ’catastrophe’ which was ’avoidable’, the late Irving Howe felt compelled to take a pro-war position but felt that the stance was ’uncomfortable’ for the Left, while Dennis Wrong concluded that because of the UN’s role this was a ’legal and just war’ (Morton et al., 1991:153-60). In France ex-radical ’soixante huitard’ Alaine Touraine gave the war his unequivocal support, while Pierre Bourdieu denounced it as ’drunken war-mongering’ (Zamiti, 1992 : 53 ; author’s trans.). In Britain, Christopher Norris comments that few intellectuals were able to resist the ’pressures of ideological recruitment’ (1992: 25) and The Times, in an article written during the conflict, described the ’old constituency of intellectual protest’ as ’in confusion’ (27 January 1991). But perhaps the most striking example of intellectual disarray was in Germany, where the issue of the war was the first event to break up decisively one of the most politically cohesive left-wing groups in Europe. Veterans of 1968 Enzensberger and Brumlik came out in support of the Allies as other intellectuals appeared to flounder in self-contradiction: Jurgen Habermas commented that the war was ’justified’ (as opposed to ’just’); Cohn-Bendit supported the war while at the same time condemned the hypocrisy of the intellectuals for ignoring the suffering of the Iraqi people (Rabinbach, 1991 : 462).

### at: charity cannibalism

#### They obviously link to this --- they have impacts, ergo they are charity cannibals

#### Alt cause --- every other proclamation of catastrophe rhetoric should cause wars and invasions

#### The fact that we talk about problems outside of this room we plainly lack the immediate ability to solve sadly----and obviously----applies to all of debate. But they don’t solve it, and actually make it far worse by vilifying attempts to engage compassionately with the world of others

Kim Sawchuk 2, PhD, Social and Political Thought, York University, prof of comm at Concordia, editor of the Canadian Journal of Communication, general book review of Distant Suffering by Luc Boltanski, Canadian journal of Communication Vol 27, No 1 (2002)

Inherent in the politics of pity in the modern period is the problem of dealing with suffering from a distance and the "massification of a collection of unfortunates who are not there in person" (p. 13). Although contemporary media may have "dramatized" the spectacle of distant suffering in the past 30 years, they neither invented nor caused this condition. Historical examples also bolster Boltanski's claim that the media did not inaugurate the politics of pity - rather, its logic was set out more than 200 years ago. Boltanski carefully examines this logic and the paradoxes it creates in the book's three sections. Part 1 lays out the argument. Part 2 relies heavily on literary sources to analyze the "topos," a term he borrows from rhetoric, of the idea of pity and suffering. The third section deals with the question of pity and misfortune, drawing primarily on historical and contemporary examples, such as the work of Doctors Without Borders and the clash in the late 1950s between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Each chapter is replete with insight, making this a difficult book to summarize. Every word and every argument is so intricately intertwined with the next that paraphrasing seems a travesty.¶ The third section should be of interest to those located in the disciplines of communications or media studies. Here it is important to recall the subtitle of the book, Morality, the Media and Politics. Boltanski returns to the question of the spectator and the anxieties of those who wish to do something about what they see unfolding on their screens. He asks: "[H]ow might the contemporary spectators' anxiety be reduced without averting their gaze from misfortune or by abandoning the project inherent in the modern definition of politics of facing up to unnecessary suffering and relieving it[?]" (p. 159). What could political action be, given the fact that suffering does occur at a distance and that not every struggle can be taken on with equal commitment? First, he argues that there is a political, technical, and moral necessity to open up a discussion of commitment and ideology, although what he means by ideology is not adequately explained. Second, he contends that witnessing suffering means that morally we are asked to act. Commitment is commitment to some kind of action. Third, he promotes the idea that speech is action. "One can commit oneself through speech; by taking a stance, even when alone, of someone who speaks to somebody else about what they have seen" (p. xv). By speaking - to others and even to oneself - we recognize and acknowledge that speech must be understood as a form of action (p. 154).¶ One of the conditions of Boltanski's argument is a clear distinction between the world of representation and the world of action. He writes: "Informed by representation, words must really be deployed in the world of action in order to be effective" (p. 154). He is critical of deconstructionist criticism, primarily meaning the writings of Jean Baudrillard, which blurs this distinction to too great an extreme, thereby "holding the order of action" at arm's length or making it illusionary (p. 154). He contends that this position makes the very intention to act nothing but a naïve illusion creating an "empire of suspicion" (p. 158). Boltanski does not claim that we remain without an emotional commitment to causes, but rather that "to prevent the unacceptable drift of emotions close towards the fictional we must maintain an orientation towards action, a disposition to act, even if this is only by speaking out in support of the unfortunate" (p. 153).¶ What then are the properties of effective speech? Boltanski turns to phenomenology and semantics, concluding that effective speech involves: (a) intentionality; (b) incorporation in bodily gestures and movements; (c) sacrifice of other possible actions; (d) the presence of others; and, (e) a commitment (p. 185). Intentionality involves an intention to speak meaningfully, not just engage in idle chatter. Action and intention are connected to each other in effective action realized in the world. Intention incorporated in action is "expression." This kind of expressive political speech must involve risk for spectators - they may be chastized, they may be contested, or they may be at physical risk in authoritarian regimes. Boltanski goes on to classify different types of action as strong and weak, collective and individual. He builds an argument for local chapters of groups supporting humanitarian movements, such as Amnesty International, for they enable one to avoid the alternative of either on-the-spot involvement or distant spectacle. They are one way to breach the schism between abstract universalism and communitarian withdrawal: "The humanitarian claim for more or less distant causes can thus avoid the alternative of abstract universalism - easily accused of being fired up for distant suffering the better to avert its eyes from those close at hand - or of communitarian withdrawal into itself - which only attends to misfortune when it affects those nearest - by being rooted in groups and thereby linked to preexisting solidarities and local interests" (p. 190). In other words, expression is most "authentic" for Boltanski when made manifest in actions, like participating in a demonstration or protest, which incarnates our beliefs and displays our commitments. By incorporating an action, the person communicates an observable tendency.¶ But is this enough? Boltanski is concerned by apathy and asks us to consider that we are doomed, inevitably, to imperfection in our politics. Despite this, we must make the attempt to be "moral subjects" - that is, committed and engaged subjects. Because he recognizes the difficulties of negotiating these contradictions, he avoids moralizing. He is no Habermasian trying to outline the conditions for an ideal-speech situation. In Boltanski's book, we live in imperfect worlds and we must contend with this. He asks that we resurrect compassion into our politics, which he says is always particular and practical, as it is oriented toward doing something about a situation. Unlike pity, it engages with the person suffering. But pity isn't always a bad thing in this analysis. Pity generalizes in order to deal with distance, and in so doing one may discover emotion and feeling for others that may translate into speech or action. A spectacle of suffering may end with a commitment to involvement.¶ Boltanski realizes the challenge, yet remains optimistic that humans are capable of such a move. There are, as he notes, an "excess of unfortunates" in our world. The problem remains to whom we extend aid or pity, given their great numbers (p. 155). This is true both in the realm of action, but also in the realm of representation. So many people are suffering and there is not enough media space for them all (p. 155). Boltanski does not prioritize causes or instances of grief. He does, however, suggest that the media represent any unfortunate groups taking action to confront and escape their distress. It is unethical to only depict them in the passive act of suffering (p. 190). He acknowledges that the mediatization of suffering may incite action. For example, it may protect populations against their own rulers, if only temporarily, for such depictions do not necessarily change the internal political situation. His analysis assumes that spectators, who are democratic citizens, have a role to play in lobbying and pressuring their own governments to take action (p. 184). Again, while aware that public opinion may be manipulated, he argues that public-opinion polls are powerful tools. Answering a poll is depicted as a potentially effective form of speech and an "adequate response to the call for action" (p. 185).¶ Distant Suffering thus describes, in sometimes painful detail, a wavering between selfish egoism and altruistic commitment to causes. Boltanski describes how we may, unfortunately, cultivate ourselves by becoming absorbed in our own pity when looking at the spectacle of someone else's suffering, a phenomenon that has been far too present since the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Boltanski tries to lead us out of this self-absorption into the world of effective political action by offering a range of involvement. While advocating commitment and debates about morality as part of the solution, this is no smug celebration of the "return to kindness" or an easy denunciation of the perverse delight of spectacles of suffering. In considering distant suffering as the "logical consequence" of the introduction of pity into politics over 200 years ago, we are asked to concern ourselves with the present.¶ Boltanski ends his fine treatise by exhorting us to quit looking to past injustices, to stop anticipating future injustice, and to stay focused on the present. "To be concerned with the present is no small matter. For over the past, ever gone by, and over the future, still non-existent, the present has an overwhelming privilege: that of being real" (p. 192). Naive? Perhaps. Boltanski does not provide simple or quick answers to the dilemma, but leaves one with the hope that pity might lead to compassion, commitment, and social change - even if such measures do not end all suffering once and for all. As such, this translation from the original French text is a welcome addition to contemporary debates in political communication.

#### Prefer utilitarian approaches to policy that cast aside qualitative assessments --- valuing how discussions make us feel rather than the truth of the discussion ensures disastrous decision-making

**Bloom 14** [Paul Bloom, Brooks and Suzanne Ragen Professor of Psychology & Cognitive Science at Yale University, “Against Empathy, Boston Review, September 13, 2014, <http://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy>]

When asked what I am working on, I often say I am writing a book about empathy. People tend to smile and nod, and then I add, “I’m against it.” This usually gets an uncomfortable laugh.

This reaction surprised me at first, but I’ve come to realize that taking a position against empathy is like announcing that you hate kittens—a statement so outlandish it can only be a joke. And so I’ve learned to clarify, to explain that I am not against morality, compassion, kindness, love, being a good neighbor, doing the right thing, and making the world a better place. My claim is actually the opposite: if you want to be good and do good, empathy is a poor guide.

The word “empathy” is used in many ways, but here I am adopting its most common meaning, which corresponds to what eighteenth-century philosophers such as Adam Smith called “sympathy.” It refers to the process of experiencing the world as others do, or at least as you think they do. To empathize with someone is to put yourself in her shoes, to feel her pain. Some researchers also use the term to encompass the more coldblooded process of assessing what other people are thinking, their motivations, their plans, what they believe. This is sometimes called “cognitive,” as opposed to “emotional,” empathy. I will follow this convention here, but we should keep in mind that the two are distinct—they emerge from different brain processes; you can have a lot of one and a little of the other—and that most of the discussion of the moral implications of empathy focuses on its emotional side.

Some degree of emotional empathy is bred in the bone. The sight and sound of another’s suffering is unpleasant for babies and, as soon as they are mobile enough, they try to help, patting and soothing others in distress. This is not uniquely human: the primatologist Frans de Waal notes that chimps will often put their arms around the victim of an attack and pat her or groom her.

Empathy can occur automatically, even involuntarily. Smith describes how “persons of delicate fibres” who notice a beggar’s sores and ulcers “are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies.” John Updike writes, “My grandmother would have choking fits at the kitchen table, and my own throat would feel narrow in sympathy.”

And empathy can be extended through the imagination. In a speech before he became president, Barack Obama stressed how important it is

to see the world through the eyes of those who are different from us—the child who’s hungry, the steelworker who’s been laid off, the family who lost the entire life they built together when the storm came to town. . . . When you think like this—when you choose to broaden your ambit of concern and empathize with the plight of others, whether they are close friends or distant strangers—it becomes harder not to act, harder not to help.

Obama is right about this last part; there is considerable support for what the psychologist C. Daniel Batson calls “the empathy-altruism hypothesis”: when you empathize with others, you are more likely to help them. In general, empathy serves to dissolve the boundaries between one person and another; it is a force against selfishness and indifference.

It is easy to see, then, how empathy can be a moral good, and it has many champions. Obama talks frequently about empathy; witness his recent claim, after his first meeting with Pope Francis, that “it’s the lack of empathy that makes it very easy for us to plunge into wars. It’s the lack of empathy that allows us to ignore the homeless on the streets.” In The Empathetic Civilization (2009) Jeremy Rifkin argues that the only way our species will survive war, environmental degradation, and economic collapse is through the enhancement of “global empathy.” This past June, Bill and Melinda Gates concluded their Stanford commencement address by asking students to nurture and expand their empathetic powers, essential for a better world.

Most people see the benefits of empathy as akin to the evils of racism: too obvious to require justification. I think this is a mistake. I have argued elsewhere that certain features of empathy make it a poor guide to social policy. Empathy is biased; we are more prone to feel empathy for attractive people and for those who look like us or share our ethnic or national background. And empathy is narrow; it connects us to particular individuals, real or imagined, but is insensitive to numerical differences and statistical data. As Mother Teresa put it, “If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will.” Laboratory studies find that we really do care more about the one than about the mass, so long as we have personal information about the one.

In light of these features, our public decisions will be fairer and more moral once we put empathy aside. Our policies are improved when we appreciate that a hundred deaths are worse than one, even if we know the name of the one, and when we acknowledge that the life of someone in a faraway country is worth as much as the life a neighbor, even if our emotions pull us in a different direction. Without empathy, we are better able to grasp the importance of vaccinating children and responding to climate change. These acts impose costs on real people in the here and now for the sake of abstract future benefits, so tackling them may require overriding empathetic responses that favor the comfort and well-being of individuals today. We can rethink humanitarian aid and the criminal justice system, choosing to draw on a reasoned, even counter-empathetic, analysis of moral obligation and likely consequences.

#### Extinction outweighs---our framing shifts security policy from a national to existential frame---solves their threat K’s

Nathan Sears 20, PhD Candidate in Political Science at The University of Toronto and Trudeau Fellow in Peace, Conflict and Justice at the Munk School of Global Affairs, 4/17/20, “Existential Security: Towards a Security Framework for the Survival of Humanity,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12800

Humanity’s capacity for self‐destruction poses a radically different problematique for security policy: survival interdependence . Survival interdependence means that the survival of human societies on one side of the world increasingly depends on the (in)action of human societies on the other. For most of history, human societies – clans, tribes, city‐states, empires, and nation states – could seek security irrespective of the security of other societies; but today no single nation state can solve the biggest security problems of the times on their own, nor in many cases can they hope to escape their security consequences. Humankind is becoming ever more tied together as a single ‘security unit’. The forces behind this process are not political – indeed, international politics remains stubbornly committed to ‘national security’ – but material (Deudney, 2007, 2018), especially certain human‐driven trends in technology and the environment that could threaten humanity with destruction. Security policy must take into account the significance of these changes. Thus, a new security framework is required.

‘Existential security’ responds to a similar set of questions as alternative security frames (see Table 2). Security for whom? The ‘referent object’ of existential security is humanity. Security is therefore about humanity’s survival . Security for which values? The ‘values’ to be secured are, at the minimum, the survival of humanity (i.e. the biological entity of the human species and cultural entity of human civilization), and, at the maximum, the long‐term prosperity of human civilization and the planet. The security of humankind ranges from the survival of existing human beings and societies to past and future generations of humanity – the past whose memory is recorded in history and preserved by the present, and the future whose possibilities of existence depend on actions taken in the present. Existential security therefore adopts an intergenerational perspective of security, not only for utilitarian reasons (e.g. quantifying the potential gains/losses in ‘future lives’) (Baum, 2015; Bostrom, 2002, 2013; Torres, 2017), but also because the significance of humankind – that is, all its past sufferings, present achievements, and future potential – is at stake, since existential risks simultaneously threaten humanity’s past, present, and future (Morgenthau, 1961).

How much security? Nick Bostrom (2013, p. 19) proposes the principle of ‘maxipok’, in which security policy would seek to ‘maximise the probability of an “OK outcome”, where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe’. While reducing the probability of existential risk to ‘zero’ may be impossible, the amount of security should be determined by a level of risk‐aversion equivalent to existential threats. Since thinking in terms of ‘worst‐case scenarios’ is a common practice in the security domain, and since some ‘worst‐case scenarios’ could include civilizational collapse or human extinction, this should imply a strong aversion to risk. Although there are logical limits to the ‘precautionary principle’ with respect to existential risks,10 it has practical implications for security policy, such as taking preventive, cost‐effective, and long‐term oriented action (Clarke, 2005). More generally, making (existential) security a priority does not imply the sacrifice of all other values (e.g. political liberty, economic wealth), but it does mean that potential gains in other values be weighed against potential losses in security. Security is always a question of degree (Wolfers, 1952).

From what threats? Existential security is concerned with those threats that have their origins in human agency and could bring about civilizational collapse or human extinction. This requires broadening the security agenda beyond its conventional focus on ‘security from violence’, while excluding ‘natural’ existential risks (e.g. asteroids and supervolcanos). There are two main reasons for emphasizing anthropogenic threats. The first is the low probability of natural risks on timescales relevant to humanity (Bostrom, 2013; Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008;), whereas anthropogenic threats are, by definition, relevant to human timescales, including the twenty‐first century (Rees, 2003). The second is that many prevention/mitigation strategies for anthropogenic existential threats act on their drivers in human agency, which makes little sense for natural risks. The spectrum of anthropogenic existential threats includes threats to international peace and security (e.g. nuclear war), dangers from human intervention in the natural environment (e.g. climate change), and risks from emerging technologies (e.g. AI). Existential security must take into account the complex relationships between human, environmental, and technological systems, as well as inherent uncertainties about existential threat scenarios (e.g. ‘nuclear winter’, ‘hothouse Earth’, or ‘superintelligence’).

By what means and modes of protection? The existential security frame requires innovation in the means and modes of security policy. This is because the conventional emphasis on military capabilities and balancing is either inadequate (e.g. nuclear war), irrelevant (e.g. climate change), or counterproductive (e.g. AI). Moreover, the pursuit of relative gains/losses in security is fundamentally misguided for anthropogenic existential threats, since – as a general principle – either all human societies are safe, or none of them are. Existential security requires a paradigm shift from thinking about security policy as a matter of (national) ‘defense’ to being a matter of (global) ‘governance’. Governance is not an end in itself (e.g. the creation of a ‘world state’), but rather a means to security (i.e. the survival of humankind). The pursuit of existential security requires means of protection that involve a comprehensive set of political, economic, and technological resources – not merely military capabilities. The modes of protection are primarily ‘restraint’ and ‘resilience’. Restraint is a prevention strategy, while resilience is a mitigation strategy, which take on different forms for different threats. For the nuclear threat, restraint manifests itself in the policies of disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation, while resilience comes mostly in the form of nuclear bunkers and shelters (Bull, 1961; Deudney, 2007). For climate change, restraint is primarily about limiting greenhouse gas emissions and the degradation of carbon sinks, while resilience is about making societies less vulnerable to heat stress, rising seas, food and water scarcities, new diseases, and human migration (Wallace‐Wells, 2019; World Bank, 2012). For AI, restraint entails the slow and careful development of AI (Bostrom, 2014) – or perhaps forgoing the ‘AI dream’ altogether (Joy, 2000) – while resilience is about reducing societal vulnerability to technological disruption (e.g. cybersecurity). Importantly, the growing survival interdependence of human societies implies that restraint and resilience must be mutual to be effective. If only some states choose disarmament or nonproliferation, if some societies reduce carbon emissions while others increase them, or if one technology firm decides to rapidly pursue ‘superintelligence’, then the (in)action of some actors may affect the security of all humankind. This emphasis on mutual restraint and resilience contrasts with the national security frame's emphasis on ‘self‐help’.

### at: death k (robinson)

#### Their assertion that “modern society is premised upon the exclusion of the dead” is ungrounded mysticism that fetishizes death as a truly authentic experience

**Noys 5** [Benjamin, BSc, MA, DPhil, Professor of Critical Theory at the University of Chichester, *The Culture of Death*, Berg: New York, NY (2005), p. 24-27]

For Baudrillard this eclipse of symbolic exchange also affected our relationship with death. As symbolic exchange is destroyed, including our exchanges with the dead, so ‘little by little, the dead cease to exist’ (Baudrillard, 1993: 126). Once we had exchanges with the dead, we traded or bargained with them, or made offerings to them. This extends to practices like the Irish wake, when a party would be held while the body of the dead was still in the house to celebrate the life of the deceased. Now, the dead are excluded, we remove them as rapidly as possible to be buried or cremated and mourning rituals have also been curtailed. Baudrillard argues that we can never completely eliminate symbolic exchange or our dealings with the dead. The more we try to exclude the dead the more they return in traumatic forms. Perhaps the modern fashion for zombie films, such as the trilogy of George A. Romero, Night of the Living Dead (1969), Dawn of the Dead (1979) and Day of the Dead (1985), is a sign of this? What is interesting is that in the second film of the trilogy, Dawn of the Dead, the zombies invade that bastion of capitalist culture the shopping mall (although they seem strangely pacified by the muzak!). What is also interesting is that this film is the one from the trilogy that has recently been remade. In a sense death takes its revenge on us as, for Baudrillard, death can never be fully programmed or contained by the postmodern society of images. The dead resist the process of exchange and cannot be fully integrated into the capitalist economy. This is despite the fact that, as Nancy Mitford pointed out in her 1963 book The American Way of Death (1998), a scathing exposé of funeral home practices, there is a great deal of money to be made in the funeral business. Baudrillard emphasised that this return of the dead would force us to rediscover symbolic exchange or we would be left with a culture that had become terminal. Either we deal with the dead through symbolic exchange, or we become the living dead, like the zombie consumers of Dawn of the Dead. His work is almost a parody of those radical thinkers of the 1960s who tried to find resistance in those who could not be integrated into the system, whether that was women, students, lesbians and gays, petty criminals or African-Americans. It seems as if, for Baudrillard, the dead are the only ones who cannot be integrated! The problem with his model is that it offers no real explanation for why death comes to invade our whole culture. His idea of a radical reversal, when what is excluded returns in a more virulent form, is extremely hard to pin down concretely. This leaves his argument ungrounded and it is no surprise that it has been greeted with scepticism. In comparison, whatever criticisms we might want to make of it, Agamben’s analysis of our exposure to death is more concretely grounded. The increasing exposure to death in modern culture is understood as the result of the act of sovereign power that creates bare life, a life exposed to death. In modern culture this production of bare life has spread because bare life has become the ground of our political identity. Agamben does not regard death as some point of resistance that somehow lies outside our culture. In treating death as a point of resistance Baudrillard is in danger of turning death into some sort of authentic experience where we can find, or recover, our true values. In fact, the exposure to death in modern culture seems to be, as we shall see later in this book, a far more banal and everyday process. Baudrillard’s model does explore our exposure to death in modern culture but it seems to offer no adequate explanation for that exposure. Instead it offers something like a magical or metaphysical thinking where what is excluded can only ever return in a more extreme form. Agamben provides an analysis which is more precise but which is also not beyond criticism. If Baudrillard’s thesis has proven controversial and been treated with scepticism then so have Agamben’s claims. In particular, his history of bare life has faced five major criticisms. The first is that Agamben’s theory concerning bare life is not well supported by the historical evidence and that he is selective in the evidence he draws on. Secondly, that Agamben’s history of bare life is too straightforward, too linear, and so doesn’t really deal with the complex nature of the social history of death. Thirdly, that in only studying Western culture Agamben is ethnocentric, and that he excludes evidence from other cultures and tends to treat Western culture as a monolithic whole. Fourthly, that Agamben’s model of biopolitics tends to erase the important distinctions between different political systems, especially between democracies and totalitarian states. And, finally, that he does not consider in enough depth the different experiences of exposure to death, or the fact that this exposure to death is unevenly distributed.

#### That celebration of death culminates in juvenile shock tactics that are fascinated with the aesthetics of mass death, resulting in apolitical apathy to suffering – the negative’s exposure to the banal and profound suffering through the mass suffering caused by capitalism encourages new modes of communal thinking capable of challenging modern death culture

**Noys 5** [Benjamin, BSc, MA, DPhil, Professor of Critical Theory at the University of Chichester, *The Culture of Death*, Berg: New York, NY (2005), p. 144-6]

Chapter Five examined the celebration of death as a transgressive experience in contemporary art. This celebration can be understood as the result of our exposure to death as bare life in modern culture. What is problematic is that it remains bewitched by bare life and fascinated with the threat of mass death. Although it might make that threat visible, quite literally, it leaves the politics of modern death invisible. The desire to shock and scandalise, the desire to find in the confrontation with death an experience of intensity, is actually quite limited. What we need to do is to move beyond an aesthetics of transgressive death (Bataille), or an aesthetics of intense life (Bacon/ Deleuze), to an aesthetics of bare life. I suggested that the profane and banal death in the car crash might be a better model of death in modern culture than the extreme experiences on which artists have so often concentrated. This is not to deny or ignore the need for an aesthetics of modern death, as Agamben seems to do. Instead, it is to suggest that the aesthetics of bare life is an aesthetics of exposure: the exposure to a banal and profane death. In this final chapter, I have turned to the politics of resistance to modern death. If the boundary between life and death is political, then it may well be that we need a politics of modern death to resist the new forms of our exposure to death. However, the value of resistance is problematic, especially when that resistance to power is located in the body or in life. The problem is that this resistance does not deal with bare life, but celebrates bare life as the site of resistance. As we rethought power in the light of death in Chapter Two, so now we have had to rethink resistance in the light of death in this chapter. It may well be that the value of resistance is exhausted in the face of our exposure to death and that we need a new politics of exodus from power. This politics is extremely ambiguous and has hardly even been developed yet. To develop it further, and so to gauge its worth, is not just a matter of critical analysis but also of practical and communal politics. The theorist cannot stand in for the practice of politics, but must encourage new and inventive modes of communal thinking that might allow us to think beyond the modern culture of death. I am not sure that it is possible to end on the reversal of the desperate state of the current situation into a new hope, as Agamben suggests. We might well actually require more careful and extended analysis of the culture of death, which contests some of the limits of our contemporary thinking. One way to do this, which I have used here, is to approach modern death through the concept of our exposure to death. This approach has no pretence to solving the problem of modern death or offering the definitive account of the contemporary culture of death. Instead, it is a critical starting point that I have developed to try and come to terms with the widespread sense of our exposure to death after Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and in the current time of the ‘war against terrorism’. The model of exposure to death allows us to recast the culture of death, to approach our history and the present in new ways. Perhaps it might also allow us to challenge both the visibility and invisibility of death in modern culture, and to analyse the culture of death as the culture of our survival in the face of the exposure to death.

#### Their K is too reductive- their attempt to investigate death is counterproductive and constitutes theoretical violence

**Dollimore, PhD, 2013**

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture )

Jean Baudrillard presents the argument for the existence of a denial of death in its most extreme form. For him, this denial is not only deeply symptomatic of contemporary reality, but represents an insidious and pervasive form of ideological control. His account depends heavily upon a familiar critique of the Enlightenment's intellectual, cultural and political legacy. This critique has become influential in recent cultural theory, though Baudrillard's version of it is characteristically uncompromising and sweeping, **and more reductive than most**. The main claim is that Enlightenment rationality is an instrument not of freedom and democratic empowerment but, on the contrary, of repression and violence. Likewise with the Enlightenment's secular emphasis upon a common humanity; for Baudrillard this resulted in what he calls 'the cancer of the Human' - far from being an inclusive category of emancipation, the idea of a universal humanity made possible the demonizing of difference and the repressive privileging of the normal: the 'Human' is from the outset the institution of its structural double, the 'Inhuman\*. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand 'Others' with inhumanity, and therefore with nullity, {p. 125) Baudrillard acknowledges here the influence of Michel Foucault, but goes on to identify something more fundamental and determining than anything identified by Foucault: at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death, (p. 12.6) So total is this exclusion that, 'today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy' (p. 126). He insists that the attempt to abolish death (especially through capitalist accumulation), to separate it from life, leads only to a culture permeated by death - 'quite simply, ours is a culture of death' (p. 127). Moreover, it is the repression of death which facilitates 'the repressive socialization of life'; all existing agencies of repression and control take root in the disastrous separation of death from life (p. 130). And, as if that were not enough, our very concept of reality has its origin in the same separation or disjunction (pp. 130-33). Modern culture is contrasted with that of the primitive and the savage, in which, allegedly, life and death were not separated; also with that of the Middle Ages, where, allegedly, there was still a collectivist, 'folkloric and joyous' conception of death. This and many other aspects of the argument are questionable, but perhaps the main objection to Baudrillard's case is his view of culture as a macro-conspiracy conducted by an insidious ideological prime-mover whose agency is always invisibly at work (rather like God). Thus (from just one page), the political economy supposedly ^intends\* to eliminate death through accumulation; and 'our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death' {p. 147; my emphases). What those like Baudrillard find interesting about death is not the old conception of it as a pre-cultural constant which diminishes the significance of all cultural achievement, but, on the contrary, its function as a culturally relative - which is to say culturally formative - construct. And, if cultural relativism is on the one hand about relinquishing the comfort of the absolute, for those like Baudrillard it is also about the new strategies of intellectual mastery made possible by the very disappearance of the absolute. Such modern accounts of how death is allegedly denied, of how death is the supreme ideological fix, entail a new intensity and complexity of interpretation and decipherment, a kind of hermeneutics of death. To reinterpret death as a **deep effect of ideology,** even to the extent of regarding it as the most fundamental ideological adhesive of modern political repression and social control, is simultaneously to denounce it as in some sense a deception or an illusion, and to bring it within the domain of knowledge and analysis as never before. Death, for so long regarded as the ultimate reality - that which disempowers the human and obliterates all human achievement, including the achievements of knowledge - **now becomes the object of a hugely empowering knowledge**. **Like omniscient seers**, intellectuals like Baudrillard and Bauman relentlessly anatomize and diagnose the modern (or post-modern) human condition in relation to an ideology of death which becomes the key with which to unlock the secret workings of Western culture in all its insidiousness. Baudrillard in particular applies his theory relentlessly, steamrollering across the cultural significance of the quotidian and the contingent. **His is an imperialist, omniscient analytic, a perpetual act of reductive generalization**, a self-empowering intellectual performance which proceeds without qualification and without any sense that something might be mysterious or inexplicable. As such **it constitutes a kind of interpretative, theoretical violence,** an extreme but still representative instance of how the relentless anatomizing and diagnosis of death in the modern world has become a struggle for empowerment through masterful -i.e. **reductive - critique**. Occasionally one wonders if the advocates of the denial-of-death argument are not **themselves in denial**. They speak about death endlessly yet indirectly, analysing not death so much as our culture's attitude towards it. To that extent it is not the truth of death but the truth of our culture that they seek. But, even as they make death signify in this indirect way, **it is still death that is compelling them to speak**. And those like Baudrillard and Bauman speak urgently, **performing intellectually a desperate mimicry of the omniscience which death denies**. One senses that the entire modern enterprise of relativizing death, of understanding it culturally and socially, **may be an attempt to disavow it in the very act of analysing and demystifying it.** Ironically then, for all its rejection of the Enlightenment's arrogant belief in the power of rationality, this analysis of death remains indebted to a fundamental Enlightenment aspiration to mastery through knowledge. **Nothing could be more 'Enlightenment', in the pejorative sense that Baudrillard describes, than his own almost megalomaniac wish to penetrate the truth of death, and the masterful controlling intellectual subject which that attempt presupposes**. And this may be true to an extent for all of us more or less involved in the anthropological or quasi-anthropological accounts of death which assume that, by looking at how a culture handles death, we disclose things about a culture which it does not know about itself. So what has been said of sex in the nineteenth century may also be true of death in the twentieth: it has not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex and productive ways which then legitimate a never-ending analysis of it. It is questionable whether the denial of death has ever really figured in our culture in the way that Baudrillard and Bauman suggest. Of course, the ways of dealing with and speaking about death have changed hugely, and have in some respects involved something like denial. But in philosophical and literary terms there has never been a denial of death.2 Moreover, however understood, the pre-modern period can hardly be said to have been characterized by the 'healthy\* attitude that advocates of the denial argument often claim, imply or assume. In fact it could be said that we can begin to understand the vital role of death in Western culture only when we accept death as profoundly, compellingly and irreducibly traumatic.(123-6)

### at: ressentiment

#### No ressentiment or “melancholy” impact – reading this aff is pretty life-affirming for me – pretty sure you shouldn’t trust their amateur psychoanalysis when it comes to telling you how we feel

#### Change and survival are key to avoid passivity and ressentiment

May 5 [Todd, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, September 2005, “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 31, No. 5-6]

For those among us who seek in philosophy a way to grapple with our lives rather than to solve logical puzzles; for those whose reading and whose writing are not merely appropriate steps toward academic advancement but a struggle to see ourselves and our world in a fresher, clearer light; for those who find nourishment among impassioned ideas and go hungry among empty truths: there is a struggle that is often waged within us. It is a struggle that will be familiar to anyone who has heard in Foucault’s sentences the stammering of a fellow human being struggling to speak in words worth hearing. Why else would we read Foucault? We seek to conceive what is wrong in the world, to grasp it in a way that offers us the possibility for change. We know that there is much that is, to use Foucault’s word, ‘intolerable’. There is much that binds us to social and political arrangements that are oppressive, domineering, patronizing, and exploitative. We would like to understand why this is and how it happens, in order that we may prevent its continuance. In short, we want our theories to be tools for changing the world, for offering it a new face, or at least a new expression. There is struggle in this, struggle against ideas and ways of thinking that present themselves to us as inescapable. We know this struggle from Foucault’s writings. It is not clear that he ever wrote about anything else. But this is not the struggle I want to address here. For there is, on the other hand, another search and another goal. They lie not so much in the revisioning of this world as in the embrace of it. There is much to be celebrated in the lives we lead, or in those led by others, or in the unfolding of the world as it is, a world resonant with the rhythms of our voices and our movements. We would like to understand this, too, to grasp in thought the elusive beauty of our world. There is, after all, no other world, except, as Nietzsche taught, for those who would have created another one with which to denigrate our own. In short, we would like our thought to celebrate our lives. To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life-celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once.

### at: liberal war

#### “Liberal warfare” impact is so abstract that it’s analytically useless and doesn’t provide any accurate method to understand war

David **Chandler 9**, Professor of IR at University of Westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics", Review of Dillon and Reid’s *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

#### ‘Wars for humanity’ are an ahistorical myth – their “Empire” impact can’t explain why Western intervention happened in Libya and Iraq but not in Yemen

Benno Gerhard **Teschke 11**, IR prof at the University of Sussex, “Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory”, International Theory (2011), 3 : pp 179-227

For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of ‘perpetual peace’, the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's ‘spaceless universalism’. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of ‘neutralizations and de-politicizations’ (Schmitt 1993). But this **attempt to** read **the history of 20th century international relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins** seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of ‘liberal’ world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the survival of ‘re-feudalized’ elites in the German state classes and the marriage between ‘rye and iron’ (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the early 20th century conflicts between ‘the liberal West’ and Germany as ‘wars for humanity’ between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the ‘liberal West’ coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression is ‘blowback’. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive decision – **it** also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal ‘spaceless universalism’ sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-supervised ‘informal empire’, **which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific ways**. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.

### at: liberal subjectivity bad

#### Ascribing violence to metaphysical concepts like the liberal subject is essentialist and wrong---ontology does not determine politics

**Schwartz 8** [Joseph M., professor of political science at Temple, *The Future of Democratic Equality*, p 59-60, google books]

To contend that only an anti-foundationalist, anti-realist epistemology can sustain democracy is to argue precisely for a foundational metaphysical grounding for the democratic project. It is to contend that one’s epistemology determines one’s politics. Hence, Brown and Butler both spoke at a spring 1998 academic conference at the University of California at Santa Cruz where some attributed “reactionary” and “left cultural conservatism” to belief in “reactionary” “foundationalist humanism”42 Post-structuralism cannot escape its own essentialist conception of identity. For example, Butler contends in Feminist Contentions that democratic feminists must embrace the post-structuralist “non-definability of woman” as best suited to open democratic constitution of what it is to be a “woman.”43 But this is itself a “closed” position and runs counter to the practices of many democratic feminist activists who have tried to develop a pluralist, yet collective identity around the shared experiences of being a woman in a patriarchal society (of course, realizing that working-class women and women of color experience patriarchy in some ways that are distinct from the patriarchy experienced by middle-class white women).¶ One query that post-structuralist theorists might ask themselves: has there ever existed a mass social movement that defined its primary “ethical” values as being those of “instability and flux”? Certainly many sexual politics activists are cognizant of the fluid nature of sexuality and sexual and gender identity. But only a small (disproportionately university educated) segment of the women’s and gay and lesbian movement would subscribe to (or even be aware of) the core principles of post-structuralist “anti-essentialist epistemology.” Nor would they be agnostic as to whether the state should protect their rights to express their sexuality. Post-structuralist theorists cannot avoid justificatory arguments for why some identities should be considered open and democratic and others exclusionary and anti-democratic. That is, how could post-structuralist political theorists argue that Nazi or Klan “ethics” are antithetical to a democratic society—and that a democratic society can rightfully ban certain forms of “agonal” (e.g. harassing forms of behavior against minorities) struggle on the part of such anti-democratic groups.¶ A politics of radical democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a whole-hearted epistemological critique of “enlightenment rationality.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice, even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, democratic norms are developed by political practice and struggle rather than by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Sosuan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser).¶ Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with postmodern (allegedly anti-) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off the structural position of “the agent.” A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), post-structuralist theory has abandoned the institutional analysis of social theory for the idealism of abstract philosophy.

#### The alt fails---deriding all attempts at action as “freezing becoming” no way to deal with difficult political choices---we also control terminal uniqueness because they can’t convince others to abandon liberal subjectivity

**Schwartz 8** [Joseph, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, “The Future of Democratic Equality,” 56-61]

A politics of radical democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a whole-hearted epistemological critique of “enlightenment rationality.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice, even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, democratic norms are developed by political practice and 60 struggle rather than by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Susan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser).¶ Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with postmodern (allegedly anti) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off of the structural position of “the agent.” A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), poststructuralist theory has abandoned the institutional analysis of social theory for the idealism of abstract philosophy. ¶ Connolly, Brown, and Butler reject explicit moral deliberation as a bad faith Nietzschean attempt at “ressentiment.” Instead, they celebrate the amoral, yet ethical strivings of a Machiavellian or Gramscian realist “war of position.”44 Sheldon Wolin, however, has written convincingly of how Machiavelli can be read as an ethical realist, a theorist of moral utilitarianism.45 Even a Machiavellian or Gramscian political “realist” must depend upon moral argument to justify the social utility of hard political choices. That is, if one reads both as ethical utilitarians who believe that, at times, one must “dirty” one’s hands in order to act ethically in politics, then they embrace a utilitarian, “just war” theory of ethical choice. According to this consequentialist moral logic, “bad means” are only justifiable if they are the only, unavoidable way to achieve a greater ethical good—and if the use of such “bad means” are absolutely minimized. Such “hard” political choices yield social policies and political outcomes that fix identities as well as transform them.¶ Not only in regard to epistemological questions has post-structuralist theory created a new political “metaphysics” which misconstrues the nature of democratic political practice; the post-structuralist analysis of “the death of man” and “the death of the subject” also radically preclude meaningful political agency. As with Michel Foucault, Butler conceives of “subjects” as “produced” by powerknowledge discourses. In Butler’s view, the modernist concept of an autonomous subject is a “fictive construct”; and the very act of adhering to a belief in autonomous human choice is to engage in “exclusion and differentiations, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy.”46 That is, the power of discourse, of language and the unconscious, “produces subjects.” If those “subjects” conceive of themselves as having the capacity for conscious choice, they are guilty of “repressing” the manner in which their own “subjectivity” is itself produced by discursive 61 exclusion: “if we agree that politics and a power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction.”47 Susan Bickford pithily summarizes the post-structuralist rejection of the modernist subject: “power is not wielded by autonomous subjects; rather through power, subjectivity is crafted.”48 Bickford grants that post-structuralism provides some insight into how group and individual identity is “culturally constructed.” But Bickford goes on to contend that after post-structuralism exposes the “lie of the natural” (that there are no natural human identities), “socially constructed” modern individuals still wish to act in consort with others and to use human communication to influence others: “people generally understand themselves as culturally constituted and capable of agency.”49¶ For if there is no “doer behind the deed,” but only “performative” acts that constitute the subject, how can the theorist (or activist) assign agency or moral responsibility to actors who are “constituted by discursive practices.” (“Discursive practices” engaged in by whom, the observer may ask?) Butler insists that not only is the subject “socially constituted” by power/knowledge discourses, but so too is the “ontologically reflexive self” of the enlightenment. Now if this claim is simply that all social critics are socially-situated, then this view of agency is no more radical a claim than that made by Michael Walzer in his conception of the social critic (or agent). Walzer argues that even the most radical dissident must rely upon the critical resources embedded within his own culture (often in the almost-hidden interstices of that culture). Effective critical agency cannot depend on some abstract universal, external logic.50 Asserting that critical capacities are themselves socially constructed provides the reader with no means by which to judge whether forms of “resistance” are democratic and which are not. That is, no matter how hard one tries to substitute an aesthetic, “ironic,” “amoral ethical sensibility” for morality, the social critic and political activist cannot escape engaging in moral argument and justification with fellow citizens.¶ Butler astutely notes that “resistance” often mirrors the very powerknowledge discourses it rejects—resisting hegemonic norms without offering alternative conceptions of a common political life. But Butler seems to affirm the possibility (by whom?) of effective rejection of such “norming” by “performative resignification.” But the “resignification” of “performative” discursive constructions provides no criteria by which to judge whether a given “resignification” is emancipatory or repressive.51 And just who (if not a relatively coherent, choosing human subject) is “performing” the resignification. Furthermore, if all forms of identity and social meaning are predicated upon “exclusion,” then the democratic theorist needs to distinguish among those identities which “exclude” in a democratic way and those which exclude in an anti-humanist, racist, and sexist manner. Some social “identities” are democratic and pluralist, such as those created by voluntary affiliations. But other “identities,” such as structural, involuntary class differences and racial and sexual hierarchies, must be transformed, even eliminated, if democracy is to be furthered. And how we behave—or “perform”—can subvert (or reinforce) such undemocratic social structures. But if these social structures are immutably inscribed by62 “performative practices,” then there can be no democratic resistance. In her call for an ironic politics of “performative resistance,” Butler seems to imply that human beings have the capacity to choose which “performative practices” to engage in—and from which to abstain. If this is the case, then a modernist conception of agency and moral responsibility has covertly snuck its way back into Butler’s political strategy.52

## Ballot PIK

### 1NC---Ballot PIK

#### Presenting the 1AC’s value as dependent on the recognition of the critic reduces the revolutionary nature of the act—fails to produce meaningful change and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy ---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### Nuanced engagement and allowance of criticism is a better model for revolutionary resistance

Williams 15 – Douglas Williams, Third-Generation Organizer, BA in Political Science from the University of Minnesota at Morris, MPA from the University of Missouri Columbia, Doctoral Student in Political Science at Wayne State University, internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer at Purdue University and PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue University and MA in English with a Concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, The South Lawn, <https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/>

What conversation is there to be had around that? It is as if the mere existence of her identity inoculates her from any critique. How did we get here? — Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. But critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms the left. Refusing to say ‘this is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making that accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

### 2NC/1NR---O/V

#### By participating in this round while knowingly rejecting the resolution, an agreed upon norm, the aff has become civil disobients.  Though they have the right to challenge rules they believe to be unjust, their request for the ballot is contradictory to the goals of their resistance.

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, accessed via JSTOR)

The civil disobedient stands to gain nothing for ~~him~~self (as the ordinary criminal does) by breaking the law, but ~~he~~ stands to lose-~~he~~ risks the legal consequence of punishment. ~~He~~ knows that and goes ahead: ~~he~~ is not deterred from considerations of (what he believes to be ~~his~~) duty by considerations of self-interest. ~~He~~ believes enough in the issue for which he is acting to risk punishment for it. Can ~~he~~ complain if he takes the risk and loses? If I choose to break one of society's rules, it is hard to see how I can complain if society treats me in the way in which it has declared that it will treat anybody who breaks that rule. Claiming that I did right to break the rule (under certain conditions), even that I had a duty to break it, is one thing; claiming a right to break it with immunity is another; and the first does not carry the second with it. And that is where I am inclined to think that the appearance of consistency by the amnesty demanders breaks down. For what they are doing is demanding to be protected from the risk of punishment, not by taking the usual precautions to minimize the risk, but by demanding the right not to be punished. They are, as it were, complaining in advance about being punished. It is not all right both to take that risk and to make a claim not to be exposed to it. A claim for amnesty, made on behalf of others, may be right; but it has to be wrong for those for whom amnesty is claimed, even for those for whom it is rightly claimed, to demand it for themselves.

### 2NC/1NR---AT: Ballot Key

#### The 1AC had value in and of itself, not because it was viewed by the judge---attempts to later connect via the ballot gives too much power to the audience--- this is a means of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism-- turns the case

Phelan 6 – Peggy Phelan, Chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, “Unmarked: The Politics of Performance”, in Visual Culture: Experiences in Visual Culture, p. 146-149

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present. The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawn increasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle, for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen from the museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and members of the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The fact that these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—only lends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art object and the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistant to the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if there production is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memory forget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personal meanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptive recovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it rather helps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. The descriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generates recovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers. The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; it rehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs always to be remembered. For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148 I Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149 Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animal with whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. The mimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capital and reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing about performance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls in behind the drive of the documentary. Performance’s challenge to writing is to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.

### 2NC/1NR---AT: Stealing Labor

#### It’s not taking labor – all speech acts, including theirs, cite and use the labor of others and redeployment is inevitable. Interpret frame-subtraction as a citation of their 1AC with limited disagreement – it’s not stealing their labor, just improving on the idea

Young 11 [Kelly M., associate professor of communication and director of forensics at Wayne State University, PhD in communication studies from Wayne State University, “IMPOSSIBLE CONVICTIONS: CONVICTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE AND SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE”, Contemporary Argumentation & Debate]

General Implications for Policy Debate What is the importance of this speech act theory for our understanding of the nature and effect of sincere conviction and performance in competitive debates? Academic policy debate operates as a speech act system that is in many ways similar to Derrida’s idea of citationality and iterability. For instance, debate begins with the construction of argument briefs and blocks. These sets of arguments combine the thoughts and utterances of several experts and writers and are presented in a new context and time. No matter the original intent and convictions of these authors, their ideas are now deployed in a new manner and purpose within a debate. Also, several team members and coaches work on various sets of blocks and briefs, which means that a single student might cite the ideas and beliefs of over a dozen people in his/her speech act. Additionally, debaters post the citations and list of arguments they presented on online case lists that allow other debaters to borrow and use those arguments in new and different rounds and contexts. At the end of the debate, judges compile all of the claims, warrants, and data presented in the round and after rendering a decision, likely recount the arguments to the teams they coach, which redeploy these arguments well beyond the reach of the intent and beliefs of the debaters who constructed the original arguments and briefs. Even when students’ convictions and intentions are introduced into debate, it becomes almost immediately difficult to determine where students’ ideas begin and where the excess of meaning produced by the constant iteration of utterances stop. While students may know their personal beliefs, it is difficult for those beliefs to control and contain meaning once it has uptake. Put differently, the constant citation of ideas and beliefs always add additional meaning as more voices (e.g., a quotation from an expert, a coach’s language choices on a block) and new contexts are introduced. Even if students attempt to remain completely authentic by avoiding reference to outside experts or their coaches or teammates by citing nothing other than genuine experience in their arguments, this performance continues to operate as citation for a few reasons. First, in its selection and redeployment of past experiences, the speech act cites prior experience and conventions to make the experiences communicable. Second, the purely authentic performance is intelligible as a debate argument only because it references some competitive debate conventions (e.g., it follows time limits, it is presented as a constructive, it contains different contentions) and the expectations of the judge. Third, once a debate ends, the students have no control over what kind of uptake their arguments have beyond the debate; anyone can use these arguments in new ways and contexts. Thus, debate operates at both levels of discourse as outlined by Austin. On one hand, debate has an expressed political purpose of persuading the judge and perhaps inspiring and convincing the other team at a perlocutionary level. On the other hand, debates also produce illocutionary effects that are determined in the uptake and circulation of arguments after and outside the debate. Both levels are performative in that they produce an effect: winning a ballot, changing an opinion, or even declaring an identity for oneself. However, what becomes very difficult to assess within a debate is the authenticity and ethics of specific utterances.

#### PICs affirm a strong theory of discursive agency – rejection of PICs is far more disadvantages to the possibilities for critique

Young 11 – Dr. Kelly Michael Young, Professor of Communication at Wayne State University, PhD in Communication Studies from Wayne State University, MA in Communication Studies from Ball State University, BS in Secondary Education from Ball State University, “IMPOSSIBLE CONVICTIONS: CONVICTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE AND SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE”, Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, p. 30-31

Fourth, contemporary speech act theory provides new avenues for permutations or citation of performances in debates. In many performance debates, it is common to hear performance teams argue that opposing teams’ attempts to run plan/performance-inclusive counterplans (PICs), permutations, or other attempts to operate within a performative framework are insincere, inauthentic, or constitute a form of intellectual plagiarism (Zompetti, 2004). Put differently, these efforts should be rejected because they are fake or parasitic performances. However, as Derrida (1988) contends, efforts to regulate speech acts with an organizing center of intention or sincere beliefs undermine the citationality, excess, and structural play of discourse. For both Derrida (1988) and Butler (1997), this approach is flawed for two reasons. First, the attempts to govern speech acts will unavoidably fail because recirculation of discourse is inevitable. Additionally, speech acts always produce excess meanings that are beyond our sovereign control. Second, these regulative approaches provide very limited rhetorical agency as they reject the possibility of re-signification. For instance, without the possibility of citationality, harmful language cannot be reappropriated for new cultural and political uses. Likewise, the strategic use of essentialized identities to expose the shortcomings of such representations becomes nearly impossible within this perspective of communication (Spivak, 1996). For example, productive critiques of gender and racial identities through parody would likely be excluded if sincerity and intentions regulate acceptable performances. Additionally, if discourse is limited in agency due to intentions and sincerity, then it likely has little power to change reality. Simply put, one cannot simultaneously posit a strong (e.g., discourse changes reality) and weak (e.g., discourse is severely constrained by prior beliefs and intent) theory of discursive agency. While performance teams might find the prospect of having their opponents strategically capturing their speech acts unfair, there seems to be greater disadvantages associated with the attempts to strictly police insincere performances. However, this does not mean that these teams are left with no defense against permutations, PICs, or other capture strategies. Indeed, this review of speech act theory suggests that the opposition’s citation of the speech act must have some discursive effect or force. While I argue that effect is rather difficult to assess within a single debate round, Salih and Butler (2004) provide a solution to this problem. In discussing the progressive potential of strategic essentialism, Salih and Butler (2004) argue that re-signification of representations and terms can operate as sites for productive contestations over the meaning and exclusiveness of these identities and discourse. As a result, the debate about whether or not permutations or PICs of a performance can move away from questions of conviction and intent and instead focus on argumentative effectiveness, which could examine the exclusions and consequences created by the differences that remain between the performance team and their opponents’ orientations. Put rather simply, the debate returns to a question of net-benefits rather than one of mutual exclusivity regulated by true beliefs. Thus, the desire to exclude permutations and PICs solely because they are insincere should be rejected if performance teams want to maintain the strong theory of discursive agency that they need in order to justify the impact of their arguments.

### 2NC/1NR---AT: Sincere

#### If you do believe their stance is sincere and/or you agree with it, you should reward their civil disobedience with a loss.  Punishment is key to enlisting the sympathy of the majority and ensuring the movement succeeds.

Cohen 72 – Marshall, University Professor, Emeritus, Professor of Philosophy and Law, Emeritus, and Dean, Emeritus, College of Letters, Arts and Sciences at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2265054.pdf]

It is for this reason that the civil disobedient characteristically notifies government officials of the time and place of his actions and attempts to make clear the point of ~~his~~ protest. Obviously, one of the problems of a modern democracy is that many immoral actions taken in the people's name are only dimly known to them, if they are known at all. In such cases, the main difficulty in touching the public's conscience may well be the difficulty in making the public conscious. The civil disobedient may therefore find that in addition to making his actions public it is necessary to gain for them a wide publicity as well. Indeed, Bertrand Russell has suggested that making propaganda and bringing the facts of political life to the attention of an ignorant and often bemused electorate constitute the main functions of disobedience at the present time.3 It is certainly true that nothing attracts the attention of the masses, and of the mass media, like flamboyant violations of the law, and it would be unrealistic of those who have political grievances not to exploit this fact. But it is important, especially in this connection, to recall Gandhi's warning that the technique of law violation ought to be used sparingly, like the surgeon's knife. For in the end the public will lose its will, and indeed its ability, to distinguish between those who employ these techniques whenever they wish to advertise their political opinions and those, the true dissenters, who use them only to protest deep violations of political principle. The techniques will then be of little use to anybody. After openly breaking the law, the traditional disobedient willingly pays the penalty. This is one of the characteristics that serve to distinguish him from the typical criminal (his appeal to conscience is another), and it helps to establish the seriousness of ~~his~~ views and the depth of ~~his~~ commitment as well. Unfortunately, paying the penalty will not always demonstrate that his actions are in fact disinterested. For the youth protesting the draft or the welfare recipient protesting poverty has an obvious and substantial interest in the success of his cause. If the majority suspects that these interests color the disobedient's perception of the issues involved, its suspicions may prove fatal to ~~his~~ ultimate success. This is one reason why the practice of civil disobedience should not be limited to those who are directly injured by the government's immoral or lawless course (as Judge Wyzanski and others have suggested).4 A show of support by those who have no substantial interest in the matter may carry special weight with a confused, and even with an actively skeptical, majority. The majority simply cannot dismiss those over thirty-five as draft dodgers, or those who earn over thirty-five thousand dollars a year as boondogglers. It may therefore consider the issues at stake, and this is the first objective of the civil disobedient.

## Deleuze K

### Becoming War K

#### Subjectivity has only ever been defined by the ontological crack between the representational and the machinic, self-awareness and the neural wiring of the brain. In contrast to their machinic ontology of “becoming,” “deterritorialization,” and “quantum flux,” we adopt an ontology of the Lack, one that forefronts the inevitable linguistic split at the heart of the subject. Despite their affective calls to militarize subjectivity, their politics of differential ontology can only ever blow apart the rift in subjectivity, leaving behind a desubjectified humanity in the wake of becoming. Only a politics that begins from the position of the void can ever hope to provide freedom for the subject.

Weatherill 17 (Rob Weatherill, master’s degree in psychotherapy from St. Vincents Univesity Hospital as well as the European Certificate in Psychotherapy, “THE ANTI-OEDIPUS COMPLEX: Lacan, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism,” pgs. 91-96)//JRD

The reduction of the postmodern subject from the high Renaissance estimation of man at the pinnacle of creation is almost complete: through Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, to the emergence of the subject as pure immaterial void. Notwithstanding the turn towards appearances with phenomenology (albeit without substantial realities “behind” them), notions such as autopoeisis, the “emerging properties” of systems, events e-venting themselves, self-organising phenomena, quantum phenomena and the autonomy of pure flux events, the ontology of pure becoming – these are all part and parcel of the de-substantialised “reality,” which barely recovers some last flickers of subjectivity as the not-quitenothing of contemporary theory. The brain–machine interface implies devices that can realise Orwellian thought control, surveillance, communication, and so on, the prospect of post-human “undead” virtual entities, the blurring of the distinction between hardware (brain) and software (mind), with the latter being able to detach from the former completely and enter the virtual. Of particular fascination is the parallax between brain chemistry and consciousness. Everything experienced has neurophysiological correlates. For instance, brain processes accompany intense religious experiences. However, the question of causality remains unresolved. Taking an ecstasy pill creates in the user a feeling of ecstatic love towards the other. How does this short-cut compare to a religious training and spiritual devotion over a lifetime that might produce “naturally” similar experiences? Consider, for instance, the dour father, melancholic most of his life, who, on his deathbed is given morphine to relieve pain and seems cheerful, good-humoured and loving, for the first time in his life! Does the morphine neurophysiologically transform the father on his deathbed into this “loving” man, or does it merely facilitate a very moving loving last gesture (“choice”) at the final moment, that was always buried within this depressed man? Žižek cites Taylor’s “skating” analogy of consciousness.20 Taylor understands consciousness as a relational phenomenon where past memories, representations, emotions are used to fill in and inform present sensory imputs. This triggers a host of related activities endowing the mental process with substantiality, which, at some critical point, “lifts” the original input into a new arena, like the skater who having launched himself onto the ice glides off effortlessly. Thus, consciousness emerges released from the “friction” of the processing stages. Consciousness floats free when a threshold is crossed. Therefore, there is no consciousness without selfconsciousness. The “I” emerges as the self-relating interaction between present input and past. The “self” is this escape into the fluid field of awareness and de-centring, creating the impossibility of the I’s immediate self-presence. Consciousness spins off from the substrate that created it. ‘A new quasi-object thus emerges’ (213), the final states of which involve “attractor nets” which attract initial activity to become similar to their own, but remain insubstantial as they were created, posited and generated by the very substrates which react and interact to them in endless feedback loops. So subject and object (attractor) are almost one. The all-important minimal “gap” is also the programmed space for freedom. Thus, there is no subject prior to neural activity; no top-down, only bottom-up effects. Žižek emphasises, ‘cognitive scientists repeat again and again how our mind does not possess a centralised control structure which runs top-down … it is rather a bricolage of multiple agents who collaborate bottom-up’ (241). The self is its own self-ing, unaware21 of the steps towards its own emerging, for good evolutionary reasons to do with the necessity of rapid autopoietic information processing. So when Žižek concludes that ‘as true Freudians, we should reject the notion of “Me” as a substantial background of the ego’ (217), he is following Lacan and indeed Winnicott, whose understanding of “aliveness” is a similar process of emergence via relating and “primary illusionment.”22  This is thinking the unthinkable to Western minds – a self-less world, living as being no one – forgetting that for two and a half millennia, Buddhist enlightenment has been practising the assumption of non-being. How do we get from passive primary illusionment, or the assumption of “non-being,” to something more active to do with subjectivity? Or how does self-consciousness arise amidst and minimally separate from being potentially overwhelmed by billions of neural data? The answer seems to be by some process of negation or by some malfunction or fault in the nature of the smooth running of the system, otherwise we would be no more than passive processing machines. Maybe self-consciousness is stumbled upon through an “ontological crack” (242) in “reality” itself, which enables one to say: YES, I AM HERE, over and against being a passive (unconscious) recipient of neuronal impulses. Žižek dramatises this crack by reference to a traumatic excess, through an “error” that creates a measure of freedom. The Cartesian consciousness of pure reflection that gets caught up in emotion is the price the mind has to pay for being lumbered with a body. Consciousness emerges through the disturbance of the organism’s homeostasis. Consciousness is the activity of dealing with disturbances. For Damasio, for instance, ‘the core you is only born as the story is told, within the very story itself … You are the music while the music lasts’.23 In Lacanian terms, the subject is the ‘answer of the Real’ (225). The subject has the possibility of answering for the Real. Žižek recalls the joke about the patient in a large hospital ward who complains to the doctor about constant noise and crying from the other patients. The doctor replies that nothing can be done to prevent these suffering people from expressing their despair, since they know they are dying. The patient then asks why they cannot be put in a separate room for the dying. And the doctor replies that this is the separate room for the dying. However, Žižek believes that Damasio leaves out of consideration the ‘proper empty core of subjectivity’, radically exposed as it is, not to mere life experience, but also to affects such as anxiety and horror; ‘anxiety as correlative to confronting the Void that forms the core of the subject; horror as the experience of disgusting life at its purest, “undead” life’ (227). Here again, Žižek is asserting the Lacanian void. Not life experience as it teems forth with Deleuze and Guattari to blow apart the constraining Symbolic, but more like Badiou’s ‘from nothing to nothing’, the awareness of the raw flesh and blood body. When the subject is violently attacked, for instance, the emotional response is such that the cortical areas of the brain focus on the stimulus and inhibit interest in sex and food. Such stressors over evolutionary time have acted to accelerate the development of our cognitive and behavioural capacities, not least our acquisition of language, “placed” as it is between these higher capacities and our emotional sub-systems. Žižek emphasises this all-important structural “gap” in connectivity between cognitive systems and language on the one hand, and emotional abilities on the other. This gap, or point of “failure,” where emotions lag behind cognition, defines our humanity. In the absence of the gap humans would be machines. To be specific and crucial for our argument, human emotions (like anxiety) arise when the human animal loses its footing in biological functioning, requiring this loss to be supplemented inadequately ‘by the symbolically regulated emotions qua man’s “second nature”’ (228). Or to put it another way: imagine that our emotions and cognitive abilities precisely coincided, with no lag or gap: was this not our central concern with the desiring machines in their machinic-ness? Rather than being human, representational and failing, they seemed inhuman, presentational – perfectly functioning monstrosities, incapable of anxiety and concern, because the subject was reduced to a vestigial parasite of no consequence. In addition, animals themselves are not machines, because of a similar but narrower gap between their biological instincts and cognitive abilities. The gap indeed may be a measure of our evolutionary ascendancy, with lowly insects, for instance, being more or less indistinguishable from machines, with their robotic creepy-crawliness capable, for that reason, of inspiring fear and anxiety. This gives a new significance to the gaps or lacks of the analytic session, the space to speak, the creation of silence, punctuation and so on, in order to lessen the machinic automaticity of alienated speech/action, and to increase “human” qualities for reflection which can occur only in the division of the subject. It is no exaggeration to say that Freud’s invention of the psychoanalytic space therefore is linked to civilisation itself. Without this reflective-gap-pause between the drives and manifest behaviour, there is no civility. As Damasio says, ‘Memory, language, and intelligence make the difference, not emotion’.24 This subject, Descartes’ cogito, Kant’s transcendental subject, is exposed to the drive per se; to affects – potentially, raw anxiety, panic and horror. As suggested, all “human” suffering rests in this void of the pure subject. In this gap between the pre-Symbolic Real of the biological machinery of emotion and the Symbolised feelings of the autobiographical self lie everything that must be defended in this work: the sense of the tragic, the melancholic, the human – pity, empathy and compassion, followed by the critical necessity for the elaboration of language (the treasure house of signifiers) qua containing and subjectivising of affect, the telling of dreams, stories, narratives, etc. All the contemporary trends, as we have stressed, point in the reverse direction towards the inhuman – core unmediated machinic “experience” – paroxysms of sex, convulsions of violence, pitilessness, autism, jouissance and the death drive.

#### Their “becoming war” is exactly what good little capitalists strive to enjoy

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont, USA, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” pgs. 64-70)//JRD

It follows from this that the primary line of social critique launched against capitalist society would focus on society’s failure to live up to its ideology. It is a truism of Marxist analysis — especially aft er the Frankfurt School — to suggest that capitalist ideology uses the image of successful accumulation in order to hide the lack of accumulation that most subjects endure and thereby produce docility. According to this position, images of enjoyment, such as Hollywood f lms, create a false or illusory pleasure that helps to satisfy otherwise dissatisfied subjects. While entranced by the romantic bond between Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman or between Ashton Kutcher and Natalie Portman, **capitalist subjects do not think about their position within the capitalist order of things.** **These subjects invest themselves in the image of enjoyment rather than in the real thing.** This is why Theodor Adorno claims that “all mass culture is fundamentally adaptation.”23 The promulgation of the image of enjoyment, for Adorno and the Frankfurt School, becomes capitalist ideology’s way of creating subjects who believe that they are enjoying themselves while existing within the intractable dissatisfaction of capitalism. In the face of capitalist ideology’s proliferation of such images, the task for the critical thinker becomes one of tearing them apart, exposing the lack of enjoyment at the heart of them and showing how, as Adorno and Max Horkheimer make clear in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, capitalism and its ideological handmaiden, the culture industry, never really deliver.24 According to this view, capitalist subjects aren’t really enjoying themselves despite feeling that they are. Such subjects actually exist in a state of perpetual dissatisfaction, and Adorno and Horkheimer hope to expose this dissatisfaction for what it is in order to create a revolutionary consciousness akin to their own. For Marxist thinkers like those of the Frankfurt School, the chief problem with capitalism is that it promises an enjoyment without ever delivering on that promise (even to those who seem taken care of by the capitalist system). But there is a further problem that this critique doesn’t touch — the alignment of accumulation and enjoyment. Few Marxist thinkers have questioned this link. In fact, the primary aim of the Marxist project seems to be expanding or equalizing accumulation while retaining it as the source of enjoyment. This attitude stems in large part from Marx’s own privileging of production and his vision of the Communist revolution as an unleashing of the means of production. In contrast to capitalism, in which the restricted relations of production erect a barrier to the expansion of the unrestricted means of production, Communism would lift all such restrictions and allow for excess production without restraint — and thus enjoyment without limit. The ideal of enjoyment without limit is visible in the politics articulated by many recent and contemporary thinkers influenced by Marx. One can see it in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s call for decoded flows, Alain Badiou’s plea for more development of technology, and Paolo Virno’s embrace of dissolved boundaries.25 These visions of the future involve accepting the fundamental premise of capitalist ideology — its privileging of accumulation — but there is a countervailing movement within Marx’s own thought that hints at a more radical critique of the capitalist system. By examining this other dimension of Marx’s thought, we can see the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure as it operates within capitalist society and observe how a politics of the death drive would intervene in this relationship Finding Our Lost Enjoyment At times, Marx indicates how the capitalist mode of production transforms the driving force of human activity, and he implicitly envisions Communism as a corrective to this transformation. The drive to accumulate, in this view, ceases to be a drive inherent in human subjectivity itself, and an alternative becomes visible. In the second volume of Capital, Marx almost articulates the position of psychoanalytic emancipatory politics directly when he says, “For capitalism is already essentially abolished once we assume that it is enjoyment that is the driving motive and not enrichment itself.”26 Here, the distinction between enjoyment and enrichment as motives for action divides capitalism from other unmentioned economic systems. The alternative to accumulation is satisfaction — or, more specifically, the recognition of our satisfaction. the fundamental problem with capitalism is this: it doesn’t allow us to recognize our enjoyment or even to grasp enjoyment as what drives us. It’s not that capitalism deprives us of the satisfaction involved with thinking, loving, theorizing, singing, painting, and fencing (to use Marx’s examples cited above) but that it doesn’t allow us to view satisfaction as a possible motive for our acts. We can think of the drive for enjoyment or a drive centered around enjoyment as a possibility existing outside of the capitalist system. T is drive — the death drive — would have no purpose other than enjoyment, which is to say that it would operate in contrast to the accumulative logic of the capitalist drive. The capitalist drive to accumulate represents a distortion of the death drive, a rewriting of it that changes its structure. But the capitalist drive to accumulate does not simply do away with enjoyment. As a rewriting of the death drive, it continues to provide the enjoyment that this drive does, though this drive to accumulate makes it more diffi cult for subjects to identify the site where they enjoy. Our investment in capitalism doesn’t occur through a complete neglect of our enjoyment but depends in a fundamental way on its ability to deliver enjoyment. **If capitalist subjects weren’t actually enjoying themselves at all, they would not continue to be capitalist subjects.** We really do enjoy ourselves within the capitalist universe — the death drive continues to function — but we don’t enjoy in the way that capitalist ideology tries to convince us that we do. Political struggle is not simply a struggle over the right to enjoy certain goods and the distribution of this right. It is also — even predominantly — a struggle over how we identify and locate our enjoyment. Capitalist ideology is triumphant today because it has won this struggle. As capitalist subjects, we must define enjoyment in terms of accumulation: one enjoys insofar as one accumulates objects of desire. This definition has become ubiquitous: according to the prevailing logic today, even the enjoyment that derives from romance comes from acquiring one’s object of desire. But this is not the only way of figuring enjoyment. One of the most important political tasks for emancipatory politics today consists in transforming our way of thinking about enjoyment — breaking the link that capitalist ideology has forged between accumulation and enjoyment. At every turn, capitalist ideology works to persuade subjects that their enjoyment derives from acquiring and having objects of desire. As a result, popular fantasies place most of their focus on the moments when subjects obtain these objects. Rather than emphasizing the points at which a couple struggles through the quotidian aspects of their relationship, the typical Hollywood romance stresses the moment of the couple’s union. The entirety of Sleepless in Seattle (Nora Ephron, 1993) builds to the climactic embrace of the long-separated couple, and this embrace, according to the logic of the film, provides us as spectators with the ultimate enjoyment. The final embrace is the high point (the point at which each lover has the love object), and we leave the theater convinced that this embrace, this union, is the source of our enjoyment. In this way, the very structure of popular fantasies today underlines the link between acquisition and enjoyment. The problem with this stress on the enjoyment of accumulation is not simply that it tends to produce a destructive society with egoistic subjects (though it certainly does) but that it doesn’t really work. When we watch a film like Sleepless in Seattle, our enjoyment — if we have any at all — does not in fact derive from the moment when the lovers obtain their love objects. To understand where to locate our enjoyment of the film, we must observe the rigid distinction between enjoyment and pleasure. Pleasure occurs, for Freud, with a release of excitation, when we are able to overcome the barriers in the way of realizing our desire for this release. While pleasure provides a good feeling and a sense of well-being, enjoyment uproots us and disturbs our well-being. We have pleasures, but enjoyment, in some sense, has us. Though the proper spectator clearly experiences pleasure at the conclusion of Sleepless in Seattle, she or he does not enjoy at this point. Instead, this marks the moment at which our enjoyment dissipates. We enjoy the events leading up to the denouement — the struggles of each character with the absence of the object — not the acquisition of the object itself. the moment of acquiring the object represents the end, not the beginning, of our enjoyment, though it does mark the point at which we experience the most pleasure. There is a link between Freud’s conception of the pleasure principle as the motivating force of human activity and the capitalist drive to accumulate. In both cases, the focus is on the end point — either the psyche ridding itself of stimulation and achieving pleasure or the subject obtaining capital and commodities in order to have things to enjoy without worry. But what distinguishes them is their diff erent ways of envisioning the end point: according to the logic of the pleasure principle, the subject works to eliminate excitation, and according to that of the capitalist drive, the subject tries to increase excitation through the acquisition of more and more commodities. We might reconcile the two positions by thinking of acquisition as a way of calming psychic excitation while enhancing the possibilities for physical excitation. If one has enough capital, one might avoid disturbing thoughts about losing it. But sustaining the homology between the psychoanalytic conception of motivation and the drive to accumulate becomes impossible when we turn from the pleasure principle to the death drive as the fundamental psychoanalytic category. Before 1920 Freud identifies enjoyment and pleasure; he sees enjoyment as the product of the activity of the pleasure principle. As he puts it in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” in 1915, “The aim [Zeil] of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the instinct.”27 Satisfaction or enjoyment results from eliminating stimulation, which is precisely what the pleasure principle demands. After writing Beyond the Pleasure Principle, however, Freud ceases to credit the pleasure principle with being the primary explanatory category for human activity.28 He retains pleasure as a category, but the death drive dislodges it from its foundational place. Rather than explaining human activity itself, the pleasure principle begins to function as a supplement to the death drive as an explanatory category. Pleasure supplements the death drive by providing a lure for consciousness. The subject actively takes up the path of the death drive — a drive that uses the subject and produces enjoyment at the cost of the subject’s well-being or self-interest — because moments of pleasure render it bearable and even attractive. But this pleasure can only be imaginary: it is more the image of a future pleasure to be obtained than an actual pleasure experienced. This is the fundamental problem with the logic of accumulation and the would-be pleasure that derives from enrichment. Every capitalist subject has experienced the dissatisfaction that inevitably results from actually obtaining the desired commodity. As an absent object, the object of desire appears to embody incredible pleasure, but when this object becomes present, it devolves into an ordinary object. In the act of obtaining the object of desire, we deprive this object of its very desirability. The pleasure embodied in the object exists only insofar as it remains out of reach for the subject. Because we desire the object as absent, actually obtaining the object provokes disappointment rather than pleasure. No matt er how pleasurable the presence of the object is, this presence never offers us what we desired in the object. The great lie of capitalist ideology is its insistence that one can enjoy the act of accumulation itself. This act inevitably produces disappointment in the subject who buys into it, and this disappointment is never more acute than just after what promised to be the most satisfying acquisition. For capitalist subjects, the disappointment that follows acquisition of a treasured commodity is not a reason to abandon the process of accumulation. In fact, it suggests to such subjects that they simply haven’t taken accumulation far enough, that they need more. In this way, capitalist ideology feeds off the disappointment that it produces. If it actually produced the ultimate enjoyment for subjects that it promised them, they would no longer feel compelled to enter into the process of accumulation. After a little accumulation, subjects would become satisfied and thereby cease to be capitalist subjects, properly speaking. Capitalism needs dissatisfied subjects, but it also needs subjects who believe that the ultimate satisfaction is possible. This is accomplished by locating the ultimate satisfaction in the act of accumulation. Subjects invest themselves in capitalist ideology because they accept its map of enjoyment. The key to combating this ideology lies not in undermining the fantasies that it proffers but in revealing where our enjoyment is located, in proffering a different map. Rather than enjoying the process of accumulation, we enjoy the experience of loss — the loss of the privileged object. Accumulation allows us to have objects, but it doesn’t allow us to have the object in its absence. This is why accumulation always leads not to satisfaction with what one has but to the desire to accumulate more and more. Loss, in contrast, permits us to experience the object as such. Th rough the act of losing the privileged object, we in effect cause this privileged object to emerge. Th ere is no privileged object prior to its loss. Understood in this way, loss becomes a creative act. the loss of the object is the foundation of our enjoyment because this act elevates an object above the rest of the world and embodies that object with the power to satisfy us

#### Their anti-oedipal politics are nothing more than a modality of mimesis – the aggressive distaste for the uncastrated subject in opposition to the self.

Weatherill 17 (Rob Weatherill, master’s degree in psychotherapy from St. Vincents Univesity Hospital as well as the European Certificate in Psychotherapy, “THE ANTI-OEDIPUS COMPLEX: Lacan, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism,” pgs. 52-54)//JRD

In the absence of landmarks – the Law, Oedipus, the Symbolic register and civilisation itself, there is nothing for it but to collapse backwards into imaginary rivalry and the escalating violence of the war machines.49 It is only the Law and the thin seam or stratum of civilisation that stands guard over and against the (violent) jouissance of the BwO, and all the desiccated and de-structured remains of the molecularised aborted institutions, the bricks on the ground, the bodies strewn about, the fires still burning. And for those who correctly point out that the Law itself is founded on violence and maintained by violence, let them compare this “violence of normality” with Mogadishu (1993), Sarajevo (1992), Rwanda (1994), Phnom Penh (17 April 1975), Srebrenica (1995), Grozny (1999–2000), Darfur (2003–), Baghdad (2003–11), Misrata (April 2011), Homs (2012), all in the hellish nonstriated grip of their various war machines which show no pity and that is in just the last quarter century. At this point, we will turn our attention to a theorist of war, René Girard. From his early work on literary theory and criticism, Girard turned his attention to anthropology and the primitive mythological origins of violence and the means of its cessation. In his key text, Violence and the Sacred, 50 written coincidentally in the same year as Anti-Oedipus, Girard underlines the ubiquity of violence in primitive societies, like our authors’ theorising of the nomadic war machines. Girard, however, draws attention specifically to the mimetic character of violence. Envy is the response to ontological lack; jealousy and resentment of what the other has. Girard is unnecessarily critical of psychoanalysis when much of his theorising amplifies both what Freud emphasised about the ubiquity of the death drive and Lacan’s Hegelian-Kojévian theory of desire. Girard’s explication sounds Lacanian: ‘he [the subject] desires being, something he himself lacks and which some other person seems to possess. The subject thus looks to that other person to inform him of what he should desire in order to acquire that being’ (155). We desire what the other desires because they desire it, not because we need it, but because they have it and we want it. Very quickly, many people will desire the same thing, because it seems desirable. Desire mimes the other’s desire; we want the same as the other. Two key points emerge: first, desire manifests as a social phenomenon, not just biologically rooted in the drive; and second, desire (as in the “mirror stage”) quickly becomes aggressive and rivalrous, in which case it becomes a fight for what the other possesses, with the potential for escalation. Girard likens this extremism to an infection or pollution, or the spilling of blood. Our perceiving evil in the other and the violent measures taken to combat it, inevitably converge sowing chaos and destruction. So-called “mimetic violence” will only be controlled, not by counterviolence, but by religion, i.e. by sacred rituals involving the killing of a scapegoat – an unimportant third party who can “safely” be sacrificed to defuse the crisis which is tearing apart the social fabric. The scapegoat must be foreign, an enemy or “other,” designated by the warring factions as sufficiently different so that his death does not lead to more killings within the society. The sacrifice is a sacred duty, a perfect cover for the violence of the act, the true logic of which must never be disclosed to the participants. **The so-called “bad” violence of the warring factions will be countered only by the “good” violence of a sacrifice that will end the chain reactions of violent reprisals.** As if taking his cue from psychoanalyst Matte Blanco, Girard demonstrates again and again how violence becomes symmetrical, reciprocal, eliminating difference as the combatants become mirror images of each other, “monstrous doubles,” with their tit-for-tat killings, spreading throughout the community. For instance, Oedipus, Creon, Laius, Tiresias, taking their cue from the oracle, each seek the other’s downfall. Each becomes similarly and symmetrically violent. Oedipus is selected as the sacrificial victim, because he alone is regarded as guilty of patricide and incest. He is the monstrous exception. Oedipus becomes the repository of all the community’s ills, to be done away with in order for peace to return.51 Likewise here, the anti-Oedipals unite in their hatred of Oedipus, who therefore must be sacrificed. Oedipus is scapegoated because he wasn’t sufficiently anti-Oedipal, thus remaining a tragic divided figure. The list of potential sacrificial victims is varied: prisoners of war, slaves, adolescents, children, the handicapped, anyone sufficiently different, sufficiently other from Pharmakós to King, might be selected for sacrifice. Twins are regarded as impure and demonic especially if identical. Other potential victims include a warrior steeped in blood, an incestuous couple, menstruating women, and so on. Recalling our argument, the erotic eliminates difference, celebrates confusion, because it allows for the “return of the repressed” and thus provokes counter-cathectic violence against such “evil.” This recalls Laplanche’s “sexual death drive” theory,52 and George Bataille’s erotic.53 As Girard says, ‘naked or pure sexuality is directly connected to violence. It is the final veil shielding violence from sight’ (122). Violence once started creates an orgy of destruction. Violence is con-fusion, difference is eliminated: between god and non-god; between man and woman; parent and child – ‘a hallucinatory state that is not a synthesis of elements, but a formless and grotesque mixture of things that are normally separate’ (169). This is anti-Oedipus, everything is reduced via mixing to the sameness of shit! Violence has this eviscerating effect. Our authors, averse to key Oedipal differentiations (mother, father. child, brother, sister, etc.), celebrate contagion. Differentiation, on the other hand, establishes culture, peace with the “violence of normality,” where the scapegoated “monsters” are marginalised and some stability is assured provided the paranoid machines continue to function in the background, with their counter-cathexes. However, ambiguities should not to be passed over too lightly. The so-called differentiations within civilised culture, from the exorcised, excluded, violated position of the scapegoat, are clearly stigmatised differences; differences that threaten the civilised repressive edifice. The apparent peace and stability of the civilised culture depends on these exclusions. In other words, the differentiating and thus civilising process is a violent process. Whereas the anti-Oedipal utopian vision is inclusive: the promiscuous and multiple “becomings” are multiply differentiated singularities, molecularities, apparently without any exceptions, antagonisms or rejected scapegoats.

#### Do no place your bets on a losing hand – the Body without Organs will fail. Instead bet on Organs without a Body. Their moralism is nothing more than the reduction of bodies to a machinic nightmare, the regression to the human, all too human idealisms of “good” and “evil.”

Weatherill 17 (Rob Weatherill, master’s degree in psychotherapy from St. Vincents Univesity Hospital as well as the European Certificate in Psychotherapy, “THE ANTI-OEDIPUS COMPLEX: Lacan, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism,” pgs. 91-96)//JRD

Žižek believes that the genius of Deleuze resides in his “transcendental empiricism,” where the impersonal machinic flow of pure becoming teems infinitely more richly than the dullness of perceived being. The genius of the real philosopher is that his thinking enlivens ordinary reality. You can see the stratifications and segmentations of political opinion that resist any deterritorialisations: people remain in their defensive molar aggregations, locking in intensities, repelling with their paranoid machines. You can trace the molecular developments of youthful enquiry, the lines of flight, the singularities, before they are bounced off the solid wall of language and reabsorbed into the existing sediments. You can sense the spinning in the black hole of the empty BwO of the addict. Deleuze “sees” the quantum level before the collapse of wave forms. He imagines the infinite possibilities of fluid open multiplicities, before they precipitate out as concrete actualities. Deleuze’s ultimate reference, following Nietzsche, is “pure becoming,” against the dull opacity of Being. The assertion of continuous movement, flight, break-flows, escapes, fluxes, etc., is the pure hidden potential of the virtual, not to be misunderstood as the “before” and “after” of any historicism, but pure becoming – no stratigraphy or evolution, no development or progress, no context, no reference to real events. Deleuze was the key interpreter of Nietzsche in France. Nietzsche pointed out that nothing important is ever free from a “nonhistorical cloud.” This leads to the paradox that something really new can only emerge via repetition out of the cloud, the repetition of the past “failure” to realise itself properly. Žižek cites Walter Benjamin’s example of the October Revolution’s repetition of the French Revolution, “redeeming” the latter’s alleged failure. What is repeated is the transcendental-non-historical-cloud that was betrayed, missed, not fully realised at the time. The Spirit (Becoming) has been betrayed by the Letter (Being). It is tempting to add that schizoanalysis, as the true Spirit of human freedom, has been betrayed by the (repressive) Letter of psychoanalysis. Schizoanalysis might redeem the failure of psychoanalysis: the “betrayal” by the later Freud of the originality of the early Freud. Schizoanalysis is more (early) Freudian, closer to the Freudian spirit, than all the subsequent Freudians – more Freud than Freud himself! Stick to the Letter and you betray the Spirit – always becoming – fluid-multiplemolecular-singular. Schizoanalysis is the truly new version of psychoanalysis, redeeming its potential vitality, its failure to aspire to full liberation. This is the lesson to be learnt from our authors. Against the thrust of the previous chapter, Žižek asserts that, ‘What Deleuze calls “desiring machines” concerns something wholly different from the mechanical’.1 Against dull machinic repetition of the same, what emerges is the miraculous new, on the lines of Chesterton’s Christian ontology.2 For instance, there is nothing “mechanical” in the sun’s rising every morning; on the contrary, it reveals the miracle of God’s creativity! Therefore, our negative assertion, that “machinic” refers to an inhuman banality, emphasising not the miraculously new but quite the reverse, the totally repetitive – the emerging post-human, the ticking atomic clock, should not be conceded here but held in suspense.3 While the schizo[schizoanalysis] may celebrate this miraculous “becoming machine” of everything, the neurotic[psychoanalysis] fears the increasing reductionism and automation of human experience, the translation of the most sublime experiences into pure “functioning” and the inherent violence of such thinking. The more human capacities are handed over to prosthetics, the more we emerge as de-substantialised (parasitic) subjects controlled by the machanosphere and artificial intelligence.4 The proximity of miraculating machines can terrify. After he had settled, a man described his ordeal on the main thoroughfare of the capital city. He had had a sudden real-isation. Reality had decomposed. He heard the grinding mechanics, gears, bearings, pistons, explosions in the engines of passing lorries and buses without any mediation or imaginary filter, as in a nightmare, and he had collapsed in shock. A woman described the horror she felt when she saw the bony skeletal articulations of people and the skulls like an X-ray machine. Anorexics can describe in minute detail the machinations of food in their digestive machines. A man says he will only sleep in a room that contains hundreds of ticking alarm clocks all timed to go off at the same hour. Another says, all I can tell you is that we are fluid luminous beings made of contracting and relaxing fibres. Another man says, ‘I am a block of ice’. In this, he has all the frozen smoothness of a BwO. The schizos and our authors “see” machinic assemblages everywhere and these monstrosities approach the Real in the Lacanian sense, or Hegel’s “Objective Spirit.” Žižek points to a crack in the edifice of the simple opposition between molar and molecular, between being and becoming, the Symbolic and the Real. These opposed registers are not equal and opposite. Representation (Symbolic) cannot be opposed to production (Real). With Deleuze, ‘The virtual field is (re)interpreted as that of generative, productive forces, opposed to the space of representations’. And for Žižek, the proper site of production cannot be the virtual space as such, which is the “empty” Lacanian Real, but, rather, the passage from it to constituted representational reality. Žižek therefore questions the duality of Deleuzian thinking – becoming versus being; the nomadic versus the State; the molecular versus the molar; the schizo versus the paranoiac. He concludes, ‘This duality is ultimately over-determined as “the Good versus the Bad”’.5 To pursue Žižek’s ontological “crack,” the first step is to question this simple duality with similar duality, that of Badiou’s Being and Event, emphasising their ultimate incompatibility. Event(s) cannot be simply mapped onto the field of becoming which generates the order of being. Event(s) are only be posited retrospectively. Only later can we “believe” that this was indeed “an Event,” standing out from the multitude – an Event to which to remain politically faithful in a militant way, as opposed to the ephemeral indiscriminate spontaneous way of the “anarcho-désirants.” Žižek suggests that our authors are doing no more than re-heating the old humanist-ideal: regressing from the “reified” and reduced result in the world, to its abundant productive becoming. It is the old story of vitalism, the elevation of life to a new “becoming.” Whereas, Žižek believes that Badiou’s “mathematics” is the only adequate ontology: ‘the meaningless Real of the pure multitude, the vast infinite coldness of the Void’; i.e. the indifference of truth to the chaotic flow of the world. While Deleuze asserts life in its multiple singularities, for Badiou there is only the Hegelian from ‘nothing to nothing’.6 Žižek creates another reversal. Against the notion of BwO and its high-intensity prolonged pleasure/joy, the pure body of immanent desire, he pits “organs without a body” (OwB). The latter might be, for instance, the lonely masochist staging his sterile rituals for futile pleasure – maybe one of those failed, empty or cancerous BwOs. Žižek complains that **Anti-Oedipus is the worst book Deleuze ever wrote,** citing the political ideological “bad influence” of Guattari. He concludes that our authors, despite protestations to the contrary, end up as ‘the ideologist[s] of late capitalism’. For Éric Alliez, however, Deleuze and Badiou typify the polarity of French philosophy. For Badiou, Deleuze’s work and politics lacks coherent theoretical autonomy, being imbued with Romantic mystical pretensions. Badiou sees mercantile possibilities in communities demanding their singular recognitions – women, gays, transsexuals, ethnic groups, etc., although clearly not what our authors had in mind with their revolutionary explosive field of immanence. As Alliez says, The BwO is to be considered as the very body of desire, as its purest expression, so absolutely coincident inseparate from what it can do that it relates back to an unliveable power, a power which is as such the pre-condition of every real experience of desire, driven by the necessity of [machinic] constructions that cut [striate] the BwO in itself’.7 Thus, Anti-Oedipus confronts structuralism head-on by establishing beyond any doubt the biopolitical primacy of desire. In other words, the deterritorialising lines of flight, etc., come first and are therefore not reactive to established biopolitical structures. The schizo is not a revolutionary subject (or indeed a “subject” at all), but merely the site of interruption, mutation, rupture, the potential for revolution, schizzing effects – undercutting state, party and even utopian communitarian projects. Inevitably, desire becomes exile, the unconscious is orphan. What Alliez concludes is that we should not oppose the Badiou–Žižek–Lacanian–structuralist axis with a shallow post-structural, ‘making room for a spontaneous democracy of desire and its pop-philosophical flights of fancy’, but oppose it much more vibrantly, ‘with a Biopolitics of Multitudes whose socially constitutive character is the ontological fact that sustains the constructivism of desire’.8

#### The attempt to mobilize subjects on the basis of knowledge eschews enjoyment as the basis for action.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont, USA, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” pgs. 172-176)//JRD

For emancipatory politics, the transformation of knowledge from a vehicle of liberation to an instrument of power has had devastating effects. Emancipatory politics has traditionally relied on knowledge in order to facilitate political change, and even today one of the primary operations of emancipatory politics is getting information out to citizens. In the minds of most people engaged in the project of emancipation, the fundamental task has been establishing class consciousness among the members of the working class. Class consciousness, according to this way of thinking, is the basis for substantive political change. As Georg Lukács puts it in History and Class Consciousness, “The fate of a class depends on its ability to elucidate and solve the problems with which history confronts it.”12 Political change depends, for someone like Lukács, on the knowledge that makes decisive action possible. As long as authority remains in the position of the traditional master, knowledge can have a revolutionary function. Historically, the primary problem for emancipatory politics involved access to education, which is why a key component of the communist program that Marx and Engels outline in The Communist Manifesto is universal access to public education. There are those on the side of emancipation who continue to insist that knowledge will be the source for political change. According to this position, people side with conservative policies against their own self-interest because they lack the proper information. They are the victims of propaganda, and emancipatory politics must respond by providing the missing knowledge. If not for big media’s control over knowledge, the thinking goes, subjects would cease to act against their self-interest and would begin to oppose contemporary capitalism in an active way. **For those who adopt this position, political activity consists in acts of informing, raising consciousness, and bringing issues to light.** But today the failures of consciousness-raising are evident everywhere. Such failures are the subject of Thomas Frank’s acclaimed analysis, What’s the Matter with Kansas? Frank highlights the proclivity of people in areas of the United States like Kansas to act politically in ways that sabotage their economic interests. He notes: “People getting their fundamental interests wrong is what American political life is all about.”13 The Right’s current success in the United States and around the world is not the sign that more people have become convinced that right-wing policies will benefit them. Instead, conservatism permits people a way of organizing their enjoyment in a way that today’s emancipatory politics does not. Emancipatory politics may offer a truer vision of the world, but the Right offers a superior way of enjoying. Traditionally, the primary advantage that emancipatory politics had in political struggle was its challenge to authority. When one took up the cause of emancipation, one took a stand against an entrenched regime of power and experienced enjoyment in this defiance. One can still see this form of enjoyment evinced in the revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011. Though emancipatory activity always entailed a certain risk (even of death, to which the fate of innumerable revolutionaries attests), it nonetheless brought with it an enjoyment not found in everyday obedience and symbolic identity. In short, there was historically a strong libidinal component to emancipatory militancy that the risk it carried amplified rather than diminished. The liberating power of emancipatory activity is present in almost every political film. We see activists falling in love as they jointly embark on an emancipatory project or romance burgeoning as a fight for justice intensifies. This dynamic, attesting to the enjoyment inherent in militancy against the oppressive ruling order, manifests itself in Warren Beatty’s Reds (1981), Ken Loach’s Bread and Roses (2000), and Gillian Armstrong’s Charlotte Gray (2001), to name just a few of the many. In each case, the romance seems to spring out of the risk that militancy against an oppressive regime entails. The love that develops between Maya (Pilar Padilla) and Sam (Adrien Brody) in Bread and Roses sparks first at the moment when Maya helps Sam to elude corporate security agents at the office building where he is trying to help unionize the janitors. Maya risks losing her job as a janitor when she aids Sam, and this risk acts as the driving force for the eroticism between them. Conservatism has not traditionally provided much enjoyment of this type, but it has had its own appeal. It took the side of authority and stability. Whereas emancipatory politics could offer the enjoyment that comes from defiance of authority, conservatism could offer the enjoyment that comes from identification with it. This is the enjoyment that one feels when hearing one’s national anthem or saluting the flag. It resides in the fabric of the nation’s military uniform that makes the fingers touching it tingle. This eroticism is not that of emancipatory politics — and it is perhaps not as powerful — but it is nonetheless a form of eroticism. It produces a libidinal charge. The struggle between conservatism and emancipatory politics has historically been a struggle between two competing modes of organizing enjoyment with neither side having a monopoly. Despite the traditional emphasis that the forces of emancipation placed on knowledge, even in the past the struggle between emancipatory politics and conservatism centered on enjoyment rather than knowledge. In the political arena, knowledge is important only insofar as it relates to the way that subjects mobilize their enjoyment. If subjects see through ideological manipulation and have the proper knowledge, this does not necessarily inaugurate a political change. The knowledge that something is bad for us — a president or a Twinkie — **does not lessen the enjoyment that we receive from it. It is not that we have the ability to enjoy while disavowing our knowledge but more that the knowledge works to serve our enjoyment.** The enjoyment of a Twinkie does not derive from the physiological effect of sugar on the human metabolism but from the knowledge of the damage this substance does to the body. Knowing the harm that accompanies something actually facilitates our enjoyment of it, especially when we are capable of disavowing this knowledge. Enjoyment is distinct from bodily pleasures (which the Twinkie undoubtedly also provides); it depends on some degree of sacrifice that allows the subject to suffer its enjoyment. Sacrifice is essential to our capacity for enjoying ourselves. There is a fundamentally masochistic structure to enjoyment.14 It always comes in the form of an alien force that overcomes us from the outside. As Alenka Zupančič puts it, “It is not simply the mode of enjoyment of the neighbour, of the other, that is strange to me. The heart of the problem is that I experience my own enjoyment (which emerges along with the enjoyment of the other, and is even indissociable from it) as strange and hostile.”15 An initial experience of loss gives birth to the lost object around which we structure our enjoyment, and our subsequent enjoyment demands a return to the experience of loss. Through sacrifice and loss, we reconstitute the privileged object that exists only as an absence. This is why actually obtaining the privileged object necessarily disappoints: when the lost object becomes present, it loses its privileged status and becomes an ordinary empirical object. Knowledge thus helps us to enjoy not in the way that we might think — that is, by showing us what is good for our well-being — but by giving us something to sacrifice: if we know, for instance, that cigarettes are unhealthy and could kill us, this elevates the mundane fact of smoking into an act laced with enjoyment.16 With each puff, we repeat the act of sacrifice and return to the primordial experience of loss. The death that we bring on is not simply the price that we pay for smoking; it is the means through which we enjoy the act of smoking. In this sense, every cigarette is really killing the smoker. If it didn’t, the act would lose its ability to provide enjoyment (though it may still produce bodily pleasure).17 Under the rule of the traditional master, prohibition sustains the possibility for this type of enjoyment: we can enjoy an act because it transgresses a societal prohibition. As Lacan notes in Seminar VII, “Transgression in the direction of jouissance only takes place if it is supported by the oppositional principle, by the forms of the Law. If the paths to jouissance have something in them that dies out, that tends to make them impassable, prohibition, if I may say so, becomes its all-terrain vehicle.”18 Prohibition makes our enjoyment possible by offering us the possibility for sacrifice. We sacrifice the good and violate the prohibition. But prohibition no longer plays this role in contemporary society. No universal prohibition bars certain activities; instead, knowledge about the harm that activities cause begins to play the role that prohibition once played. We don’t avoid smoking simply because it is wrong but because we know the harm that it causes. We don’t refrain from extramarital sex because it is wrong but because we know the societal and physical dangers it entails. Even conservatives think and talk this way. When, for instance, conservatives argue for excluding information about condoms from sex education classrooms, they claim that we know condoms aren’t 100 percent safe in preventing the spread of hiv. In each case, the authority is knowledge, not law. The libidinal charge in politics involved with challenging the master has largely disappeared today, and now that libidinal charge has attached itself to challenging the experts, who represent the new agents of authority.

#### Our alternative asks the question of “what remains after the death of Oedipus?” In opposition to their will to positivity, we forefront the negative, the lack, irreducible void at the heart of subjectivity.

Weatherill 17 (Rob Weatherill, master’s degree in psychotherapy from St. Vincents Univesity Hospital as well as the European Certificate in Psychotherapy, “THE ANTI-OEDIPUS COMPLEX: Lacan, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism,” pgs. 123-125)//JRD

Psychoanalysis, to be (in)credible must keep faith with the traumatic kernel of the Real – negative thinking. Insofar as therapy supports repression with its recovery programmes, our husband will try to focus on the fact that he did arrive home too early, or, even if he didn’t, and whatever his wife was doing, he should work on his issues – to do with jealousy, dependency and so on. Mindfulness would help him relax. The whole drama of psychoanalysis struggles against these false notions of recovery, growth and comfort which are legion, to find instead the “basic fault,”63 where the story breaks, or the mask slips, the lip quivers and the cracks appear. The analyst struggles against all the various “fixes” that tempt the sufferer, from CBT programmes to drug therapies, all of which have their uses, but have to do with “doing” and “utility” rather than with “being” as such; to do with “moving on” rather than “being still,” to do with continuous re-invention and re-branding, the “new me,” and so on, rather than reflection. In this Heideggerian sense, therapies are indeed ‘forgetful of Being’, individual being and the larger Being. Following the machinic anti-Oedipal logic, treatments for mental suffering resemble hit-and-run crashes, where drivers leave the scene of the accident never to return. ‘My father was depressed; his brain was malfunctioning; he just needed a drug to fix it’. Return to the devastated surface. Is he okay now? Yes. Well fine! Within a very short time, the road is cleared, the traffic is flowing again. A few bits of glass remain. How can an analyst ever be an authority again without the Oedipal compass that should orient everything analytic? Who is willing to believe that, for instance, a hyperactive child, let us take a hypothetical but not uncommon instance, is continually trying to evacuate from his mind/body, unbearable and unthinkable anxiety generated by his distressed mother, deserted by the boy’s father, living in a part of town that is disadvantaged, now on her own and unable to cope herself? The child seeks a “container,” his school, or the classroom to hold him together, but he continually destroys it as he repeats and “communicates” his psychotic distress about his (idealised and unreachable) mother who bore him and now cannot love him. No! He has a damaged brain, neuro-imaging shows it, and he must take his Ritalin. Who is willing to investigate by listening to the narrative of the life of a middle aged woman who presents with, for her and her family, an unaccountable depression after her father died, which has continued too long. Medication is indicated. She believed that out of her four siblings she was secretly her father’s favourite, enjoying really special times with him especially when her mother got sick. In adult life, she became his unofficial secretary and confidante and would even accompany him to functions as his career progressed. She got married, had children, but her imaginary father still held a special place in her heart. When he got sick and died suddenly just a few years back, she was distraught. But when his will was read, she was left with practically nothing. Who, without analytic insight and experience, can really appreciate the intense rage and hurt at the “betrayal” by her father and the self punishment and self-hate (depression) that ensue as she identifies with his rejection and abandonment, first by dying and second at the level of his final desire/will? The analyst with an Oedipal compass understands the primitive oral omnipotence involved in anorexia, the master-slave fight to death with the re-discovered disappointing mother, over food – the ravaging greed coming from the id and the cannabalistic superego that that reduces her body to a skeleton that looks as if it might win the battle of will and counter-will in the war for total control and total perfection of the emaciated body. And the father was forced out to be a helpless bystander. Everyone has a story to tell, but the analyst needs investigative powers, the skill and the desire to get beyond the story’s manifest content – the very limited story – to the real scandals of Oedipal dynamics. Who understands and accepts as real, for instance, the intense emotions elaborated by Melanie Klein – matricidal, infanticidal, the insane mute limits of the human? And who in these non-judgemental days is prepared to find hidden sadism and masochism? Even analysts under supervision regularly miss human deviousness, complicity, deceit, double-dealing, and so on. They refuse in toto the real range of human dialectic, preferring instead the sentiments around a “damaged self,” or now a “damaged brain,” with minimal responsibility. We believe what people say, but must also disbelieve, because revelation and resistance alternate. Resistance is always present. Only the gullible will just listen and believe, but this now passes for the highest therapeutic understanding and respect. To disbelieve is disrespectful and insulting unless you are a negative thinker. Winnicott spoke of the true and false self. If we give it a Levinasian gloss, conatus essendi is the false self. The striving to maintain being, the false self qua caretaker self, or ego, begs the question of the status of the true self. Does it exist? Winnicott’s answer is that it “exists” to a degree in secret,64 until it finds a facilitating environment (in life, in analysis?) in which to express its emergent spontaneity, aliveness and real feeling, or in Lacanian terms, until it can speak. An analyst unaware of this distinction may allow years of analysis to continue unproductively – ‘The patient’s false self can collaborate indefinitely’.65 The existential twist creates a necessary edge, not there with Winnicott. The delight with Winnicott was always his sense of ease and playfulness. However, analysis is bound to interrogate the false self, as it can become not so much a caretaker, but a minder, at worst a paranoid mindbody guard, protecting the subject from suffering, from the other within and without. With the loss of the “facilitating environment” over the half-century since this paper was written, the minder false self increasingly threatens to usurp the whole scene, guaranteeing security at the expense of life. Disturb this minder false self (via analysis) and he is likely to retaliate with terroristic threats against the subject and the analyst. What happens, observes Winnicott, is ‘a need to collect impingements from external reality so that the living-time of the individual can be filled by reaction to these impingements’.66 Thus, an analysis risks taking on the minders but with no certain outcome! Rather than resolving the Oedipus complex, the anti-Oedipal “solution” is likely to end up becoming bogged down within it, or remaining pre-Oedipal. But who can detect this without the Oedipus compass? Like the young man with no history and no dreams, who lives from minute to minute, not thinking but reacting. His mother calls him many times a day as she worries about him. He lets her. She does his washing and sometimes she “feeds” him. He works a little but spends time helping out his sisters with their children. He says, ‘they are always there for him’. There is never a mention of his father. Who without an Oedipal orientation can identify the “plague,” the story spoken of around the forbidden/enjoyable/disappointing incestuous bonds? A young woman was given medication to cope with the ongoing stress caused by her parent’s acrimonious divorce 10 years previously. Her father left and remarried. She had no self-confidence in spite of significant success in her career. Her therapist gave her positive exercises to increase confidence but to no avail. Analysis revealed her secret Oedipal wish that her fighting parents would separate, countered by an equally strong reparative wish that they would stay together. When they really did divorce, her guilt was intense. She had caused it. She tried to excel at work to ward off her “badness.” When her father re-married, his “betrayal” was complete, stirring up more jealous hatred and punitive self-condemnation. Only by proper analysis of Oedipal desire, confronting head-on the negative drives, is it possible to rebuild, repair, but not recover. The subject remains divided. People used to fear their demons, derived from negative thinking and wishes associated with the Oedipus complex. Now, after anti-Oedipus there is shallowness. With positive thinking, not just some things are phoney, but everything may be phoney! Semblants everywhere forcing their dissembling reality on you like an insomniac roar to drown out the void. The closer the void, the louder the roar, which bespeaks the ultimate failure, the ultimate cynicism of positive thinking. The pendulum has swung so far in this direction that all moderation has been lost. Heidegger reminds us that for the Greeks, truth is something stolen from concealment. For Heraclitus, the prevailing of things has in itself a striving to conceal. The risk of analysis is underlined by American satirist H. L. Mencken: ‘for every nugget of truth, some wretch lies dead on the scrapheap’. The conceit of positive thinking is that it can definitely improve on the prevailing of things, whereas analysis, in creating a space for the saying of what is concealed, risks the radical contestation of “prevailing of things.” The criticism of modern “analysis” is that it does not contest. It listens well but does not analyse. Analysis per se belongs to a master discourse and must cease its search for truth. Listen but don’t analyse; the end of analysis. Freud’s instruction to the analyst was ‘to put aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and concentrate his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation [analysis] as skilfully as possible’. Freud concludes his remarks by reference to the French surgeon, Ambroise Paré: ‘I dressed his wounds, God cured him’.67 At first reading, this is the best refutation of the comforting therapeutic you could imagine – analysis not therapy. This instruction should be read in conjunction with the aforementioned assertion by Freud that ‘analysis is a cure through love’ – clearing a space free of sympathy, pity, etc., yet dressing his wounds, and finally, the unknown – God’s cure – through love. But who ever thinks of God?

#### We must forefront the analytic of the drive. Only analysis which begins from the question of enjoyment and the abandonment of the good as a model of desire can ever hope to transform political terrains.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont, USA, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” pgs. 283-286)//JRD

There is no path leading from the death drive to utopia. the death drive undermines every attempt to construct a utopia; it is the enemy of the good society. It is thus not surprising that political thought from Plato onward has largely ignored this psychic force of repetition and negation. But this does not mean that psychoanalytic thought concerning the death drive has only a negative value for political theorizing. It is possible to conceive of a positive politics of the death drive. The previous chapters have attempted to lay out the political implications of the death drive, and, on this basis, we can sketch what a society founded on a recognition of the death drive might look like. Such a recognition would not involve a radical transformation of society: in one sense, it would leave everything as it is. In contemporary social arrangements, the death drive subverts progress with repetition and leads to the widespread sacrifice of self-interest for the enjoyment of the sacrifice itself. This structure is impervious to change and to all attempts at amelioration. But in another sense, the recognition of the death drive would change everything. Recognizing the centrality of the death drive would not eliminate the proclivity to sacrifice for the sake of enjoyment, but it would change our relationship to this sacrifice. Rather than being done for the sake of an ultimate enjoyment to be achieved in the future, it would be done for its own sake. The fundamental problem with the effort to escape the death drive and pursue the good is that it leaves us unable to locate where our enjoyment lies. By positing a future where we will attain the ultimate enjoyment (either through the purchase of the perfect commodity or through a transcendent romantic union or through the attainment of some heavenly paradise), we replace the partial enjoyment of the death drive with the image of a complete enjoyment to come. There is no question of fully enjoying our submission to the death drive. We will always remain alienated from our mode of enjoying. As Adrian Johnston rightly points out, “Transgressively ‘overcoming’ the impediments of the drives doesn’t enable one to simply enjoy enjoyment.”1 But we can transform our relationship to the impediments that block the full realization of our drive. We can see the impediments as the internal product of the death drive rather than as an external limit. The enjoyment that the death drive provides, in contrast to the form of enjoyment proffered by capitalism, religion, and utopian politics, is at once infinite and limited. This oxymoronic form of enjoyment operates in the way that the concept does in Hegel’s Logic. The concept attains its infinitude not through endless progress toward a point that always remains beyond and out of reach but through including the beyond as a beyond within itself. As Hegel puts it, “The universality of the concept is the achieved beyond, whereas that bad infinity remains afflicted with a beyond which is unattainable but remains a mere progression to infinity.”2 That is to say, the concept transforms an external limit into an internal one and thereby becomes both infinite and limited. The infinitude of the concept is nothing but the concept’s own self-limitation. The enjoyment that the death drive produces also achieves its infinitude through self-limitation. It revolves around a lost object that exists only insofar as it is lost, and it relates to this object as the vehicle for the infinite unfurling of its movement. The lost object operates as the self-limitation of the death drive through which the drive produces an infinite enjoyment. Rather than acting as a mark of the drive’s finitude, the limitation that the lost object introduces provides access to infinity. A society founded on a recognition of the death drive would be one that viewed its limitations as the source of its infinite enjoyment rather than an obstacle to that enjoyment. To take the clearest and most traumatic example in recent history, the recognition of the death drive in 1930s Germany would have conceived the figure of the Jew not as the barrier to the ultimate enjoyment that must therefore be eliminated but as the internal limit through which German society attained its enjoyment. As numerous theorists have said, the appeal of Nazism lay in its ability to mobilize the enjoyment of the average German through pointing out a threat to that enjoyment. the average German under Nazism could enjoy the figure of the Jew as it appeared in the form of an obstacle, but it is possible to recognize the obstacle not as an external limit but as an internal one. In this way, the figure of the Jew would become merely a figure for the average German rather than a position embodied by actual Jews. Closer to home, one would recognize the terrorist as a figure representing the internal limit of global capitalist society. Far from serving as an obstacle to the ultimate enjoyment in that society, the terrorist provides a barrier where none otherwise exists and thereby serves as the vehicle through which capitalist society attains its enjoyment. The absence of explicit limitations within contemporary global capitalism necessitates such a figure: if terrorists did not exist, global capitalist society would have to invent them. But recognizing the terrorist as the internal limit of global capitalist society would mean the end of terrorism. This recognition would transform the global landscape and deprive would-be terrorists of the libidinal space within which to act. Though some people may continue to blow up buildings, they would cease to be terrorists in the way that we now understand the term. A self-limiting society would still have real battles to fight. There would remain a need for this society to defend itself against external threats and against the cruelty of the natural universe. Perhaps it would require nuclear weapons in space to defend against comets or meteors that would threaten to wipe out human life on the planet. But it would cease positing the ultimate enjoyment in vanquishing an external threat or surpassing a natural limit. The external limit would no longer stand in for a repressed internal one. Such a society would instead enjoy its own internal limitations and merely address external limits as they came up. Psychoanalytic theory never preaches, and it cannot help us to construct a better society. But it can help us to subtract the illusion of the good from our own society. By depriving us of this illusion, it has the ability to transform our thinking about politics. With the assistance of psychoanalytic thought, we might reconceive politics in a direction completely opposed to that articulated by Aristotle, to which I alluded in the introduction. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.”3 Though later political thinkers have obviously departed from Aristotle concerning the question of the content of the good society, few have thought of politics in terms opposed to the good. This is what psychoanalytic thought introduces. If we act on the basis of enjoyment rather than the good, this does not mean that we can simply construct a society that privileges enjoyment in an overt way. An open society with no restrictions on sexual activity, drug use, food consumption, or play in general would not be a more enjoyable one than our own. That is the sure path to impoverishing our ability to enjoy, as the aftermath of the 1960s has made painfully clear. One must arrive at enjoyment indirectly. A society centered around the death drive would not be a better society, nor would it entail less suffering. Rather than continually sacrificing for the sake of the good, we would sacrifice the good for the sake of enjoyment. A society centered around the death drive would allow us to recognize that we enjoy the lost object only insofar as it remains lost.

#### They are narcissists.

Weatherill 17 (Rob Weatherill, master’s degree in psychotherapy from St. Vincents Univesity Hospital as well as the European Certificate in Psychotherapy, “THE ANTI-OEDIPUS COMPLEX: Lacan, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism,” pgs. 26-28)//JRD

With psychoanalysis now overwhelmed by therapy culture, our authors’ attack was farseeing. A lachrymose philosophy around victimhood, the allegedly traumatic nature of ordinary life, the “fragile child,” the “loving” mother, the regressive infantilisation of language, and so on, have become commonplace since Anti-Oedipus. However, has schizoanalysis fostered this regression, while aggressively asserting the opposite? The “flowers” were told that they had no power against the fascist System. They were traumatised by excess! No wonder the mass of ordinary working people at the time failed to understand and sympathise with their hysterical protesting! The paranoid logic machine deployed through books, TV, lectures, sit- ins, workshops, etc., convinced and seduced many into believing that the “military industrial complex of the West” was at work everywhere; the silent masses were complicit, as fascistic as the war-planners in Washington or Moscow. They were told and believed that they had been alienated, colonised, violated and conditioned into fascistic “normality;” and with this ideology the engine of narcissism and hurt was set going demanding a whole therapeutic culture to put things right.21 They were tuning in and dropping out like flies. The baby- boomers had the biggest tantrum in history. Born into an unprecedented age of prosperity after WW2, protected by the welfare state, educated beyond what any former generation could ever have hoped for, pampered with consumer goods, and they are the ones to complain! They felt guilty about war, about violence (televised from anywhere in the world for the first time in real- time), about wealth, about living. They succumbed to ressentiment, as activated anti- Oedipal force or desire is turned around against itself, ‘pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself’ (Nietzsche cited: 234). Baudrillard referred to this self-hatred or backlash as the last stage in the liberation of the species, a paradoxical turning around against the self at the advanced stage of rationality and civilisation. ‘There is no need to posit a death drive at work, a biological nostalgia for a state prior to individuation and sex’,22 just a reflexive mortification as we glimpse the degree to which the soul has lost its grandeur. Two post-psychoanalytic strands took shape during the past half century. First, the non-erotic infantile logic based in hurt and trauma; second, the “nonhuman erotic” spirited on by neo-Reichians and anti- Oedipeans with their desiring machines and molecular rhizomal energies. Both strands claim a psychoanalytic heritage; both have polemicised an aspect of Freud to the detriment of his whole opus. And now it is probably too late to rescue that whole thing. Sloterdijk noted that psychoanalysis lacked thymos and thymotic potential, what he called a “bank of rage.” Instead of mobilising prideful rage, honour and ambition, we domesticated rage, turning it into hurt, while becoming preoccupied with sex as an end in itself. In short, we went crazy about both love and humility, creating ‘subcultures in which beautiful souls sent one another messages of love’.23 The interruption of pride for the sake of a libidinal politics entirely suits contemporary capitalist consumerism, buying off the dignity of human beings with gadgets as concessions. Pride, dignity and honour are not part of the psychoanalytic lexicon. Instead they have become pathologised by ‘the thymos-forgetting therapeutic culture … in the tradition of Christian moralists’.24 The rage generated in the pages of Anti- Oedipus against familial domestication in all its forms is a great burst of freedom, a mass break-out and escape- release of great thymotic potential. Why in practice does it fall back to earth in narcissistic ruins, a failed project easily reterritorialised by the capitalist machine? In the last chapter of Rage and Time, called “The Dispersal of Rage in the Era of the Centre,” Sloterdijk points to this diffusion of desire where ‘every individual is turned into a consumption citizen, who unless uplifted by family, cultural and cooperative counter- forces, is increasingly fixed to a poisoned loneliness with a doomed irritation of desire’.25 Desire per se, destined for total liberation by anti- Oedipeans, forever free and untrammelled, becomes just an irritation. Enzenberger, seeming to echo Anti- Oedipus, refers to “molecular civil wars.” ‘The reality is that civil war has long since moved into the metropolis’. As Enzensberger26 says, ‘The beginning is bloodless, the evidence circumstantial. Molecular civil war starts unnoticed; there is no general mobilization’. Rubbish accumulates, syringes and broken bottles appear in the park, graffiti is daubed on the walls. In schools and colleges, classroom furniture is smashed. These are ‘muted declarations of war which any experienced city- dweller can interpret’. Then, tyres are slashed, cars set on fire. In one incident after another, rage is vented, hate turns on anything that works, and forms an insoluble amalgam with self- hate’. He concludes, ‘its only message [is] one of autism’.27 Not dispersal of rage, but a free-floating random affair, a lone-gunman syndrome – molecular, atomistic, homicidal- suicidal. The desiring machines exact their revenge for their wholesale failure to break through and break out by turning themselves into rage machines. Add self- radicalisation here as Islamism is a ready conduit for rage. The flowers are turned into weeds, dominated not by Oedipus and daddy, but by mommy alone, or indeed by no one at all. Be orphan. Be nomad. Be free. Go viral: ‘Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don’t sow, grow offshoots! Don’t be one, be multiple, be multiplicities!’28 Free – to be bereaved, homeless, rootless, aimless “singularities” with “enjoyments,” left absolutely alone with ‘the unconscious that produces itself in a cyclical orphan movement’ (319). The wreck of psychoanalysis is to be found at these two extremes: at the weedy end with mommy, safe but fragile; or with mommy and daddy slaughtered long ago as part of the libidinised, schizo killing machines – ‘knowing nothing of persons … nothing of the ego’ (392) – in total indifference creating a level killing field and a race to the bottom- anus- shit. If you take schizoanalysis seriously you seem bound to end as a speck on a pseudopodium of the erotic (Foucault), or a green- fly parasite consumer sucking on the erotic juices of Capitalism. No effective thymotic, no bank of rage, no balls, just generalised neurasthenia and stress. Every bridge back (to civilisation) has been burned by the scorched earth deterritorialisations of capitalism and schizoanalysis, with no way of deciding about these mass “enjoyments,” daring not even to venture a judgement. Sloterdijk shares our disillusion with a reference to Lacan. ‘In its pretension to co-form a revolutionary subject, politicised psychoanalysis failed miserably’. So, as a half-way house to revolution, ‘the new purists [Lacanians] mark themselves off from everything to do with sense-giving, interpretation, construction, life-projects, because this would once again put into play the need to explain people normatively, to develop positive ideas of culture [civilisation], and introduce creative processes’.29 By retaining notions such as castration, the Law, the Symbolic, they are still part of the kill-joy processes, while pretending to be otherwise. As our authors say, psychoanalysis spans a mixed semiotic. On the one hand, ‘a despotic regime of significance and interpretation’, and on the other, ‘an authoritarian regime of subjectification and prophetism’. Between the fetishised authority of the unconscious and the aura of the silent analyst: ‘[T]he worst, most underhanded of powers are founded on it’ (138). For its part, however, romanticised schizoanalysis has been influential. Like Zarathustra, these romantics know incredible sufferings and sicknesses. Fifty or more years on are they still remarkable? ‘They must reinvent each gesture. But such a man produces himself as a free man, irresponsible, solitary and joyous, finally able to say and do something in his own name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing …’ (142).

### Deleuze Stuff v PEss

#### We offer an ethics of affirmation: a joyous politics of transforming negative affects into ones that affirm life. Ethics is the dictum that we will never cease affirming multiplicity, relational connections, and the emergence of the New. To affirm becoming is to recognize the joyful potential for everything to be weaponized, subverted, and rendered active.

Braidotti ‘6 /Rosi, Utrecht University and Birkbeck College, “Affirmation versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates” *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy*, vol. 10, no. 1, Spring / Printemps 2006, pp 235-254/

The ethics of affirmation, with its emphasis on moving across the pain and transforming it into activity, may seem counter-intuitive. In our culture people go to great lengths to ease all pain, but especially the pain of uncertainty about identity, origin, and belonging. Great distress follows from not knowing or not being able to articulate the source of one’s suffering, or from knowing it all too well, all the time. People who have been confronted by the irreparable, the unbearable, the insurmountable, the traumatic and inhuman event will do anything to find solace, resolution, and also compensation. The yearning for these measures— solace, closure, justice—is all too understandable and worthy of respect. Nowadays, this longing is both supported and commercially exploited by genetics and its application to tracking of racial and territorial origins. The ethical dilemma was already posed by Jean-François Lyotard in Le Differend and, much earlier, by Primo Levi about the survivors of Nazi concentration camps: the kind of vulnerability human beings experience in face of events on the scale of high horror is something for which no adequate compensation is even thinkable, let alone applicable. There is an incommensurability of the suffering involved for which no measure of compensation is possible—a hurt or wound beyond repair. This means that the notion of justice in the sense of a logic of rights and reparation is not applicable in a quantifiable manner. For Lyotard, in keeping with the poststructuralist em phasis on the ethical dimension on the problem, ethics consists in accepting the impossibility of adequate compensation, and living with the open wound. On the contrary, contemporary culture has taken the opposite direction: it has favored, encouraged, and rewarded a public morality based on the twin principles of claims and compensation**,** as if financial settlements could provide the answer to the injury suffered, the pain endured, and the long-lasting effects of the injustice. Cases that exemplify this trend are the compensation for the Shoah in the sense of restitution of stolen property, artworks, and bank deposits. Similar claims have been made by the descendants of slaves forcefully removed from Africa to North America (Gilroy, 2000), and more recently compensation for damages caused by Soviet communism, notably the confiscation of properties across eastern Europe, from Jewish and other former citizens. The ethics of affirmation is about suspending the quest for both claims and compensation, resisting the logic of retribution of rights and taking instead a different road. In order to understand this move it is important to de-psychologize the discussion of affirmation. Affectivity is intrinsically understood as positive: it is the force that aims at fulfilling the subject’s capacity for interaction and freedom. It is Spinoza’s conatus, or the notion of potentia as the affirmative aspect of power. It is joyful and pleasure-prone, and it is immanent in that it coincides with the terms and modes of its expression. This means concretely that ethical behavior confirms, facilitates, and enhances the subject’s potentia, as the capacity to express his/her freedom. The positivity of this desire to express one’s innermost and constitutive freedom (conatus, potentia, or becoming) is conducive to ethical behavior, however, only if the subject is capable of making it endure, thus allowing it to sustain its own impetus. Unethical behavior achieves the opposite: it denies, hinders, and diminishes that impetus or is unable to sustain it. Affirmation is therefore not naive optimism or Candide-like unrealism. It is about endurance and transformation. Endurance is self-affirmation. It is also an ethical principle of affirmation of the positivity of the intensive subject—its joyful affirmation as potentia. The subject is a spatio-temporal compound which frames the boundaries of processes of becoming. This works by transforming negative into positive passions through the power of an understanding that is no longer indexed upon a phallogocentric set of standards, but is rather unhinged and therefore affective. This sort of turning of the tide of negativity is the transformative process of achieving freedom of understanding through the awareness of our limits, of our bondage. This results in the freedom to affirm one’s essence as joy, through encounters and minglings with other bodies, entities, beings, and forces. Ethics means faithfulness to this potentia, or the desire to become. Deleuze defines the latter with reference to Bergson’s concept of “duration,” thus proposing the notion of the subject as an entity that lasts, that endures sustainable changes and transformation and enacts them around him/herself in a community or collectivity. Affirmative ethics rests on the idea of sustainability as a principle of containment and tolerable development of a subject’s resources, understood environmentally, affectively, and cognitively. A subject thus constituted inhabits a time that is the active tense of continuous “becoming.” Endurance has therefore a temporal dimension: it has to do with lasting in time—hence duration and self-perpetuation. But it also has a spatial side to do with the space of the body as an enfleshed field of actualization of passions or forces. It evolves affectivity and joy, as in the capacity for being affected by these forces, to the point of pain or extreme pleasure, which come to the same; it means putting up with hardship and physical pain. The point, however, is that extreme pleasure or extreme pain—which may score the same on a Spinozist scale of ethology of affects—are of course not the same. On the reactive side of the equation, endurance points to the struggle to sustain the pain without being annihilated by it. It also introduces a temporal dimension about duration in time. This is linked to memory: intense pain, a wrong, a betrayal, a wound are hard to forget. The traumatic impact of painful events fixes them in a rigid, eternal present tense out of which it is difficult to emerge. This is the eternal return of that which precisely cannot be endured and returns in the mode of the unwanted, the untimely, the un-assimilated or in-appropriate/ d. They are also, however, paradoxically difficult to remember, insofar as re-membering entails re trieval and repetition of the pain itself. Psychoanalysis, of course, has been here before (Laplanche, 1976). The notion of the return of the repressed is the key to the logic of unconscious remembrance, but it is a secret and somewhat invisible key which condenses space into the spasm of the symptom and time into a short-circuit that mines the very thinkability of the present. Kristeva’s notion of the abject (1980) expresses clearly the temporality involved in psychoanalysis—by stressing the structural function played by the negative, the incomprehensible, the unthinkable, the other of understandable knowledge. Deleuze calls this alterity “Chaos” and defines it ontologically as the virtual formation of all possible form. Lacan, on the other hand—and Derrida with him, I would argue—defines Chaos epistemologically as that which precedes form, structure, and language. This makes for two radically divergent conceptions of time and negativity. That which is incomprehensible for Lacan, following Hegel, is the virtual for Deleuze, following Spinoza, Bergson, and Leibnitz. This produces a number of significant shifts: from negative to affirmative; from entropic to generative; from incomprehensible, meaningless, and crazy to virtual waiting to be actualized; from constituting constitutive outsides to a geometry of affects that require mutual synchronization; from a melancholy and split to an open-ended web-like subject; from the epistemological to the ontological turn in poststructuralist philosophy. This introduces a temporal dimension into the discussion that leads to the very conditions of possibility of the future, to futurity as such. For an ethics of sustainability, the expression of positive affects is that which makes the subject last or endure. It is like a source of long-term energy at the affective core of subjectivity (Grosz, 2004). Nietzsche has also been here before, of course. The eternal return in Nietzsche is the repetition, yet neither in the compulsive mode of neurosis nor in the negative erasure that m arks the traumatic event. It is the eternal return of and as positivity (Ansell-Pearson, 1999). This kind of ethics addresses the affective structure of pain and suffering but does not locate the ethical instance within it, be it in the mode of compassionate witnessing (Bauman 1993; 1998) or empathic co-presence. In a nomadic, Deleuzian- Nietzschean perspective, ethics is essentially about transformation of negative into positive passions, that is, about moving beyond the pain. This does not mean denying the pain but rather activating it, working it through. Again, the positivity here is not supposed to indicate a facile optimism or a careless dismissal of human suffering. What is positive in the ethics of affirmation is the belief that negative affects can be transformed. This implies a dynamic view of all affects, even those that freeze us in pain, horror, or mourning. Affirmative nomadic ethics puts the motion back into e-motion and the active back into activism, introducing movement, process, and becoming. This shift makes all the difference to the patterns of repetition of negative emotions. What is negative about negative affects is not a value judgment (any more than it is for the positivity of difference), but rather the effect of arrest, blockage, and rigidification that comes as a result of an act of violence, betrayal, a trauma—or which can be self-perpetuated through practices that our culture simultaneously chastises as self-destructive and cultivates as a mode of discipline and punishment: all forms of mild and extreme addictions, differing degrees of abusive practices that mortify and glorify the bodily matter, from binging to bodily modifications. Abusive, addictive, or destructive practices do not merely destroy the self but harm the self’s capacity to relate to others, both human and non-human others. Thus they harm the capacity to grow in and through others and become others. Negative passions diminish our capacity to express the high levels of interdependence, the vital reliance on others, which is the key to a non-unitary and dynamic vision of the subject. What is negated by negative passions is the power of life itself, as the dynamic force, vital flows of connections and becomings. This is why they should not be encouraged, nor should we be rewarded for lingering around them too long. Negative passions are black holes. An ethics of affirmation involves the transformation of negative into positive passions: resentment into affirmation, as Nietzsche put it. The practice of transforming negative into positive passions is the process of reintroducing time, movement, and transformation into a stifling enclosure saturated with unprocessed pain. It is a gesture of affirmation of hope in the sense of affirming the possibility of moving beyond the stultifying effects of the pain, the injury, the injustice. This is a gesture of displacement of the hurt, which fully contradicts the twin logic of claims and compensation. This is achieved through a sort of de-personalization of the event, which is the ultimate ethical challenge. The displacement of the ego-indexed negative passions or affects reveals the fundamental senselessness of the hurt, the injustice, or injury one has suffered. “Why me?” is the refrain most commonly heard in situations of extreme distress. This expresses rage as well as anguish at one’s ill fate. The answer is plain: for no reason at all. Examples of this are the banality of e vil in large-scale genocides like the Holocaust (Arendt,1963), and the randomness of surviving them (think of Primo Levi who could/not endure his own survival). There is something intrinsically senseless about the pain or injustice: lives are lost or saved for all and no reason at all. Why did some go to work in the WTC on 9/11 while others missed the train? Why did Frida Kahlo take that tram which crashed so that she was impaled by a metal rod, and not the next one? For no reason at all. Reason has nothing to do with it**.** That is precisely the point. Contrary to the traditional morality that follows a rationalist and legalistic model of possible interpretation of the wrongs one suffered to a logic of responsibility, claim, and compensation, affirmative ethics rests on the notion of the random access to the phenomena that cause pain (or pleasure). This is not fatalism, and even less resignation, but rather amor fati. This is a crucial difference: we have to be worthy of what happens to us and rework it within an ethics of relation. Of course, repugnant and unbearable events do happen. Ethics consists, however, in reworking these events in the direction of positive relations. This is not carelessness or lack of compassion, but rather a form of lucidity that acknowledges the impossibility of finding an adequate answer to the question about the source, the origin, the cause of the ill fate, the painful event, the violence suffered. Acknowledging the futility of even trying to answer that question is a starting point. Edouard Glissant (1991) provides a perfect example of this productive ethics in his work on race and racism. An ethical relation cannot be based on resentment or resignation, but rather on the affirmation of positivity. Every event contains within it the potential for being overcome and overtaken; its negative charge can be transposed. The moment of the actualization is also the moment of its neutralization. “Every event is like death, double and impersonal in its double,” argues Deleuze (1990, 152). The free subject, the ethical subject is the one with the ability to grasp the freedom to depersonalize the event and transform its negative charge. The focus thus shifts to asking the adequate questions. Adequateness, both the logic of claim and compensation, lies at the heart of the ethical stance. This requires a double shift: of the pain itself—from the frozen or reactive effect to proactive affirmation—and of the line of questioning—from the quest for the origin or source to a process of elaboration of the kind of questions that express and enhance a subject’s capacity to achieve freedom through the understanding of its limitations. What is an adequate ethical question? One that is capable of sustaining the subject in his/her quest for more interrelations with others, that is, more Life, motion, change, transformation, and potentia. The adequate ethical question provides the subject with a frame for interaction and change, growth and movement. It affirms life as difference-at-work. An ethical question had to be adequate in relation to how much a body can take, which is the notion of sustainability. How much can an embodied entity take in the mode of interrelations and connections, that is, how much freedom of action can we endure? That is the question. It assumes, following Nietzsche, that humanity does not stem from freedom, but rather that freedom is extracted out of the awareness of limitations. Ethics is about freedom from the weight of negativity, freedom through the understanding of our bondage. A certain amount of pain, the knowledge about vulnerability and pain, is actually useful. It forces one to think about the actual material conditions of being interconnected and thus being in the world. It frees one from the stupidity of perfect health, and the full-blown sense of existential entitlement that comes with it. Paradoxically, it is those who have already cracked up a bit, those who have suffered pain and injury, who are better placed to take the lead in the process of ethical transformation. Because they are already on the other side of some existential divide, they are anomalous in some way —but in a positive way, for Deleuze (1969, 1988). Their anomaly deterritorializes the force of habit and introduces a powerful element of productive difference. They know about endurance, adequate forces, and the importance of Relations. Marxist epistemology and feminist standpoint theory have always acknowledged the privileged knowing position of those in the “margins.” Postcolonial theory displaces the dialectics of center-margin and locates the force of discursive production. Affirmative ethics is on the same wavelength: only those who have been hurt are in a position not to return the violence and hence make a positive difference. In order to do so, however, they have to become-minoritarian, that is, transcend the logic of negativity (claim and compensation) and transform the negative affect into something active and productive. The center being dead and empty of active force, it is on the margins that the processes of becoming can be initiated. It is also crowded on the margins. The figure of Nelson Mandela—a contemporary secular saint—comes to mind, as does the world-historical phenomenon that is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa. This is a case of repetition that engenders difference and does not install the eternal return of revenge and negative affects, a massive exercise in transformation of negativity into something more livable, more life-enhancing. Christianity has tried to be here before. It has had an important input in the work of Cornell West, bell hooks, and other spiritually-m inded activists today, especially in reconstituting a sense of community and mutual responsibility in places devastated by hatred and mutual suspicion. Affirmative nomadic ethics is profoundly secular and it refuses simply to turn the other cheek. It proclaims the need to construct collectively positions of active, positive interconnections and relations that can sustain a web of mutual dependence, an ecology of multiple belongings. It is a case of extracting freedom from the awareness of limits. For the affirmative ethics of sustainability, it is always already a question of life and death**.** Being on the edge of too-muchness, or of unsustainability, surfing on the borders of the intolerable is another way of describing the process of becoming. Becoming marks a qualitative leap in the transformation of subjectivity and of its constitutive affects. It is a trip across different fields of perception, different spatio-temporal coordinates. Mostly it transforms negativity into affirmative affects: pain into compassion, loss into a sense of bonding, isolation into care. It is simultaneously a slowing down of the rhythm of daily frenzy and an acceleration of awareness, connection to others, self-knowledge and sensorial perception. Ethics includes the acknowledgment of and compassion for pain, as well as the activity of working through it. Any process of change must do some sort of violence to deeply engrained habits and dispositions which got consolidated in time. Overcoming these engrained habits is a necessary disruption, without which there is no ethical awakening. Consciousness- raising is not free of pain. The utterance: “I can’t take it anymore!” far from being an admission of defeat, marks the threshold and hence the condition of possibility for creative encounters and productive changes. This is how the ethical dimension appears through the mass of fragments and shreds of discarded habits that are characteristic of our times. The ethical project is not the same as the implementation of ruling standards of morality. It rather concerns the norms and values, the standards and criteria that can be applied to the quest for sustainable, that is to say for newly negotiated limits. Limits are to be rethought in terms of an ethics of becoming, through a non-Hegelian notion of “limits” as thresholds, that is to say points of encounter and not of closure, living boundaries and not fixed walls. The joint necessity for both the pursuit of social change and in-depth transformation, as well as for an ethics of endurance and sustainability, is important to stress because critical and creative thinkers and activists who pursue change have often experienced the limits or the boundaries like open wounds or scars. The generation that came of age politically in the seventies has taken enormous risks and has enjoyed the challenges they entailed. A lot was demanded and expected from life and most ended up getting it, but it was not only a joy ride. An ethical evaluation of the costs involved in pursuing alternative visions, norms, and values is important in the present context where the alleged “end of ideology” is used as a pretext for neoliberal restoration that terminates all social experiments. It is necessary to find a way to combine transformative politics with affirmative ethics so as to confront the conceptual and social contradictions of our times. Sustainable affirmative ethics allows us to contain the risks while pursuing the original project of transformation. This is a way to resist the dominant ethos of our conservative times that idolizes the new as a consumerist trend while thundering against those who believe in change. Cultivating the ethics of living intensely in the pursuit of change is a political act.

#### Venerating injuries as the starting point for activism traps identity in the shame of the past impotence in face of those wounds, which re-inscribes powerlessness. It becomes locked in a cycle of revenge, constructing hostile external threats to blame as a symptom-treatment to ressentiment

**Brown 93** (Wendy. The First Professor of Political Science at the University of California. “Wounded Attachments”. Political Theory. August 1993. JSTOR)//JuneC//

**Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and "reaction" to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning that Nietzsche ascribed to it, namely, as an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in "reaction"-the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds-and not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction**. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought, **Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is a reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. If ressentiment's "cause" is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds." This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"23 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege" as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery."** But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressenti- ment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This invest- ment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recogni- tion predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfac- tions of revenge that ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alter- nately denies the very possibility of these things or blames those who experience them for their own condition. **Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverses without subverting this blaming structure: it does not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal indi- vidualism presupposes nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile extemal world."**25 Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reac- tion to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. **Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impo- tence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation. Indeed it is more likely to punish and reproach-"punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself'-than to find venues of self-affirming action.26 But contemporary politicized identity's desire is not only shaped by the extent to which the sovereign will of the liberal subject, articulated ever more nakedly by disciplinary individuation and capitalist disinternments, is dom- inated by late twentieth-century configurations of political and economic powers**. **It is shaped as well by the contemporary problematic of history itself, by the late modern rupture of history as a narrative, history as ended because it has lost its end, a rupture that paradoxically produces an immeasurable heaviness to history. As the grim experience of reading Discipline and Punish makes clear, there is a sense in which the gravitational force of history is multiplied at precisely the moment that history's narrative coherence and objectivist foundation is refuted**. As the problematic of power in history is resituated from subject positioning to subject formation, power is seen to operate spatially, infiltrationally, "microphysically" rather than only tempo- rally; it is also seen to permeate and construct every heretofore designated "interior" space in social orders and in subjects. As the erosion of historical metanarratives takes with them both laws of history and the futurity such laws purported to assure, the presumed continuity of history is replaced with a sense of its violent, contingent, and ubiquitousforce. History becomes that which has weight but no trajectory, mass but no coherence, force but no direction; it is war without ends or end. Thus the extent to which "dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living" is today unparalleled even as history itself disintegrates as coherent category or practice. We know ourselves to be saturated by history, we feel the extraor- dinary force of its determinations; we are also steeped in a discourse of its insignificance, and above all, we know that history will no longer (always already did not) act as our redeemer. **I raise the question of history because in thinking about late modem politicized identity's structuring by ressentiment, I have thus far focused on its foundation in the sufferings of a subordinated sovereign subject. But Nietzsche's account of the logic of ressentiment is also tethered to that feature of the will that is stricken by history, that rails against time itself, that cannot "will backwards," that cannot exert its power over the past-either as a specific set of events or as time itself:** Willing liberates but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? 'It was'-that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. **Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past.... He cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.27 Although Nietzsche appears here to be speaking of the will as such, Zarathustra's own relationship to the will as a "redeemer of history" makes clear that this "angry spectatorship" can with great difficulty be reworked as a perverse kind of mastery, a mastery that triumphs over the past by reducing its power, by remaking the present against the terms of the past-in short, by a project of self-transformation that arrays itself against its own genealogical consciousness.** In contrast with the human ruin he sees everywhere around him-"fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents"-it is Zarathustra's own capacity to discern and to make a future that spares him from a rancorous sensibility, from crushing disappointment in the liberatory promise of his will: **The now and the past on earth-alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which much come.** **A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future-and alas, also as it were, a cripple at this bridge: all this is Zarathustra.28 Nietzsche here discerns both the necessity and the near impossibility-the extraordinary and fragile achievement-of formulating oneself as a creator of the future and a bridge to the future in order to appease the otherwise inevitable rancor of the will against time, in order to redeem the past by lifting the weight of it, by reducing the scope of its determinations. "**And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and redeemer of accidents?"29 **Of course, Zarathustra's exceptionality in what he is willing to confront and bear, in his capacities to overcome in order to create, is Nietzsche's device for revealing us to ourselves. The ordinary will, steeped in the economy of slave morality, devises means "to get rid of his melancholy and to mock his dungeon" that reiterate the cause of the melancholy, that continually reinfect the narcissistic wound to its capaciousness inflicted by the past.** "Alas," says Nietzsche, "every prisoner becomes a fool; and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly.

#### The alt affirms the Black aleatory body as a rhizomatic line of flight whose existence exceeds and precedes any formal ontological structure. Blackness is a “rhizome” – a flowing and creative force which overflows structuralist accounts of antagonism. We must decenter the frame of political ontology to enable resistance grounded in micropolitical pragmatics.

**Kline ’17** (David Kline, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Religion at Rice University, “The Pragmatics of Resistance: Framing Anti-Blackness and the Limits of Political Ontology,” *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, pg. 63 - 66, *Emory Debate*)

Chandler is describing the way Blackness—in all of its social scope and complexity—**overflows** or breaks open the boundaries of any formal imposition, the way Blackness cannot be reduced to a frame of abjection or the irreconcilable position of an antagonism. From this perspective, Blackness is a **rhizome**, a dynamic, **creative**, and **desiring** counter-force in which **lines of flight** present possible modes of freedom and sociality in excess to political ontological positioning. As a paraontological phenomenon, Chandler and Moten understand Blackness as a unique and specific exertion within modernity—which might also be called the historical regime of racial political ontology—that challenges every schema of formalization and [End Page 63] positional fixity. In this way, from this vantage, the history of Blackness is read as a history of a certain performativity of the drive towards a freedom not determined by the terms or boundaries of ontology, as a history of the object’s absolute objection to the macropolitical capture of identity. This paraontological movement of Black fugitivity, as Moten has coined it, calls into question the framing of Blackness wholly within a political ontology that seeks to index and describe Black life in terms of pure abjection.

Again, Moten and Chandler do not in any way downplay the abjection to which Blackness is given in the modern world. Indeed, Moten considers his project and that of Afro-pessimism as two sides of a mutual project where “Black optimism and Afro-pessimism are asymptotic” (Moten 2014, 778). Yet, by insisting on the possibilities of Black life within an immanent and micropolitical field of becoming that moves in resistance to a rigid political ontology of social death, Moten taps into something vital that precedes the force of imposition, the force of law, or the force of the structure of White supremacy and its sedimented political ontological order. In this way, he also expands the frame of analysis and praxis so that a much wider field of resources and possibilities are available in terms of a project of liberation that goes beyond the political ontological frame.

This is where I suggest the **decentering** of political ontology and the inclusion of the **Black aleatory body** as the site of struggle, evasion, and creation becomes a pragmatic mode of framing the problem and thinking a purely practical politics of both **spontaneous creation** and a **calculated movement** against the political ontological regime of anti-Blackness. Although Moten would certainly object to describing this turn by way of a “pragmatic politics,” I suggest that his “Black optimism” and Chandler’s paraontology find congruence with a kind of Foucaultian-Deleuzian pragmatics which, as Paul Patton describes Deleuze’s philosophy, “[enables] a form of description which is immediately practical” and an “ethico-political conception of philosophy as oriented towards the possibility of change” (Patton 2003, 16, 17). From this angle, the **accurate representation** of an **ontological reality**, while certainly necessary and crucial to the task of naming the full scope of the problem and thinking a way forward, does not take precedence over the task of **creating new concepts** and lines of flight that should be judged on their effectiveness not in terms of properly representing an ontological problem, but in terms of their concrete effects within a **wide field of contexts**, specific socio-political problems, and conjunctures. As Deleuze and Guattari describe how pragmatics marks a study attuned to the complexity, [End Page 64] contingency, and potential danger that defines the micropolitical, “the study of the dangers of each line is the object of pragmatics or **schizoanalysis**, to the extent that it undertakes not to represent, interpret, or symbolize, but only to **make maps** and **draw lines**, marking their mixtures as well as their distinctions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 227). Pragmatics, in this way, is all about drawing lines and making maps against macropolitical sedimentations that lead somewhere, that **create something new.**

Such pragmatic orientation is especially pertinent in the contemporary biopolitical frame as Foucault understands it. As I’ve already described, Foucault’s biopolitics is premised on the idea that when politics takes the biological body as its primary aim and object, as opposed to sovereign power’s object of the legal subject and its constitutive negative, then there is introduced into politics the possibility, as Cary Wolfe notes, “for life to burst through power’s systematic operations in ways that are more and more difficult to anticipate” (Wolfe 2014, 158). The **increasing complexity** of bodily knowledge and the power that takes this knowledge as its operating principle means that both **risk** and **possibility** increase in terms of what the body can do and what can be done to the body. The pragmatic thrust of this emerges when situating it at the level of micropolitics, where, as I’ve been describing, Deleuze and Guattari locate the conditions for lines of flight and where “there is always something that flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding machine” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 216). Out of any sedimentation there will always be deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The pragmatic possibility or potential, then, is that there is always a simultaneity of the micropolitical and the macropolitical that provides the conditions for an ongoing search for **new** **tactics**, orientations, assemblages, vocabularies, and **processes of becoming** that are aimed practically towards change: “What matters is to break through the wall, even if one has to become-black like John Brown. George Jackson. **‘I may take flight, but all the while I am fleeing, I will be looking for a weapon!”** (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, 277). This emphasis on pragmatics and lines of flight—both in potentially negative and positive terms (i.e. in terms of pure contingency)—provides a much more expansive level for framing the problem of anti-Blackness that is not reducible to fixed political ontological positions and the macropolitical plane.

Finally, I suggest this kind of pragmatics is what Moten and Harney describe as “fugitive planning and Black study,” what Jack Halberstam [End Page 65] characterizes simply as “reaching out to find connection” (Moten and Harney 2013, 5). Pragmatics finds a footing in the highly dynamic and shifting terrain of power relations and its multiplicity of conjunctures that signal the condition of movement and connection. It finds its enactment in sites such as “the little Negro’s church and logos and gathering, this gathering in and against the word, alongside and through the word and the world as hold, manger, wilderness, tomb, upper room, and cell” (Moten 2014, 775). Within these and other sites of micropolitical connection and the practices that take place in them, there is flight, resistance, and the creation of something new and productive. The **inclusion** of these sites and practices within the analytical frame and critique of anti-Blackness provide a much wider set of resources for thinking the complexity of the full scope of the political field that exists in excess to the political ontological frame, and, in the same way, orients the fight against anti-Blackness in practical (though potentially no less revolutionary), rather than apocalyptic, terms. This, I argue, does not have to mitigate or pass over Sexton’s call that “slavery must be theorized maximally if its abolition is to reach the proper level” (Sexton 2011, 33). The maximum theorization of slavery and anti-Blackness does not need be completely hedged in by a political ontological frame. However, analytical expansion beyond the political ontological frame does mean locating a positive emphasis on what Sexton disparagingly identifies as a tendency towards “forces of mitigation that would transform the world through a coalition of a thousand tiny causes” (ibid.). Taking Sexton’s (and Wilderson’s) call of a maximum theorization of slavery/anti-Blackness with full seriousness, I wonder what the proper level of **abolition could possibly mean** other than a pragmatic coalition—or a **micropolitics**—of a **thousand tiny causes**. As I’ve argued, thinking what this might mean would certainly necessitate an expansive analytics of power relations flowing over a highly complex field of forces, intensities, technologies, and dispositifs that together form a micropolitical field far in excess of sovereign power and the political ontological frame. Out of such an analytics, a pragmatics that finds its possibility in the micropolitical field of movement and flight emerges as the condition for an ongoing life of resistance, connection, and a movement toward freedom. [End Page 66]

#### The idea of a completely pure rejection of the anti-black world both homogenizes experience and traps the figure of the Black as a fungible anchor for revolutionary impulse.

Walsh 15 [Shannon, “The Philosopher and His Poor: The Poor-Black as Object for Political Desire in South Africa,” *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Volume 42, Issue 1, 2015, June 17, 2015]

Fantasy, optimism and the poor-Black as object

While Rancière claims that the poor as object creates possibility for the philosopher, Frank Wilderson goes further. Wilderson (2010) argues that the Human itself is forged through the denial of humanity to the Black.5 Through situating the Black as anti-human, object and voiceless, the Human is thus constituted. In South Africa, the Philosopher's poor is also, always, Black.

For the academic Left, I would argue that there is a cruelly optimistic attachment or relation with a fungible poor-Black. This optimistic relation is bound up with emancipatory, and sometimes pseudo-revolutionary, desires for another possible world. This attachment or relation is not limited to South Africa, but very often it is Black bodies (or the bodies of indigenous people) who are objectified for this kind of fantasy to play out. The fundamental antagonism is one in which the poor-Black is a repository for the projected desires and longings of (white) revolutionary fantasy—a strange nostalgia of some impossible vanquished time that existed in the pure space of non-knowledge.

Lauren Berlant reminds us that your desire misrecognizes a given object as that which will restore you to something that you sense effectively as a hole in you. Your object, then, does not express transparently who you ‘are’ but says something about what it takes for you to anchor yourself in space and time. (2011, 110)

This is a romance between the Human and the necessarily non-Human, the Other, which is always fantasy. The poor-Black becomes object onto which revolutionary desires can be projected and fantasized. For the revolutionary fantasy to hold, they must remain in their wretchedness, must remain as objects denied the complex existence—the being Human—enjoyed by those who hold the power of representation and fantasy construction. Of course, the horrible irony of such a situation is that while the poor-Black as an object of desire might offer an anchor for such ‘fantasmic investments’ towards a better world for the Left, in so doing it effectively denies that world from ever appearing. For how can such a world erupt from such a depraved and violent denial of being?

The fantasy of the fungible poor-Black is a romance full of optimism and aspirations, as well as full of dangerous denials and objectifications. Ultimately it is also a romance like any other: full of false hopes, good intentions and lots of fantasy (Bob 2005; Levenson 2012). The implication of leaving behind revolutionary subjectivities as vestibules for political optimism and hope is difficult, but it must be done. Indeed a critique of the ways social movements, and the poor-Black, have been constructed, and at times desired, in Left academia is crucial, and one that I hope will open spaces for reimagining what solidarity could look like. This is no easy task. As Berlant (2013) reflects,

All political movements … are complicated spaces where the courageous insistence on interrupting the reproduction of toxic normativity is a relief from resignation to life. But every movement that we've ever been in reproduces issues of inequality around race, gender, sexuality and education, along with the inevitable personality glitches. That also can be devastating.

Berlant encourages a dose of humour to counter the devastation, to laugh at the foibles, missteps and false romances. I sincerely hope that the fantasy can be abandoned, that there can be a way forward that will include a transparent reflection on the nature and exercise of political power within and around social movements in South Africa, reflection that takes seriously race, gender and institutional power.

## AT: Disability K

### 2AC – L/T – Disability

#### Populism creates ableism – Trump proves.

Harnish 16 [Andrew Harnish is an Assistant Professor of Writing at the University of Alaska Anchorage, 11-15-2016, Ableism and the Trump phenomenon, Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684] Eric

The rural, white working class offered Donald Trump unprecedented support in the 2016 US presidential campaign (Collingwood [2016](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684)). Some analysts have pointed to the power of Trump’s racist rhetoric in winning these voters (Matthews [2016](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684); Yglesias [2016](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684)). Others have noted the pull of his populist economic promises (Guo [2016](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684); Casselman [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684)). Yet Trump also used ableist rhetoric to court rural, working-class whites; his repeated use of metaphors equating bodily difference with weakness and failure played to a fear of disability that is deeply embedded in rural, white working-class culture. This fear has been magnified by the damage to working-class communities wrought by technological change and the neoliberal policies of deregulation, entitlement ‘reform,’ and disinvestment in the welfare state. Trump’s own bodily difference is also important in any understanding of his popularity with rural, working-class whites. His spectacular and even, at times, debilitated-seeming embodiment mirrors the often debilitated state of many rural, white working-class Americans, whose lack of appreciation for the values of thoroughgoing diversity too often primes them to endorse exclusive definitions of ‘normativity’ that do violence to those who are not ‘like’ them.

### AT: Ableism Alt

#### Engaging the state and coalition-forming is key to successful disability rights advocacy

Dr. Mario **Levesque 20** - Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Mount Allison University. PhD from McMaster University. (“Characteristics of Disability Leaders: An Atlantic Canada Profile,” Canadian Journal of Disability Studies, February 2020, <https://cjds.uwaterloo.ca/index.php/cjds/article/download/599/873/> ) PJW

Discussion and Conclusion This article developed a profile of Atlantic Canadian disability leaders in terms of tasks performed and leadership styles in order to take stock of the existing skill sets and to identify gaps in needed skills so as to enhance services delivery in government-disability nonprofit partnerships. It did so in relation to government disability program officials and executive directors of disability organizations, the latter of which included a scan of their boards of directors to assess their impact. At a broad level, we are seeing disability organizations in a struggle to survive let alone thrive in a period of increasing needs for disability services. For executive directors, the emphasis was on contract implementation with fundraising and budgeting issues closely behind. This placed a premium on skills used—people, management, capacity and communication skills. In particular, people skills such as the ability to continually cultivate relationships with key individuals such as sponsors and **government officials are critical** and is at the heart of needed management skills such as fundraising and financial reporting skills. Relationship building is also key to organizational effectiveness given the need to develop staff while remaining flexible and collaborative in orientation in order to meet a diverse set of work objectives (the latter capacity skills). Cultivating relationships required effective oral and written communication skills, especially for grant writing. Far from a top down model of management as is often found in the for-profit sector, we found, in addition to an inclusive and collaborative model of management down to staff and clients, a notable outward need be similarly inclusive and collaborative in working with partner agencies and sponsors. The above results differed slightly for government disability officials. While the hierarchical top down model of management can be found in the significant upward need to meet the need or “manage” superiors, a large and significant role exists of managing outwards to **engage other** departments and **stakeholders** in order **to win support** for their initiatives. Evidence of this pressure can be found in the needed capacity skills: analysis and synthesis and in having a good understanding of how government worked in addition to key relationship and effective communication skills. Executive directors have also been challenged in the move to a competitive funding environment with many noting in interviews they wished they had had more exposure to financial issues and management. We also found executive directors challenged at times in working with their board of directors. Significant time was required to manage them given needed information and in filling gaps that remained to ensure the organization moved along. The results suggest that working with boards of directors was a “**necessary evil**” in that one could not get around it given regulations for nonprofit organizations, but the time devoted to such work necessarily took away from what could be devoted to working with client groups, staff and external stakeholders, especially for small to medium sized disability organizations. The result is that we are left with a **patchwork quilt of disability services** as **persons with disabilities have become customers in this neoliberal period** able to purchase needed services from a number of disability organizations. However, as citizens in a democratic society, this is troubling given people are not obtaining adequate services either because they cannot afford to or because of under provision of services thereby limiting their ability to equally participate in society. This is where a focus on disability rights can help balance the playing field. It was interesting to see this point made by a government disability official (NS 3). While this **may on the surface suggest a desire to minimize disability services**, that is, to provide only what one is legally entitled to provide in order to meet basic rights, **this was not the case**. Rather, as the individual explained, the challenge was in working across departmental silos and with other units within their own department in pursuing their goals, and where the need existed to not think in terms of costs. Instead, the question to be asked was one of “What’s best for the person in need of disability services?” and to then go from there. This underscored the fact that governments were poorly structured to meet the complex needs of persons with disabilities, at least until they begin using a cross-departmental person-centred approach, something which governments are poorly structured to do.

## AT: Empire K

### AT: Empire K

#### Priming of existential risk focuses on *compassion* which results in progressivism

Vail et al, 9 (Kenneth E. Vail III, University of Missouri Department of Psychological Sciences researcher, Jamie Arndt, University of Missouri psychology professor, Matt Motyl, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs Masters in Experimental Psychology, and Tom Pyszczynski, University of COlorado at Colorado Springs professor and co-developer of terror management theory; "Compassionate Values and Presidential Politics: Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, and Support for Barack Obama and John McCain in the 2008 Presidential Election," Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 263-266, IC)

The present findings extend those of Rothschild et al. (2009). Rothschild et al. showed that priming religious fundamentalists with compassionate values that were clearly tied to their religious foundations in either Christianity or Islam led to lower level of support for the use of violence against Iran among Americans and to less hostile attitudes toward the United States (including less support of martyrdom attacks) among Iranians; in the absence of priming these compassionate values, death reminders led to increased support for violence among both groups. The present study goes beyond a religious context to show that in the absence of being faced with compassionate values, death reminders increased support for John McCain; but when oriented toward compassionate values, MS increased support for Barack Obama. This study also provides convergent support for a growing number of findings that existential threat is capable of motivating defense of progressive, prosocial values like tolerance, egalitarianism, and empathy (Gailliot et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 1992; Rothschild et al., 2009; Schimel et al., 2006). Because people possess a variety of resources for buffering existential fear, terror management trajectories can be quite malleable. Thus, increasing the salience of a particular aspect of one’s cultural worldview, such as the prosocial value of compassion, can motivate increased adherence to this value after reminders of death. As such, examining the effects of MS in light of individual differences in progressive value orientation might be a useful direction for the future research on the psychology of politics and/or intergroup relations. For example, emerging research suggests that compassion might be found in the perception of interdependence among diverse groups of people, helping to reduce or eliminate reactionary, hostile forms of worldview defense. Motyl et al. (2009) report that priming a perception of a common humanity attenuated an increase in anti-Arab prejudice and hostile immigration policy among Americans reminded of death. This compassionate perception of a common humanity can also be observed, rather ominously, in universal dangers (i.e., global warming) that threaten humanity as a whole. In research conducted with both Americans and Palestinians living in Israel, Pyszczynski et al. (2009) demonstrated that the perception of such global threat bolsters support for peaceful coexistence in the face of increased death awareness. Future research on these values and concerns might provide useful directions for those seeking peace and political harmony among groups embroiled in long-standing conflicts. The present analysis of compassion also offers potential insights into understanding reactions to other political figures. Weise et al. (2008) found that MS motivated securely attached adults to support John Kerry instead of Bush. Given that secure attachment is linked to compassion and empathy (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2005), the existentially motivated activation of secure adult attachment systems may have increased support for Kerry to the extent that he was perceived as the more compassionate candidate. However, comparing the current study with Weise et al. suggests a crucial distinction between the ability of Obama and Kerry to capitalize on the MS-induced need to achieve psychological equanimity by rigorously defending culturally cherished values. Whereas both men might very well have been harbingers of compassion, for Kerry, this may have been obscured by his relatively dry speaking style and meeker presence; Obama, on the other hand, wore compassion on his sleeve (Steinhauser, 2008). Thus, it may have been that Obama’s frequent, eloquent outbursts of compassion boosted his support by priming thecultural defense of this value amid frequent discussion of issues involving reminders of mortality (e.g., healthcare, Iraqi occupation, Russian invasion of Georgia, etc.). It is important to note, however, that the present analysis does not imply that compassionate associations are limited only to Democratic candidates. Indeed, as the quote which opens this paper illustrates, then-President George W. Bush co-opted the term “compassionate conservative” during his second campaign, a move that may have helped garner support, assuming both that he was perceived as the more compassionate candidate and that such values were made salient. The present research also contributes to understanding the nature and specificity of responses to thoughts of death (cf, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006). Like a number of other studies, here we tested the impact of MS against that of personal uncertainty. Proponents of the uncertainty management model claim that MS effects are actually a result of increased personal uncertainty, which motivates efforts to regain a sense of certainty by defending the validity of one’s cultural worldview and confidently adhering to its norms and values (e.g., Van Den Bos, Poortvliet, Marjolein, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). The present study demonstrates that uncertainty concerns did not impact political preferences, or produce reactions to cultural values (e.g., compassion) similar to those triggered by MS. The recently proposed uncertainty-threat model (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) claims that uncertainty and mortality threat both produce a shift toward political conservatism. Critics of this model (e.g., Anson et al., in press; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), on the other hand, have argued that the motivated social-cognitive foundations (i.e., dogmatism; intolerance of ambiguity; personal need for closure, structure, or order; etc.) of political ideology are not limited to a conservative shift, but can readily trigger support for progressive change. The present study provides clear and direct evidence for the latter contention: MS-induced threat is indeed capable of motivating support for either conservative or progressive politicians, depending on the values that are salient at the time. This idea, however, does raise an interesting possibility with regard to interpreting the present effects. The compassionate value statements were designed for this study to directly emphasize the value of compassion. While the comparison statements were designed to lack such references, it is possible that these statements might have been construed as priming wisdom. Previous research (e.g., Landau et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2004, 2005) demonstrated that MS motivated increased support for authoritarian candidates, and for Bush specifically, without moderating factors such as a wisdom induction. This is consistent with the notion that Republican candidates tend to enjoy increased support from those reminded of mortality because these candidates tend to emphasize American superiority. However, McCain was considerably older than Obama and held his Senate seat for much longer; thus, he may have been seen as “wise” relative to Obama’s “na¨ıvete.” If this were the case, and if the neutral value condition’s statements did ´ prime wisdom, this may have motivated increased support for McCain after death reminders. While the participants in this study were by no means representative of the diverse American electorate, they provided crucial insight into the psychological impact of each candidate’s campaign and even of the candidates themselves. Embedded within a social climate boiling over with death reminders (e.g., war, terrorism, fear-mongering rhetoric, etc.), people may latch onto certain political leaders in an effort to affirm their faith in the permanence and validity of their particular culture. However, it would seem that the individual can achieve this leader-based worldview defense in several different ways. Depending on the salience of particular cultural values, a person might be motivated to follow a conservative leader who rigorously asserts the fundamental superiority of one’s culture and aggressively “defends” it from the clutches of evil, or they might be motivated to support progressive prototypes of their more compassionate social values. As Ernest Becker (1973, p. 139) concluded, “[The human] is a trembling animal who pulls the world down around his shoulders as he clutches for protection and support and tries to affirm in a cowardly way his feeble powers. The qualities of the leader, then, and the problems of people fit together in a natural symbiosis.

#### Imagining future pathways to conflict is essential to challenge *nuclear overconfidence* and spills-up to more responsible policy-making – even if we’re not completely correct, recognizing the *fragility of the nuclear order* is essential

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Full awareness of the limits of knowledge of and control over nuclear weapons is crucial for historical accuracy, for nuclear learning, and as a starting for a fruitful nuclear weapons policy debate that would include strategic, ethical, and political concerns. This awareness is all the more important as overconfidence has been shown to be a cause of increased danger. Therefore, learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis is essential given that, over the last thirty years, analysts have discovered and confirmed that it was one of the most dangerous events in the history of the nuclear age, the peaceful outcome of which was partly due to luck, and that in the preceding three decades they had been overconfident in the ability of good management to explain its peaceful outcome. In order to understand the construction of such overconfidence, I have accepted the idea that learning occurred mostly at the national level and focused on the French case, in comparative perspective. I have first shown how those scholarly findings have not been adequately refuted and argued that those who do not take these elements seriously have done so via epistemological or practical inconsistencies. The rejection of counterfactual thinking as a legitimate scholarly practice is another way of rendering these findings invisible without having to refute them. Finally, I have used the French example to show that an experience and official memory of the Crisis that is not based on fear does over time fuel overconfidence in the safety, controllability, and predictability of nuclear crises. American and British elites and populations did not grasp the full extent of the dangers at the time but, unlike the French, they certainly experienced fear. These ideational and disciplinary factors would be sufficient to prevent the problem from emerging as an issue of public concern in France; they also call for responsible nuclear scholarship to address them without waiting for structural or policy change. This opens up three avenues for research. First, social scientists cannot let Fidel Castro take the unbearable lightness of luck with him to the grave. Following from the efforts of cognitive psychologists to uncover our tendencies to deny luck retrospectively, further exploration of the politics of luck and how the distinction between risk and uncertainty (as uncontrollability and unknowability even of the boundaries of the possible) has been blurred would be a first critical step towards a reconceptualisation of nuclear controllability, a reconceptualisation that would place luck at the heart of political and ethical action, power and responsibility over time.126 At the empirical level, this approach would involve treating the question of ‘how close did we come to nuclear disaster’ as a starting point, and focusing on pathways towards disasters rather than patterns identified in the past and expected to bind possible futures. Second, cases of near-nuclear use need to be requalified as events worth investigating.127 Diplomatic historians and security studies scholars could fruitfully join forces independently of their views on the value of counterfactuals. Indeed, we need further investigations into the history of nuclear-armed states both to unearth primary documentation about the past security and safety record of nuclear arsenals and to allow for rigorous counterfactual thinking, going beyond risk thinking.128 Comparative critical oral histories of nuclear close calls would likewise help recover the limits of control over nuclear weapons as a legitimate object of scholarly interest. Such an approach would also tackle directly the scholarly problem of uncritical reliance on accounts from former officials, while at the same time addressing the policy problems that result from misguided assumptions of a shared experience and interpretation of events like the Crisis.129 The empirical dimension of this article is only a first step in this direction.130 This research programme allows analysts to start working against overconfidence without waiting for structural or institutional reforms and suggests that they have a responsibility to do so. Third, in security studies, it is crucial to reassert the socially and historically constructed process of valuation of nuclear weapons instead of perpetuating the widespread assumption that the destructive capability of nuclear weapons triggers adequate fear, which in turn initiates a learning process that is sufficient for existential deterrence to work everywhere. If the relevant French decision-makers were indeed adequately afraid at the time but did not leave any evidence of it, the contentions of this article would remain valid: that absence of evidence would only be additional evidence of the scholarly blinders entailed by a rejection of counterfactual thinking; in any case, and whatever the unspoken thoughts of decision-makers at the time, their public display of fearlessness would be consequential for future generations of leaders. Evidence of private doubts on the part of statesmen would only bring to the fore the need to reconnect nuclear weapons scholarship with democratic theorising and the issue of citizens’ right to know. Identifying the effects of rejecting counterfactual thinking and documenting the diverse experiences and memorialisations of nuclear danger as components of a process of valuation of nuclear weapons are ways to understand and counter overconfidence in their controllability. This is crucial for policy-relevant learning because the coexistence of this diversity of memories with the retrospective illusions of unanimity and control gives an unsettling resonance to Peter Sloterdijk’s claim: ‘the only catastrophe that seems clear to all is the catastrophe which no one survives’. 131

#### Extinction outweighs.

Farquhar et al. 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Computer Science DPhil Student at the University of Oxford. John Halstead, Political Philosophy DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Owen Cotton-Barratt, Pure Math DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Stefan Schubert, Philosophy PhD at Lund University. Haydn Belfield, a BA. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Philosophy PhD Student at the University of Oxford. [Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project, 1-23-17, [https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]//BPS](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf%5d//BPS)

In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of *intergenerational equity* according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them *nothing*. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is *a global public good*. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an *intergenerational* public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is *temporal* free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the *availability heuristic*, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### 2AC – L/T – Empire

#### Russian imperialism is infinitely worse – reject any evidence before Ukraine.

Wang 22 [Jack Wang is an Editor of News and Content at the University of Chicago, 3-7-2022, How Putin’s invasion of Ukraine connects to 19th-century Russian imperialism, University of Chicago News, https://news.uchicago.edu/story/putin-invasion-ukraine-russian-empire-19th-century-imperialism-history] Eric

In late February, Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops into Ukraine, sparking a humanitarian crisis that, according to many scholars and analysts, has upended a decades-old global order.

But while some have characterized the conflict as a return to the Cold War, one University of Chicago historian has argued that we must look further back. According to Prof. Faith Hillis, Putin doesn’t seek to resurrect the Soviet Union, but rather 19th-century imperialism—a threat made even more dangerous by modern surveillance technology.

“I think he wants to reconstitute the Russian Empire and its guiding ideologies, which were orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality—except now, under the power of a very sophisticated police state,” said Hillis, a professor of modern Russian history.